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Preface 
Lebanon is a small country in West Asia with 3,925,502 inhabitants. It was once 
recognized as an example of Muslim-Christian coexistence. The institutions with which the 
country endowed itself permitted Lebanon to deal with its religious diversity rather 
successfully (17 different communities with Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Catholic, Orthodox, and 
Maronite being the largest). 
Lebanon was first constituted as a territorial state in 1920. It was given its present 
boundaries by France in agreement with Britain, by mandate of what was then the League 
of Nations. The project for this Lebanese state, however, was originally envisaged by the 
Christian of the country more specifically, by those of the Maronite sects who acquired the 
paramount political control of the Lebanese system. The Muslim communities were never 
really consulted about the Lebanese state project before it was transformed into a reality 
and imposed upon them; and for a long timed after, these communities refused to accord 
the country their willing allegiance. 
The Maronite clergy were the first to develop the idea of a Maronite state, claiming 
that Mount Lebanon had for centuries been an independent or autonomous Maronite 
homeland. The reign of Fakhr al-Din 11 was portrayed as the high point in Lebanese history, 
which an independent polity covered the entire country. 
The Maronite Church and its patriarch took an active part in shaping Lebanon's 
political history and the establishment of a Christian state in Lebanon 1920. They were the 
first develop the idea of a Maronite state, claiming that Mount Lebanon had for centuries 
been an independent or autonomous Maronite homeland. Whit the establishment of a 
state of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the old practice of the interference by the religious 
leaders and ecclesiastical bodies in Lebanese politics continued and became more 
competitive with the addition of two new actors: the Sunnis and the Shiites. 
The modern state of Lebanon is run on a sectarian formula of power sharing dating 
back to the French mandate period. The 1943 National Pact allocated the presidency to 
Maronites and established a fixed 6:6 Christian-Muslim ratio of parliamentary seats. The 
office of prime minister was granted to the Sunni Muslim community, while the office of 
parliament speaker was granted to Shiite Muslims (originally the second and third largest 
sects, respectively). The pact also entailed a tradeoff — Christians agreed to forgo Western 
protection and accept Lebanon's "Arab face," while Muslims agreed to shelve calls for 
integration in Syria or a pan-Arab state. This coincided with the political awakening of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as an armed movement operating from Lebanese territory. 
Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war was sparked primarily by Christian-Muslim sectarian 
tensions and the alignment of Palestinian groups with the latter, but turned into a regional 
conflict involving a host of outside forces. Syrian troops entered in 1976, while the Israelis 
entered in 1982 to combat the PLO, followed b American and European peacekeepers the 
following year. All came at the invitation of leading Maronite political or militia leaders, and 
in all three cases the result was not what Christians expected. Amid this turmoil, the 
dominant Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia created a state-within-a-state, while 
advocating a "federal" system of government that would preserve Christian autonomy. 
Christians lost militarily, politically, and demographically during the civil war. In the 
late 1980s, loyalties split between the LF and the Army, led by Gen. Michel Aoun. Both 
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eventually succumbed to the Syrians; leaving the Christian community with little.leverage in 
negotiating a place in the postwar order. 
The 1989 Taif Accord reduced Christian parliamentary representation to half and 
weakened the presidency in favor of the (Sunni) prime minister. However, the Christian 
community's malaise during the occupation had less to do with Taif than with its own 
inability to forge a united front, at least on basic questions of sovereignty and democracy. 
Lebanese Christians have never been uniform in their politics. They are secular and multi-
denominational, so there is no uniform religious perspective to bring solidarity. In contrast, 
the Shiites have today closed ranks behind Hezbollah, while the Sunnis have mostly 
gravitated behind the Hariri family. 
At the time of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, four groupings were 
evident in the Christian leadership. Syria's Assad regime has always had a strong minority 
following among Lebanese Christians. Some identify with Syria's Assad regime for sectarian 
reasons, believing that Alawites are a natural ally of Christians in the face of Islamification. 
Others are ideological proponents of Lebanese-Syrian unity. 
Christian allies of Syria also include traditional political elites bound by longstanding 
business links to Damascus, such as former Health Minister Suleiman Franjieh (the grandson 
of a former president) and his extended family and network of retainers. The outgoing 
president, Emile Lahoud, and others who rose to power purely on the basis of opportunism 
during the occupation constitute another (now relatively weak) segment of the pro-Syrian 
Christian leadership. 
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This is a.  diverse category of traditional politicians, businessmen, and others who 
advocate a strong relationship with the West for cultural, economic, and political reasons. 
They tried to make the best of the Syrian occupation (which was what French and American 
officials counseled) and gained modest representation in parliament, but were largely 
marginalized during the 1990s. They formed an umbrella opposition group known as the 
Qornet Shehwan Gathering during the final years of the occupation. The Phalange Party, led 
by former President Amine Gemayel, and National Liberal Party (NLP), led by Dany 
Chamoun, is now closely aligned to this camp. 
The Christian nationalist trend is represented by the LF. Originally an outgrowth of 
the late Bashir Gemayel's Phalange militia, the LF became more narrowly sectarian in the 
1980s under the leadership of Samir Geagea. LF ideologues believe (or, at any rate, once 
believed) that Christians ultimately cannot subsume their differences with Muslims under a 
common national identity, and that Lebanon should be a federal state with autonomous 
sectarian enclaves. They too believe that a strong relationship with the West-particularly 
Washington-is central to their political aspirations. 
Michel Aoun The secular nationalist trend is represented by Aoun's Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM). The FPM is ideologically opposed to political sectarianism, federalism and 
other formulas that privilege narrow primordial ties. In his grand ambition of reforming 
Lebanon's corrupt and feeble government institutions, this popular and controversial leader 
departs from the narrow pursuit of Christian communal interests and thinks in non-sectarian 
terms. The FPM was by far the most popular Christian political force at the time of Syria's 
April 2005 withdrawal. Aoun's personal popularity stems largely from his ill-fated (but 
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pupular) 1989-1990 revolt against the Syrians and from the role of the FPM in leading 
opposition to the Syrian occupation after his exile. 
Over the next two years, Hezbollah had a falling out with the coalition and eventually 
led a Shiite boycott of the government. The FPM formed a united opposition front with the 
Hezbollah-led Shiite bloc (and with pro-Syrian politicians), jointly calling for the resignation 
of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his cabinet. Although the alignment (like the March 14 
coalition's previous pact with Hezbollah) is politically opportunistic, the FPM and Hezbollah 
have always shared similar domestic reform principles. The former general insists that 
domestic reform must precede disarmament and that he could act as an agent trusted by 
Shiites to bring about integration of Hezbollah's militia into the defense structure of the 
country. 
The main concern of Christians is not so that Hezbollah will directly harm them 
(there has been surprisingly little Shiite-Christian violence in Lebanon's history) or tries to 
Islamicize Lebanon, but that it will jeopardize the country's prosperity. Peace and political 
stability are essential to the growth of Lebanon's service economy (particularly the tourism 
sector) and necessary for much-needed Western and Arab gulf investment in Lebanon. A 
government that formally accepts Hezbollah's "resistance" indefinitely runs the risk of 
setting back the country's economic recovery and alienating the outside world. And yet 
gambling everything on foreign assurances rather than domestic concord is a road that 
Christians know can lead to catastrophe. Some Christians who loathe any form of Islamic 
fundamentalism also see no alternative to a political compromise and reform process that 
give Shiites (and, at least in the near term, Hezbollah) greater voice in government. Despite 
the immense economic toll of the July-August 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, Hezbollah 
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remains very popular among its constituents — there is no one else to talk to in the Shiite 
community. 
The most reliable hard data on Christian public opinion comes from the 2005 
parliamentary elections and the August 2007 by-election in Metn. The FPM won a large 
majority of Christian votes running against the March 14 coalition in the 2005 elections, 
though not a majority of Christian seats (most of which are in Muslim majority districts due 
to Syrian gerrymandering). Whether the vote tally signified solid support for the FPM or 
public disgust over the refusal of Hariri and Jumblatt to amend the anti-Christian electoral 
law has been much debated, but it is the main basis for Aoun's claim to represent majority 
opinion. 
The by-election took place in a district that is predominantly Maronite, politically 
conservative, and home to Amine Gemayel, who was running to fill a seat previously 
occupied by his recently assassinated son. Support for the Gemayel family is so strong in 
Metn that the FPM did not contest one seat in the district, in 2005 (allowing voters to vote 
for the FPM-led slate, while writing in the name of the late Pierre Gemayel). In the by-
election, however, the FPM candidate, an obscure physician, narrowly defeated the ex-
president. March 14 leaders pointed to the fact that a slight majority of Maronites had 
voted for Gemayel as evidence that Aoun's much vaunted majority public support had 
slipped. Some went further, complaining that Aoun had relied on the support of Armenian 
Christians (and pro-Syrian Greek Orthodox MP Michel Murr) to win the primarily Maronite 
district (drawing angry Armenian reactions). 
However, the Aounists claim that many Christians, whatever their political 
orientations, would never dream of voting against a respected elder statesman running to 
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fill his martyred son's seat under the current climate. By their reckoning, the fact that a slim 
majority was willing to "take back" the Gemayel family's seat and give it to a no-name 
candidate purely on the basis of FPM affiliation signifies impressive growth in public 
support. Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir Whatever the exact balance of Christian public opinion may 
be, the by-election affirmed a lack of consensus even if majority support for the FPM 
remains intact. Recognizing that the Christian public is divided, the Council of Maronite 
Bishops (itself said to be divided) has not taken a firm line in favor of either March 14 or the 
opposition, in spite of the fact that Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir is 
sympathetic to the former. 
The focal point of contention between the government and opposition in recent 
months has been the choice of a successor to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, whose 
term as president expired on November 24. The president is elected not by the people, but 
by parliament. However, the coalition's slim legislative majority was insufficient to 
unilaterally crown one of its own presidential candidates because of the traditional two-
thirds quorum requirement, which enables an opposition controlling over third of 
parliament to effectively veto the majority's choice by refusing to attend the vote. 
The opposition, pointing to FPM electoral victories, has supported Aoun's bid to 
become president. Aoun would easily win a direct election for president, as he can count on 
the overwhelming majority of Shiites, at least half of Christians, and perhaps a fourth of 
Sunnis and Druze to vote for him over any prospective challenger. Although willing to forgo 
the election of Aoun, the opposition said that it would attend a parliamentary session to 
elect a president only if a compromise candidate is agreed upon beforehand. Months of 
negotiations over the selection of a compromise candidate (and over side deals concerning 
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cabinet representation and other matters) ensued, but without success. There is a debate 
about whether this quorum requirement can be legally circumvented, but the ruling 
coalition ultimately backed away from such an attempt. A "50 plus one" president would 
have been severely handicapped at a time when the strengthening of government 
institutions (particularly the presidency) is seen by most Christians as vital. 
Gen. Michel Suleiman, the commander of the Lebanese Army, eventually won out 
over other "neutrals." While maintaining friendly relations with the Syrian regime that 
originally appointed him to his post, Gen. Suleiman has cultivated a reputation for efficiency 
and political neutrality since the Syrian withdrawal. He earned considerable respect in 
Washington and Paris for the army's successful war against Fatah al-Islam this past summer. 
Although both sides were in agreement that Suleiman was an acceptable compromise 
candidate as 2007 drew to a close, negotiations have since deadlocked over the formation 
of a national unity government and other matters. 
Amid reports that both pro-March 14 and opposition Christian factions are arming 
themselves, many Christians are beginning to see the peaceful election of virtually any 
president as preferable to a prolonged vacancy in the office. An extended power vacuum 
(or, God forbid, renewed civil war) could open the way for the collapse of the Taff power-
sharing system. In light of Christian demographic decline, the alternatives will be less 
attractive. An extended political crisis (and the resulting economic stagnation) will also 
cause more Christians to emigrate, further weakening the clout of those who stay behind. 
How the crisis is resolved will likely impact the Christian leadership struggle. Aoun's 
success as self assigned "ambassador" of the state and the international community for 
negotiating change with Hezbollah would also (by design, perhaps) ensure the political 
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ascendancy of the FPM, while his failure would be a boon to pro-March 14 Christian figures. 
Because short-term gains can so easily consecrate long-term political advantages to one side 
or the other, negotiations over a comprehensive political compromise are likely to be drawn 
out for quite some time as Christian disunity persists. 
In so doing, this study is concentrated on describing and analyzing four distinct 
areas, in the form of study chapters: (1) Development of Maronite Political Identity and 
Historical Background, (2) Role of Maronite Christians in the Politics of Independent 
Lebanon 1943-1975, (3) The Maronite Christians in the Aftermath of the Civil War, (4) Tail 
Accord and Constitutional Reforms - leading to significant conclusions about the over-all 
phenomenon of contemporary confessional system as ingrained in the Lebanese political 
culture and power sharing which is influenced and affected by the recent years of turmoil. 
The methodology followed in this study is inductive, analytical and descriptive. To 
get reliable and objective information, the study relied both on primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources included documents published by governments and other 
international organizations. The secondary sources include newspapers, electronic media, 
books, periodicals, journals and research reports related to the area of the study. 
The first chapter deals the historical background and development of Maronite 
political identity and traces the evolution of the Maans, and Shihabs families and 
governorate of the Mustassarrifiyya. It traces the evolution of the Maronite opinions to 
create the Christian state among the Arab countries. it is in this framework that the French 
mandatory policy and the events leading to the great effort of independence, the 
characteristics of National Pact are also discussed and examined in detail. 
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The second chapter explains the role of Maronite Christians in the politics of 
independent Lebanon since 1943 to 1975, and political structure to administration in 
contemporary of Lebanese leaders. The chapter explains about the relative political 
autonomy of the Shihabist state and his reforms. The chapter also discusses the rise and 
growth of Palestinian Resistant Movement (PRM), and Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), until the slide toward civil war. 
The third chapter focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on Lebanon, 
particularly, Israeli military policy towards Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
presence in Lebanon. The chapter also examines the causes that led to the War of 1970 and 
of 1975-76 and 1982 in Lebanon, especially, operation Litani, toward the Mounting, 
Operation Peace for Galilee and the aftermath that the Maronite Christians received from 
the War. 
The forth chapter deals the Taif Accord in detail and its impact to end the second 
Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990. The chapter highlights the 1989 Taif Accord reduced 
Christian parliamentary to half and weakened the Presidency in favor of the Sunni Prime 
Minister. The chapter also focuses the powers of President have been reduced substantially. 
And the powers of the Council of minister, chaired by Prime Minister, have been increased. 
The last section of this chapter analyses the contemporary Lebanese politicians and 
situation in Lebanon. 
The last of the concluding chapter brings together the distinctive aspects of 
Lebanese political culture of confessionalism, its varied dimensions resulting to Civil War. 
This section also attempts to investigate and analyze the Lebanese polity in the post-Taif 
Accord 1989 and its future. This chapter also attempts to discuss about the view of 
Maronite Christians and Lebanese politician leaders that look forward the unity for their 
country. Perhaps, they may seek the ways of setting conflict in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER - 
DEVELOPMENT OF MARONITE POLITICAL IDENTITY: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES: Geographic, Historical, and Cultural 
The Lebanon is in reality the medial part in a line of mountains and plateaus that 
start with the Amanus in northern Syria and end with the towering massif of Sinai. This 
medial part is the highest, most rugged, most imposing and interesting part of the whole 
maritime range. Its name Lebanon (Arabic Lubnan) is derived from a Semitic word meaning 
white as milk and refers to its snow-capped peaks which look white for about six months of 
the year, rather than to the limestone rock forming its upper layer. In fact these peaks 
maintain their white stripes throughout the year. The Lebanon is the skeleton upon which 
the flesh, the adjoining plains and lowlands, are hung. It forms the first barrier to 
communication between the Mediterranean and its eastern hinterland a barrier that is 
nowhere seriously breached. 
The mountain itself is a clearly defined unit with natural boundaries on all four sides. 
On the north it is separated from the Nusayriyah Mountains of Syria by al-Nahr al-Kabir (the 
great river, Eleutherus); on the south it is bounded by al-Qasimiyah River, giving it a length 
of a hundred and five miles. Its width varies from about thirty-five miles near Tripoli to six 
on the southern extremity. It rises to alpine heights south-east of Tripoli, where al-Qurnat 
al-Sawda (the black nook) attains a height of 11,024 feet above the. sea. Its close neighbour 
2 
Dahr al-Qadib, in whose lap the largest surviving grove of cedar trees nestles, registers by 
barometric pressure 10,018 feet.l 
The mountainous character of the land, its close proximity to the sea, its central 
location in the cradle of civilization and at the crossroads of the world, astride the great 
international highway that linked the three historic continents these are the determining 
factors in its historic career. The sea was the Eastern Mediterranean, whose waters were 
the first to carry and distribute the products of civilization, both material and cultural. The 
rockers of the cradle were in Mesopotamia and Egypt, with Lebanon in between. The land of 
which Lebanon is the backbone faces the Mediterranean, to which it gave more than it 
received; behind it lies the steppe land of Syria continued by the desert and leading into 
Central Asia. Indirectly above it stretches the former Hittite land, one of the earliest seats of 
Indo-European culture. South of it lies Palestine, birthplace of Judaism and Christianity. 
Within its own boundaries the coastal plain and the central plateau of al-Biqa provided a 
situation where contact, exchange, transfusion, transformation, transition became and 
remain the keynotes of the historical process as it unfolds itself in its lowlands; whereas in 
its highlands—out of the way if not inaccessible-conservatism, self containment, 
independence, isolation and insulation became the key words to the understanding of the 
history. 
The earliest of the historical inhabitants of Lebanon were the Semitic Canaanites, 
who also populated the neighboring part of Syria and most of Palestine. Canaanite culture 
lay at the very basis of the Israelite culture of Palestine as well as the Aramaean culture of 
Syria. Both Hebrews and Aramaeans entered the land in later times and both had to borrow 
1 
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before they gave. In religion, language, art, architecture, literature, agriculture and industry 
the Hebrew settlers drew heavily and borrowed generously from the Canaanites, later called 
Phoenicians by the Greeks. 
Meantime the Aramaeans were transmitting this same Phoenician alphabet to the 
Persians, Indians, Armenians and, most importantly-from our point of view-to the Hebrews 
in which their immortal religious literature has been expressed and to the Arabs in which 
the glorious Koran has been enshrined. 
Phoenician colonies, foci of Canaanite culture, dotted both sides of the 
Mediterranean, the northern and the southern. In the southern the point d' appui was 
Carthage, daughter of Tyre and contestant with Rome for mastery over the mid-
Mediterranean. The Carthaginians considered themselves Canaanites and were so called as 
late as the fifth century after Christ.2 
In terms of geographical change, the initial expansion from the coast toward the 
interior of the Phoenician population and the settlement of Mount Lebanon occurred under 
Roman auspices. In terms of politics, Phoenician cities enjoyed a great degree of self-rule 
during the first years of Roman dominance, but their rights were considerably eroded in 
later years.3 
The approximately three million Lebanese are divided into two major communities-
Christian and Muslim. Each constitutes about half the population. The Christians are further 
fragmented into more than a dozen sects. The largest of these are the Maronites, a Catholic 
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sect that comprises more than half - the total Christian community and has dominated 
Lebanon since the modern state was founded.4 
The story of Lebanon in modern times is the story of strangers who settled together 
in one rugged and inhospitable terrain, because of a common plight. The strangers were the 
Maronite and Druze; the terrain, the coastal mountain range on the eastern shore of the 
Mediterranean, stretching from Tripoli in the north to Sidon in the south. 
The Maronites were remnants of a once flourishing Christian population in the 
eastern Mediterranean area, while the Druze was a heterodox from the dominant political 
and cultural body of Islam. Could these strangers achieve a successful life together on the 
rocky mountains of Lebanon? The difficult mountain terrain provided for the immediate 
need for protection, but that could not alone ensure complete security for an unmolested 
existence at different periods throughout history. Foreign of soldiers have managed to 
tramp over most of Mount Lebanon. Thus it was chance that made Maronite and Druze 
neighbors. The differences that separated these two communities, in their religious beliefs, 
historical background, and areas of habitation, were gradually overcome by a process of 
integration starting around the beginning of the seventeenth century. The integrating force 
was the political institutions of the Imarah, first under the Mani dynasty (1516-1697). It is 
these political institutions and their eventual transformation during the nineteenth century 
with which this study is concerned.5 
4 
M. Graeme Bannerman,Repblic of Lebanon,The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africo,ed,by David E. Long and Bernard Reich,(Westview Press, Inc, the United States of America 
by Wesview Press,Inec,1980)Pp.213. 
5 
Iliya F. Harik,Politics and Shange in a Traditional Society Lebanon,1 711-1 845, 
(New Fersey: Princection,1968)p.12. 
The mountain is as characteristic of Lebanon as the desert is of Arabia, the Nile of 
Egypt, the twin Tigris-Euphrates of Mesopotamia, and it is as vital to its life. Its position 
radically affected its climate and rainfall, its elevation gave variety to its flora, fauna and 
scenery, and its structure hindered communication with the hinterland as it encouraged 
relationship with the West lands. Through the ages the Lebanon, thanks to its valleys and 
hills, has provided places of refuge for individuals with unpopular beliefs and for groups 
representing minorities. Christian anchorites, Moslem Sufis, Druze ascetics preferred its 
caves and recesses to the pleasures of this world. 
In the seventh century A.D., when the Muslim armies swept out of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the rugged Lebanon Mountains gradually became a refuge for Levantine 
Christians, predominantly Maronites, and other dissident groups who opposed the Islamic 
establishment. Under both the Umayyad (660-750) and the Abbasid (750-1258) caliphates, 
the Lebanese mountaineers retained a degree of political autonomy. While the Muslim 
rulers easily controlled the coastal cities, total domination of the mountain was never fully 
achieved.6 
Mount Lebanon as a political community of pluralist character goes back no further 
than the seventeenth century. The peoples of Mount Lebanon lived for centuries in separate 
geographic regions without relations with each other, except perhaps for occasional 
hostilities. The Maronites called their part of the country Mount Lebanon, and the Druze 
called their region Jabal (Mount) al Shuf or Jabal al Druze. To the extreme north, around the 
famous Cedars, lies the original home of the Maronites, which was known as Mount 
6 M. Graerne Bannerman,Repblic of Lebanon,The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa,ed,by David E. Long and Bernard Reich,(Westview Press, (nc, the United States of America by Wesview 
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Lebanon. To the south of the Maronite lands was the Jabal al Shuf, also known as Jabal al 
Druze.7 
Lebanon's history has always been closely associated with that of Syria. Before 331 
B.C. Lebanon and Syria were subject to the military conquests of such great powers as the 
Egyptians, Babylons, Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians. But they retained degrees of cultural 
and political autonomy. Between 331 B.C. and A.D. 636 the two countries were part of the 
Greek Roman and Byzantine empires. It was during this period that Christianity appeared 
and became a mature religion. 
In A,D. 636, the Arabs became the predominant power in Syria, but Lebanon, 
although "within the political orbit" of the Arabs, remained largely autonomous. While the 
neighboring countries became Muslim, the people of the mountainous region of Lebanon 
remained Christian. The cold climate there was an obstacle in the spreading of Islam. 
Nevertheless, Arabic later became in the predominant language of Lebanon and the means 
by which certain aspects of the local culture were changed. 
During the tenth and eleventh centuries, Lebanon consisted of a number of local 
principalities. Consequently, it became vulnerable to conquest by the Crusaders, who 
remained in the eastern Mediterranean until the end of the thirteenth century, when the 
Mamlukes were able to drive them out. The Mamlukes controlled Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, 
and Syria until the coming of Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century. 
Four years before the merger of Tripoli and Sidon a new and separate political entity, 
commonly known as Mount Lebanon, was created. It in clued "that part of the present 
Lebanese territory which extends roughly from the watershed of the Lebanon to the sea, 
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excluding the town of Beirut and the regions of Tripoli and Sidon. From 1861 until 1915, 
Mount Lebanon was governed by a non-Lebanese Christian appointed by the Ottoman 
sultan. It was during this time that the term "Lebanon" was first used to refer to a specific 
political entity.8 
1.1 The Maronite Church 
The Maronites trace their origin to an ascetic monk Maron from the Syrian Church 
who lived in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Most of his activities took place 
northeast of Antioch. After his death his disciples moved to what is today known as Qalat al-
Mandiq on the Orontes. There the Maronites enjoyed tremendous growth and came into 
contact with a Monophysite group, the Jacobites. Eventually the Maronites adopted the 
Jacobite Christology, later moving into Jacobite territory in North Lebanon and giving- the 
Jacobite community there the Maronite name. Labeled — and persecuted as — heretics by 
other Christians, the Maronites concentrated deep in the Mount Lebanon area where they 
were free to worship as they wished and from where they spread and "became until the 
present a dominant force in Lebanese affairs.9  
The Maronites were originally a Monothelite communion, and it was only in the late 
twelfth century that they became attached to Rome. William of Tyre, the Crusader historian 
who was contemporary to the union, related the event, and later writers on the subject 
referred to him, to the embarrassment of the Maronites. Moreover, there were several anti-
Catholic movements among the Maronites during the three centuries which followed their 
8 Dodd, Mead & company, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20 h` Century,(New York, W.F. Abboushi 
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union with Rome in c.1180.1°  These movements, though not ultimately successful, were 
widespread enough to give visiting pilgrims and missionaries from Europe an unfavourable 
impression of the community's orthodoxy, Maronite scholars, starting with Ibn al-Qila'I, rose 
to defend it and went back to the history of their community for evidence. In this manner, 
Maronite historiography developed partly as a by-product of polemics.11 
The Maronites' spoken and written language is now Arabic, but for more than three 
centuries after the Arab conquest of Syria they continued to use their national language, 
Aramaic. In the fifteenth century their language was already Arabiced, although they 
continued to use Aramaic script for Arabic words (Karshuni) until late in the eighteenth 
century. The clergy still use Syriac liturgies in the mass. The connections which developed 
between the Maronites and the Papacy in Rome had great effect upon the community and 
its church.'2 
The Maronites were predominant in the northern region of Jubayl, Batrun, and 
Bshrarri. Shi'ite Muslims formed the majority in the remainder of Lebanon. During the 
eleventh century, however, the followers of Egyptian Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim (985-1021) 
entered Lebanon. Led by the disciple Darazi, the followers joined with local Lebanese to 
form their distinctive community, which is widely known as the Druze. 
The crusades had a profound effect on the Maronites, for it was at that time that 
they were brought into union with the Roman church, establishing a link that still endures. 
In addition, the large French component among the crusaders established ties with the 
10 See Kama] S. Saiibi,"The Maronite church in the Middle Ages and its union with Rome<" in Oriens 
Christianus, XL1I (1958), p. 92-104. 
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Maronites that later generations would view as the basis of a special relationship between 
France and Lebanon.13  
For the past four centuries, the Maronite population has been growing faster than 
the ability of this mountainous area to provide a living for the people. As a result there has 
been migration. During the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century the 
Maronites moved southward through the mountains until their movement was blocked by 
the hostile reaction from the Druze community. With this avenue closed many Maronites 
began emigrating. With independence in 1943, however, the majority of those who 
previously might have left the country congregated in Lebanon's urban centers. Beirut and 
its eastern suburbs soon had the largest concentration of Maronites in Lebanon.la 
in the second half of the nineteenth century different forms of national 
consciousness developed in Lebanon. In the northern region, the Christian Maronites 
emphasized the Christian identity of Lebanon. Other Christians, such as the Greek Orthodox 
and the Greek Catholics, developed a concept of Syrian unity based upon the Arab heritage 
and culture. They advocated a secular nationalism and called for cooperation between 
Muslims and Christians. This nationalism was reinforced by an Arabic literary revival that 
took place in Lebanon in the second half of the nineteenth century.'5 
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France identified herself with Maronite interests, while Russia and Britain backed the 
Greek Orthodox Christians and the Druzes, respectively, in the 1850's, Druze-Maronite 
relations were so strained that they culminated, in 1860, in a religious war known as the 
"massacre." The causes of the war were not purely external; local conditions, mostly 
economic, also contributed." 
1.2 The Traditional Organization of the Maronites 
The Maronite church's traditional organization and its poverty were not conducive to 
making it an independent and powerful social force on the political scene. However, reform 
in the church and the integration of the Maronite areas into the emirate were favorable 
conditions for the growth of its prestige and power. Church reorganization brought about 
formal hierarchy and limited bribery in seeking religious positions. It also regulated and 
made church functions more efficient. These steps were aided by the education of the 
clergy at the Maronite college which Pope Gregory XIII opened in Rome in 1584. Integration 
of Maronite areas into the emirate had put the Maronites on an equal footing with the rest 
of the population in the secular system.' 
Traditional Maronite historiography seems to have originated as an expression of 
national pride. As a small and closely-knit community surrounded by enemies, the 
Maronites tended to be deeply interested in their own history, taking pride in having 
retained their identity through many changes of fortune. Their church, perhaps the smallest 
of the Eastern Christian communions and by no means the oldest, was the first to begin a 
16 
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tradition of attachment to Rome. More important still, it was never subject to the same 
degree of Moslem tutelage as the other Eastern Christian churches.18 
In the 1840's and 1850's, the Ottoman sultan encouraged sectarian rivalries to 
induce the Lebanese to give up their traditional autonomy and submit to a stronger 
Ottoman control. This traditional autonomy had, in a sense, been force upon the Ottoman 
sultans by the European powers, who courted the religious minorities to gain influence in 
the Middle East.19 
In 1584, Gregory XIII established the Maronite College in Rome. Often its students 
were sponsored by French clergymen operating in the Levant. Jibrail al-Qilai and Istifan al-
Duwayhi had studied in Rome and they became Maronite patriarchs. At Ayn Waraqah, 
Ghazir and Zagharta schools were erected which served to create an educated clergy. From 
western-styled educational institutions emerged the Maronite clergy of the nineteenth 
century prepared to take an active role in the government and leadership of the Maronite 
nation.20 
1.3 The Social and Political Role of the Maronites 
As a social force we can distinguish two main contributions made by the Maronite 
Church in the social development of Mt. Lebanon. The first was of an ideological nature and 
the second, purely political. The ideological question is treated first at some length. 
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The clergy were responsible for the preservation of the national self-image of the 
Maronites as a community and for their social solidarity. They achieved this by virtue of 
being, for centuries past, the bearers of the Maronite system of beliefs, national and 
religious, and also by virtue of being the agents of the transmission and dissemination of 
these beliefs regarding their self-image as a group, place in history, origins, ethnicity, their 
sacred objects, and their relations to other groups with whom they came in contact. 
The Maronites, in their views, are considered a religious-political community, distinct 
from both the Muslims of Syria and the non-Maronite Christians. The picture is one of a 
people and a religion combined in past ages forming the Maronite community.21  
While the coastal cities in Phoenicia and inner Syria were undergoing Islamization, 
the Maronite community began developing from an amalgamation of Mardite and Maronite 
Christian refugees from areas in northern Syria and along the Lebanese coast. These 
Christians were able to create for themselves a permanent sanctuary in the mountains and-
to resist Islam to such a degree that centuries passed before Arabic replaced Aramaic as the 
language of Lebanon. From their first appearance in Lebanon the Maronites were destined 
to play an important role in the history of their country. The 463 years of official Moslem 
political rule in Lebanon can be divided into three major periods: the Umayyad, from 661 to 
750; the Abbasid, from 750 to 969; and the Fatimid, from 969 to 1099.22 
Through centuries of Moslem rule, the Maronites succeeded in keeping their 
mountain homeland free of the direct political authority of Islam. Their awareness of all this, 
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no doubt, contributed to that intense national pride which inspired and was expressed in 
their historiography.23 
By 1841, the Maronites were the only political force in Lebanon with foreign 
support; a romanticized ideology, charismatic leadership under the Maronite patriarchs, 
organizational strength and military proficiency capable of challenging the Sublime Porte 
and its Lebanese allies, the Druzes.24 
1.4 The Rise of the Maronite Church as a Socio-Economic Institution 
The eclipse of the Crusader's power in the Levant did not leave the Maronites of 
Lebanon isolated from the Christian west for any significant period. Religious and 
commercial ties continued to flourish with Italy and France but, by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Franco-Maronite relationship took on a political coloration. When 
the trade agreement (capitulations) were granted by Sulayman I to Francis I, in 1534, both 
France and the Maronites stood to benefit greatly from them and, as early as 1569, the 
French flag could be seen in Lebanese ports establishing a base for French supremacy in the 
Levant. From then on, both the French and the Maronites were drawn into a closer 
relationship with one another. 
With the promotion of trade came greater political responsibility. In 1616, Sidon had 
been chosen as the site for the first French consul but, by 1622, French diplomatic prestige 
required the relocation of the consul to Beirut. King Louis XIV of France issued a 
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proclamation on April 28, 1649 which extended French protection to the Maronites. In 
1655, Nadir al-Khazin (abu Nafal) was appointed deputy French consul in Beirut and shortly 
afterwards, the status of full consul was granted to the Khazin deputy. At a council held at 
Luwayzah bear the Dog River in 1736, the Maronite church entered into complete union 
with Rome and, in the following year, King Louis XV reissued the pledge of protecting the 
Maronites. Gradually the Marronite Christians of Lebanon had opened diplomatic relations 
with France and,, by the sixteenth century, they could rely on France to protect them if it 
became necessary to request French military assistance.25  
At first, the reorganized church remained poor and completely dependent upon the 
upper class `for general support, for seats where they could carry on their religious work, 
and for the establishment and maintenance of new monasteries. In return for these 
benefits, the notable clans exercised influence over the church and secured most of the top 
offices for members of their families. Thus we see a symbiotic relationship between church 
and nobility and, in many cases, the church was an institution through which the nobility 
could exercise influence over the peasants. 
When the Khazins (Maronite lords of Kisrwan) wished to encourage Maronite 
peasants to migrate to their fiefdom, they accomplished this through the church. They also 
supplied the church with protection and influenced its policies by transferring much of their 
lands into mortmain (non-transferable ecclesiastical possession). Non-Christian lords did not 
interfere with the church, but on various occasions donated land in the south of the emirate 
for the building of monasteries. This was one means of attracting the much-needed 
25 
Antoine J. Abraham, Lebanon atMiddle-Century, (U.S.A., Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication 
Data,) Pp.69-70. 
15 
peasants to the south of the Mountain. Return for their 'altruism' came in the form of 
revenues from taxes that the church had to pay. Furthermore, Christian donor families 
regarded mortmain as investments and exercised property rights over them by having 
bishops elected from their families. 
A significant development gave much political and economic power to the clergy in 
the 18th and 19th Centuries. Around 1700 the Maronite Order of Monks was founded as an 
autonomous organization within the church. The order was formally under the bishop, but 
each monastery was in fact run by its abbot. Monks were recruited from among the 
peasants and they lived a communal and ascetic life. Since they did not need much to live 
on, they were capable of working the land and saving money to acquire more land. Seeing 
how efficient these monks were, the lords began donating more non-productive land to 
them. With so much land to cultivate, the monks encouraged Maronite peasants to 
congregate around and work for them. 'For these reasons many of the mugati'jis (feudal 
lords) preferred to see monks serving their subjects rather than the village secular priest, for 
the secular priest, as an individual working by himself was not the productive force the 
organization of the monks was. In this way, the Maronite Order of Monks became 'one of 
the largest propertied sectors of Lebanese society. These corporate bodies became wholly 
integrated into the system, which they served well. 
Towards the end of the 18th Century, as the Maronite Order of Monks became 
wealthier, a power struggle developed between it and the Maronite and Druze lords. Earlier, 
the monks had paid taxes to the lords, who took their share and passed the rest on to the 
ruler of the emirate. By the 19th Century they had begun to pay their taxes directly to the 
ruler, who was also interested in curtailing the ford's power. 
16 
The church also began to encourage the oppressed peasants to revolt against the 
feudal privileges of their lords. Because of the social and economic functions that the church 
exercised in society through its daily contacts with the people, it was capable of wielding 
more influence among the people than the lords did. Interests of both clergy and peasants 
converged against the feudal system. The clergy were capable of leading the opposition due 
to their organization, education and the communal alternative to the feudal system which 
they could offer.26  
During the preceding two the centuries the fundamental economic and political 
balance of Mount Lebanon had been upset by the growth in the Maronite population and 
their gradual migration southward from traditional strongholds in North Lebanon.27 
Another problem was the growing resentment of the industrious Maronite 
peasantry toward their oppressive feudal aristocracy. In 1858 a peasant revolt broke out. In 
the northern district, the Maronite peasantry turned against Maronite shaykhs; in the 
southern district, the Maronite peasantry rose against the.Druze aristocracy. Because the 
Druze peasantry in the south felt closer bonds with their co-religionists than with the 
Maronite peasants, the hostilities south and east of Beirut became more a religious war 
than a revolt. Thousands of Maronites were massacred by Druze and other Muslims. These 
massacres have contributed to Christian and Muslim suspicions and animosities that have 
yet to be assuaged.28  
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The French attachment to Syria and to the Maronites did not begin in 1860 with 
their intervention following the civil war on Mount Lebanon. Both French and Maronites like 
to assert that Frankish Crusaders found the Maronites to be faithful allies in a hostile 
Muslim environment during the Crusade era of 1099-1291.29 
The cultural impact of the Franks on the indigenous people of Lebanon was relatively 
minor. Naturally, the Maronites, who actively aided the Crusader cause, were most affected. 
In general, however, the East gave much more to the West than vice-versa. Perhaps the 
most profound influence of the Crusader period on Lebanese history was in architecture 
embodied in the forts, castles, and churches built by the Franks on Lebanese soil. Lebanese 
cities, when not reduced to rubble, benefited somewhat from the increase in trade resulting 
from the expanded economic channels and channels of communication which developed 
between the East and the West.3o 
In 1860, following the massacre of thousands of Christians in Mount Lebanon during 
the sanguineous civil war, it was only natural that France would intervene on behalf of its 
longtime and beloved proteges. French travelers to the Levant who visited Mount Lebanon 
have always written in remarkably warm terms about the Maronites. One, who passed 
through just after the bloody events of 1860, emphatically wrote about the Maronites the 
following words: 
Words in this spirit had become commonplace in the relationship between the 
Maronites and the French. The idea that the Maronites were in fact "Ies Francais du Levant" 
29 
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was a wish made by both sides the Maronites, who entrusted their hopes to the French, and 
the French who, on the one hand, had sincere feelings for the Maronites and, on the other, 
aspired to find a perfect collaborator for their colonial aspirations in the region. The 
affection of the French towards the Maronites and the genuine belief in France's protective 
role were important pillars of the latter's policy in Syria and Lebanon French officials, from 
1860-1920 and beyond, cultivated the idea that the Maronites were as close as one could 
get in the Orient to a civilized and noble culture.31  
2. The Emirate System and the Maronites 
When in 1514 the emergent, Constantinople-based Ottoman Turks defeated the 
Persians in Armenia and Mesopotamia, the fate of Mamluk power in the Middle East was 
decided. The Ottoman Turks advanced into Syria and conquered it in 1516. One year later, 
the Mamluks' capital at Cairo was seized by the Turkish army. Upon the conquest of Cairo 
and the remainder of Egypt the Mamluk dynasty finally ended. And so, as before, Egypt, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria became fragments of still another empire, the Ottoman, which 
lasted for the next four centuries. 
In 1516 Lebanon came under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, which established 
its capital at Istanbul. Lebanon in the sixteenth century was still a conglomeration of feudal 
fiefdoms, and the political policy of the Turks in Lebanon was similar to that of the Mamluks 
in that it gave a certain degree of autonomy to the local emirs, or lords.32 
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2.1 The Fakhr al-Din II 
When Ottoman sultan 5elim-I defeated the Mamluks (rulers of Syria and Egypt) in 
Syria in 1516, Lebanon came under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, which established 
its capital at Istanbui.33  By this time, Feudalism was firmly established in the Mountain and 
the political policy to the Turks in Lebanon was similar to that of the Maluks in that it gave a 
certain degree of autonomy to the local emirs, or lords i.e. Fakhr al din-I from the Maan 
family.3a  
The Ottomans dominated this area for the next four centuries. The Ottomans 
continued the Mamluk policy of recognizing a local Lebanese notable to rule a 
semiautonomous state. Two great dynasties reigned in the mountains of Lebanon until 
1843. The Druze house of Ma'an was paramount until 1697, reaching its zenith under Fakhr 
al-Din 11 (1586-1635). His efforts to obtain total independence for Lebanon led ultimately to 
his defeat and execution. Nevertheless, this Druze leader did much for Lebanon by 
reopening the country to the West as it had not been since the crusades. 
A one —time exile in Tuscany, Fakhr al-Din II later allied with the rulers of that Italian 
state. These ties extended beyond the political realm. The Druze leader emulated his allies 
in attempting to create a modern army. He also imported engineers and agricultural experts 
to promote better land use. These efforts, however, had only a minimal long-term impact 
on Lebanon. Of greater significance was Fakhr al-Din's encouragement of the Maronite 
peasantry to move south. Over the subsequent centuries the Maronites spread form their 
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34 
B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (A Modern Political History) (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985) p.28 
20 
northern Lebanese strongholds and slowly expanded their numbers and influence 
throughout the Lebanon Mountains.35  
The power of the Ma'n reached its zenith under Fakhr al-Din II (ruled 1586-1635) the 
grandson of emir Fakhr al Din-I, who controlled all of Lebanon and parts of northern 
Palestine and northwestern Syria around the end of the sixteenth century. Fakhr al Din-II 
was able to unite the Mountain with the Chouf (south-east of Beirut, comprises a narrow 
coastal strip, the valleys and mountains of the western slopes) into the 'Emirate of Mount 
Lebanon'. During his reign the Ottomans did not interfere much in the internal affairs of the 
emirate, since they regarded it as a 'tax farm'. Fakhr al-Din ii is famous for his unsuccessful 
attempt to break away from Ottoman rule by signing treaties with European powers and 
attempting to create a greater Lebanon. He and his son were, however, ultimately defeated 
and executed in Constantinople by the Turks in February 1635. Because of his deeds he is 
considered to be the first hero of the modern Lebanese independence movement and is 
usually thought of as the "father of modern Lebanon." 
During Fakhr al Din-Il's rule, the influence of the West in Lebanon expanded 
considerably, particularly throughout the Maronite community. Catholic missionary schools 
were established in Lebanon by France during the period as part of France's now infamous 
"civilizing mission." The Maronites were also drawing closer to Rome. The ties between the 
Maronites and the Christian West were based primarily on religion; the Lebanese Christian 
communities no doubt viewed themselves as small enclaves in a vast world of Islam. To a 
35 
M. Graerne Bannerman,Repblic of Lebanon,The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa,ed,by David E. Long and Bernard Reich,(Westview Press, Inc, the United States of America by Wesview 
Press, I n e=c,1980) Pp.208-210. 
21 
lesser extent, Maronite contacts with the West were also of a commercial nature since it 
was they who controlled Lebanon's lucrative silk industry and, therefore, the large silk trade 
with Europe.36 
Fakhr al-Din II (1585-1635), who had brought about this unification, had also 
widened the Lebanese horizon by extending his control over the Biqa, Galilee, and other 
neighboring regions. Fuwayhi reflected all this in his historical writings. Not only did he take 
interest in the history of the Druzes and the other non-Maronite communities in Lebanon, 
but he also considered the regional history of Syria. Duwayhi, however, remained primarily 
a historian of his own church and community, and much of his work was written in defence 
of Maronite perpetual Orthodoxy.37 
Although Fakhr al Din-II failed to keep it, his expression of independence for Lebanon 
lived on.38 The independent Greater Lebanon which he envisaged and for which he labored 
was attempted again by another emir, Bashir Shihab-II (1788-1840), but was not fully 
realized until 1943. 
The departure of Fakhr al Din-Il from Lebanon did not end the Maanid line. The emir 
who followed was Mulhim Maan, a nephew Fakhr aI Din-{l, gained control of the Chouf and, 
by 1658, had added the districts of Batrun and Safad to his domain. Ahmad Maan, the emir 
Muihim's son, succeeded his father in 1667. During his last years, Ahmad Maan, the emir 
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was virtually a prisoner in his own palace and died in 1697, without leaving a male 
descendant.4o 
2.2 The Shihabs 
When the Ma'n Family became extinct upon the death of Ahmad Maan in 1697, the 
House of Shihab, under Amir Bashir al-Shihab, was chosen as its successor by a national 
assembly composed of the nobility of Lebanon. In line with their political policies the 
Ottoman authorities had permitted the Lebanese emirs to meet and elect their new leader. 
The house of Shihab, first under Druze emirs and later under Maronite emirs, was to rule 
Lebanon from 1697 to 1841.a' 
The Shihabs, who in 1697 succeeded the Maans, trace their pedigree to one of the 
noblest Arabian tribes, the Quraysh.42 They originally lived in the Hawran region of 
southwestern Syria and settled in Wadi at Taim in southern Lebanon.43 Bashir Shihab-I was 
elected governor in 1697 by the council of emirs, (landlords) after the last of the Maans died 
childless. 
The house of shihab achieved the apex of its power under Bashir 11 (1788-1840), who 
was a baptized Maronite. The destruction of feudal privileges reached its climax under the 
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forceful and ambitious emir Bashir Shihab-II, who succeeded in establishing a firm control 
over and expanded Shihab realm and ruled it in the manner of an enlightened despot.44 
 
Like his famous predecessor, Fakhr al-Din II, he set for himself the goals of 
independence, modernization and progress, using for their achievement the same methods 
of bribery, intrigue, alliances and war. Toward the end of his long and checkered career, 
during which he went four times into voluntary exile, religious differences and strife 
assumed a country-wide character the intensity of which had never existed before, thus 
setting the tone of the future political life. 
Bashir's tenure in Lebanon coincided with the rule of Ahmed Pasa, the Ottoman 
governor of Lebanon. Ahmed Pasha, who was known as "the Butcher," is remembered for 
his rapacious exactions and harsh rule. And it was against him that Bashir the Great strove 
to maintain and even expand his power. Bashir levied exorbitant taxes upon his people in 
order to raise enough money to satiate the appetites of thee Ottoman lords, and in order to 
maintain his holdings he pursued a policy of instigating feuds between rival local factions, 
particularly within the Druze sect. His divide-and-conquer policies mitigated against the 
development of a strong opposition to his rule; but, as Qubain has noted, his schemes did 
not always succeed. He was forced to flee the country on several occasions. 
During the rule of Bashir lithe growth of Maronite power in Lebanon accelerated 
greatly. The rule of the Christian Shihabs began earlier in 1770, when the Maronite Emir 
Yusuf became head of the ruling house of Shihab. It was then that the Maronites first 
offered a serious challenge to the Druze over lordship in Lebanon, which had begun in the 
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early seventeenth century. And by the late eighteenth century the political and economic 
power of the Maronites had clearly surpassed that of the Druzes. 
Testimony to the clever diplomacy of Bashir II was the way in which he successfully 
walked a tightrope during Napoleon's drive to conquer the Middle East. He aided neither 
Ahmed Pasha, Ottoman governor of Lebanon, nor the French, so as to alienate neither the 
Maronites nor the Druses. As it happened, Napoleon was stopped at Acre and then forced 
to retreat from Syria and Egypt altogether. During this exceedingly volatile period Bashir II 
committed himself politically only to the extent of offering supplies to the Ottoman army as 
it advanced on the crumbling French forces in Syria. When Ahmed Pasha died in 1804, 
Bashir II emerged as the new political strongman in Lebanon; and he immediately set out to 
systematically and ruthlessly eliminate all opposition. 
On religious matters Bashir II was far more tolerant and cooperative. Unfortunately, 
religious persecution of Christians and Druses had been revived during the Ottoman 
repression of non Moslems and heretics in 1808. Salibi writes the following account of 
Bashir's reaction to this renewed policy: 
Bashir 11 for his part, encouraged Christian immigration from the Syrian interior to 
Lebanon and opened the country to the fugitives. Moreover, he invited the persecuted 
Druzes of the Aleppo region to settle in the villages of the Shuf and the Matn, and shared 
with Sheikh Bashir Janbalat the expenses of their transfer to Lebanon in 1811. At the peak of 
his glory, Bashir Shibad could stand out as the champion of persecuted Christians and 
25 
Druzes in all parts of Syria. Bashir II was a clever opportunist whose policies were always 
designed for the maintenance of his own position of power in Lebanon.45  
From the Maronite educational institutions emerged an educated elite destined to 
capture and control the government. Those men moved into the public service by virtue of 
their education and talents and often fostered the policy of the Shihabi amirs. As early as 
1825, with the eclipse of Druze power, priests, bishops and the patriarch became the 
administrative aides and advisors to Bashir II. When rational debate failed to obtain a 
patriarchical goal, the clergy could use its spiritual power to threaten the Hakim with the 
"power of the keys" to which the Christian Shihabs had to bow. When Bashir II found his 
political authority being strangled by the clergy, he strengthened his relationship with 
Ibrahim Pasha. At that point, the patriarch joined the open revolt against Bashir ri and his 
ally, bringing the whole weight of the Maronite nation to bare upon the mountain prince. 
For his efforts, the Maronite Patriarch received a diamond medal and his leadership was 
recognized by the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. The patriarch knew he had 
little to fear from the Powers, the Porte or the religious sects within Lebanon for the 
Maronites had received new arms and remained capable of ruling all Mount Lebanon. 
Should his own military power fail, the patriarch could hoist the French flag from the 
churches and the monasteries and summon aid from France directly through the patriarch's 
delegate at the French court. When the patriarch supported the candidacy or Bashir Ill, it 
was only a diplomatic ploy. He sought to have a controllable Hakim in office and one who 
would be acceptable to the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire, in order to ward off 
their encroachments on Lebanon at that time. 
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Clearly, by 1840, the Maronite establishment was the only major dynamic political 
force in Lebanon. It had energetic leadership, organizational strength and mass support to 
carry out its directives. Furthermore, the Maronites were the best equipped military force in 
Lebanon and had recourse to France in support of their policies. When Bashir III filled the 
role of Hakim he was a puppet of the Maronite clergy. From 1840 until 1860, the Maronite 
establishment began to chart a course which inevitably led to a clash with the remnants of 
Druze power over total control of Lebanon and later, with the Ottoman Empire over 
Lebanese independence. 46 
2.3 Double Qaimaqamate (The two-governorate system) 
In 1842, the Ottoman replaced Bashir-III with an Ottoman ruler. Displeased with this 
alternative, the European power intervened and called for a new arrangement within which 
they could exert more influence in Lebanon. In 1843, they initiated the two-governorate 
system. This comprised a northern governorate which was predominantly Maronite and a 
southern governorate with Druze fords but mostly Christian peasantry.47 This arrangement 
came to be known as the Double Qaimaqamate. Both officials were to be responsible to the 
governor of Sidon, who resided in Beirut. The rest of Lebanon, such as the coast and the 
Biqa Valley, was placed under the direct control of the Ottoman authorities. The Beirut- 
Damascus highway was the dividing line between the two districts.48  
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This partition of Lebanon proved to be a mistake. Animosities between the religious 
sects increased and nurtured by outside powers. The French, for example, supported the 
Christians, while the British supported the Druzes, and the Ottomans fomented strife to 
increase their control. Not surprisingly, these tensions led to conflict between Christians and 
Druzes as early as May 1845. Consequently, the European powers requested that the 
Ottoman sultan may establish order in Lebanon, and he attempted to do so by establishing 
a Majlis (council) in each of the districts. Each Majlrs was composed of members who 
represented the different religious communities and was intended to assist the deputy 
governor. 49 
2.4 The Mutasarrifyya 
The 1840s witnessed the end of the principality, the cantonization of Mount 
Lebanon and the establishment of the first confessional-based councils as governing bodies. 
And by 1858, a revolt by Maronite peasants against their Druze lords was spreading 
throughout northern Lebanon.5o  
This era of sectarian and class struggle, two decades of intermittent civil war 
between peasants and feudal chiefs and between Maronites and Druzes, culminated with 
the massacres of Lebanese and Syrian Christians in 1860. Better armed, better organized, 
more disciplined, and with significantly more competent leaders than the Christians, the 
Druzes were able to wreak havoc on their foes for four bloody months.sl  
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At this point of time, which witnessed the death of around 15,000-30,000 Christians 
and many were homeless in Levant in 1860 that Britain, France, and other powers agreed to 
send 12,000 troops to bring an end to the conflict, which had also spread to Damascus. 
When, however, 7,000 French troops landed in Lebanon, the Ottoman ruler Fuad Pasha was 
already in full control of the situation. He had already clamped down on those directly 
responsible for the massacres. 
As a subsequent development, in the autumn of 1860, an international commission 
met to negotiate an agreement for the political reorganization of Lebanon. The commission 
represented Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and was presided over by Fuad 
Pasha, who represented Ottoman interests. Eight months after its first meeting on 5 
October 1860, on 9 June 1861, the commission reached an agreement, 'the Reglement 
Organique' comprising 17 articles. This accord established the Mutassarrifiyya (the two 
governorates) under an Ottoman ruler and abolished feudalism in the Mountain. 
Under the new Ottoman administration, which lasted until 1915, Lebanon was 
divided into six (later seven) districts according to the distribution of religions in the 
population.52 The appointment of Mutassarrif (governor) was appointed by the Ottoman 
Sultan, subject to the approval of the European powers. The designate Ottoman governor 
(the Mutassarrif) was always a non-Lebanese Christian and an Ottoman subject. He used to 
receive support by a central administrative council of twelve and locally recruited police 
force, civil service and gendarmerie. The whole arrangement was to be under European 
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power protection. This council was to be made up of four Maronites, three Druzes, two 
Greek Orthodox, one Shiite, one Sunni (both Muslim sects) and one Greek Catholic 53 
The Mutassarrifiyya (governorate) used to comprise Mount Lebanon with the 
exclusion of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon and the valley of the Biqa (the fertile alluvial plain 
between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon).
54  
Each district was run by a governor aide, picked from the local population, who was 
assisted by a council of three to six representatives of the various sects. Deir al-Kamar, a 
Christian town, was the seat of the government. To appease the weakened nobility, the 
governors appointed them to the central council. In this new arrangement, Druze and 
Maronite peasants agitated for ownership of agricultural land and equitable representation. 
Maronite peasants, however, left the Mountain, as land became too scarce and expensive 
for them to own. Although a stable Mount Lebanon was conducive to French political and 
economic interests, this did not prevent the French from attempting to gain a better 
position in the Mountain vis-a-vis the other powers. To this end, France encouraged the 
Maronite Yusuf Karam to rebel against Daoud Pasha, the first Ottoman governor, whose 
appointment was not popular with the Maronites. Before Fuad Pasha had gained control of 
the 1860 events, Karam was promised the governorship by the big powers. This was 
probably one reason why he and others in the north did not move to aid the southern 
peasants in 1860. France began promoting Karam as a national hero who was seeking more 
political independence for Lebanon. This French move failed, however, and Karam was 
subsequently banished from the Mutassarrifiyya. For the next 53 years the region 
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maintained stability. However, instead of political representation being based on class lines 
openly and directly, the Mutassarrifiyya system legitimized sectarian representation and 
foreign intervention in Lebanon and in the area generally. 
Even after the Karam debacle, France did not stop trying to improve her position in 
Lebanon. Through other surrogates, such as Paul Nujaym and Jesuit father Henri Lammans, 
France tried to promote Lebanese nationalism. Writing from Paris, the Lebanese Nujaym 
agitated for Lebanese territorial expansion that was in congruence with French 
expansionism at that time. Nujaym wrote.5s  
The government of the mountain maintained its own judiciary and preserved order 
by a local militia. 
Da'ud Effendi Pasha, an Armenian by birth, Roman Catholic by persuasion, director 
of the telegraph at Constantinople and author of a French work on Anglo-Saxon laws, was 
appointed as the first governor. 
However, a number of Mutassarrifs (governors) ruled the country efficiently and 
conscientiously until Ohannes Koyoumjian Pasha (1912-1915), the last in the series and like 
the first an Armenian, was replaced in August 1915 by a Turkish. Direct Turkish rule 
continued till the end of the World War 1.56 
The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 brought for Lebanon further problems, 
when Turkey entered the War as an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary (Central Powers) 
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and found themselves at war with Britain, which had been there major prop throughout 
most of the nineteenth century. Ottoman authorities used the opportunity to occupy 
Lebanon and Syria and to exercise direct rule over them and appointed Jamal Pasha, the 
minister of the navy, as the commander in chief of the Turkish forces in Syria, with 
discretionary powers.s' The next year, they suspended the Mutssarrifiyya, the privileges 
which Lebanon had enjoyed since 1861, and recalled the Armenian Mutassarrif, Ohannes 
Pasha, to Istanbul, annulling the Reglement and abolishing the Administrative Council. Jamal 
Pasha then subsequently appointed Muslim Governors for Lebanese: Ali Munif Pasha (1915-
1917), Isma'il Haqqi Pasha (1917-1918), and Mumtaz Pasha (July-September 1918).58 
The end of World War I witnessed major changes in West Asian geopolitical 
configuration. Having been the recipient of series of agreements and treaties such as the 
Sykes-Picot agreement, Balfour Declaration, and Sherif Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 
the region underwent many changes. In fact, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire opened 
the opportunity to the nations of the West Asia, and more precisely to its nationalist 
movements, to attempt to achieve their historical goals.59 
3. Lebanese Under French Mandate 
After signing the Acre Armistice, General Charles de Gaulle visited Lebanon, officially 
ending Vichy control, and the French subsequently replaced the High commissioner by a 
Delegate-General. Lebanese national leaders took the opportunity to ask de Gaulle to end 
the French Mandate and unconditionally recognize Lebanon's independence. As a result of 
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national and international pressure, on November 26, 1941, General Georges Catroux, 
Delegate-General under de Gaulle, proclaimed the independence of Lebanon in the name of 
his government. The United State, British, the Soviet Union, the Arab States, and certain 
Asian countries recognized this independence, and some of them exchanged ambassadors 
with Beirut. However, even though the French technically recognized Lebanon's 
independence, French, continued to exercise authority.60 The new government provided for 
the appointment of a Cabinet representing Lebanon regionally and confessionally. Under 
this new arrangement, the security forces and organizations were to be subjected to war 
needs; that France's privileged position resulting from centuries of association and the 
holding of the mandate was to be maintained; and that the treaty of 1936 was to be the 
basis for future Franco-Lebanese relations.61  
General elections were held, and on September 21, 1943, the new Chamber of 
Deputies elected Bishara al Khouri as president. He appointed Reyad as Sulh (also cited a 
Solh) as prime minister and asked him to form the first government of independent 
Lebanon. On November 8, 1943, the Chamber of Deputies amended the Constitution, 
abolishing the articles that referred to the Mandate and modifying those that specified the 
powers of the high commissioner, thus, unilaterally ending the Mandate in 1943. This day 
has been celebrated as Independence Day in Lebanon. 
The foundations the new Lebanese state were established in 1943 by an unwritten 
agreement between the two most prominent Christian and Muslim leaders, Khouri and 
Sulh. The contents of this agreement, later known as the National Pact or National Covenant 
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(al-Mithaq al-Watani), were approved and supported by their follower.62 The National Pact 
laid down four principles. 
1. Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. The Christian communities 
were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the Muslim communities were 
to protect the independence of Lebanon and prevent its merger with any Arab 
state. 
2. Although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its official language, it could 
not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, which had helped it 
attain such a notable degree of progress. 
3. Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states,. should cooperate with the 
other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, it should not side with one 
state against another. 
4. Public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized 
religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be given to 
competence without regard to confessional considerations.63  
Moreover, according to this accord the three to government positions should be 
distributed as follows: the President of Republic should be a Maronite; the Prime Minister, a 
Sunni Muslim; and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shiite Muslim; the Deputy 
Speaker, Greek Orthodox; the Defense Minister, Druze; and the Commander of the Military, 
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Maronite Christian. The ratio of deputies was to be six Christians to five Muslims. Post in 
the civil service, the judiciary, he military, and seats in the parliament itself were allocated 
according to the sectarian distributions reported in the 1932 census. On that basis, the 
ninety-nine-members Chamber of Deputies allocated fifty-four seats to Christians and forty-
five to non-Christians (Muslim and Druze). Since neither the Christian nor non-Christian 
sides were doctrinally homogeneous, each major sect was also jealous of its proper 
representation. 
Table 
Allocation of Seats in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 
According to Religious Sect 1943 
Christians (54) 	 Non-Christians (451 
Maronites 	20 	Sunni Muslim 	20 
Greek Orthodox 	11 	Shiite Muslims 	19 
Greek Catholic 	6 	Druze 	 6 
Armenian Orthodox 4 
Minorities 	3 
Source: Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon 
(New York: Random House,1968) p.23. 
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In addition, the Lebanese constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and respect 
for the religious interests of each community.65 
 
An analysis of Lebanon under the mandate (1920-43) would focus on the very close 
ties that evolved between the French and the Lebanese, primarily the Christians. However, 
it would also reveal the limits to that relationship, for example, that the Christian Lebanese 
would not subvert their own interests as Lebanese citizens for the sake of the French. The 
mandate period also gave rise to the political framework for the modern Lebanese state, a 
framework so delicate yet so workable that the principles remained sacrosanct for over 
three decades as the foundation for balance in Lebanese society. The framework consisted 
of the Lebanese constitution and the unwritten national pact.66 
The National Pact of 1943 represented much more than a rudimentary basis for 
political co-operation between Muslims and Christians in an independent polity. It also 
signified the fundamental unity of Christian and Muslim members of the commercial-
financial bourgeoisie a unity temporarily threatened during the period of the French 
Mandate. By working together in an independent Lebanon, the Muslim and Christian 
bourgeoisies could build a trading and banking centre which would serve as an entrepot for 
the West and the Arab world. Thus the unwritten National Pact, essentially drawn up by 
Bishara al-Khuri and Riyad as-Sulh, might have appeared to have been an agreement 
between the Maronite and Sunni communities, which were then considered to be the 
largest and leading sects in the Christian and Muslim confessions, but it also established a 
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political alliance between two 'fractions' of the bourgeoisie with respective economic 
interests in the West and the Arab hinterland. As time passed it became clear that Muslims 
actually outnumbered Christians in Lebanon and that the Shi'ites were the largest 
community of all. Nevertheless, it remained in the Muslim bourgeoisie's interest to keep to 
an arrangement which ensured that Christian deputies outnumbered Muslims in the 
Parliament and that the Presidency was reserved for a Maronite, because increased 
representation for Muslim would certainly have stimulated the communal hostility of many 
Christians, thus threatening the bourgeois alliance, and it might also have led to radical and 
socialist forces capturing control of state institutions. 67 
3.1 Confessional System and Lebanon 
The confessional system is a term used to designate the political system that has 
been in force in Lebanon since 1926.68 The roots of confessionalism go back to the millet 
system formed in the Ottoman Empire as early as the sixteenth century.69 Under this 
system, different lateral 'nationalities' (Christian, Jewish) were recognized alongside Islam 
and were governed, and were governed, often by their religious leaders, according to their 
own laws. It was, however, the direct intervention of the European powers that accelerated 
the genesis of confessionalism.70 
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After the civil conflicts of 1860 and the French intervention, the Lebanese question 
became a European one. A 'comprehensive settlement' was imposed on Mount Lebanon 
(4500 sq. km, less than half the present country), which henceforth was directly answerable 
to the Ottoman state. An administrative council was formed, comprising representatives of 
the six principal religious groups: Maronites, Druze, Sunni, Shiite, Greek Orthodox and Greek 
Catholic 71  Mount Lebanon, with its large Maronite majority, was divided into seven 
mudiriyyat or administrations: four Maronites, one Druze, one Greek Orthodox and one 
Greek Catholic.72 The sectarianism established in this way was in subsequent years 
reinforced by European power taking it upon themselves to defend a particular community: 
France championed the Maronites, British the Druze, and Russia the Greek Orthodox.73 In 
1920, France was given Mandate over the region and separated Greater Lebanon (with its 
present borders) from what was to become Syria.74 
Three factors helped confessionalism to take root: 
1. Within the new frontiers, the Christians were just in the majority, but the fear of 
being submerged by Islam revived their sense of unity and made them 
determined to maintain their power. 
2. At the beginning of 1926, the status of political community was accorded to the 
Shiite, who until then had been part of the Sunni legal sphere. 
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3. Finally, article 95 of the Constitution of 1926 stipulated, 'As a temporary 
measure, and with the intention of establishing justice and harmony, 
communities will have equal representation in public office, and in the 
composition of ministries'.75  
This temporary measure is still in force to fill date. In the meantime, 17 religious persuasion! 
or `confessions' have been officially recognized, each of which operates along essentiall 
tribal or ethnic lines. In matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance), eacl 
community has its own rules. Civil marriage, therefore, does not exist. In the field of politics 
the rules were laid down by a pact concluded between community leaders in 1943.76 
3.2 Working of the Confessional System 
The confessional system outlined in the National Pact was a matter of expediency 
an interim measure to overcome philosophical divisions between Christian and Muslim 
leaders at independence.77 It was hoped that once the business of government got under 
way, and as national spirit grew, the importance of confessionalism in the political structure 
would diminish. Over the years, the frequent political disputes — the most notable of which 
were manifested in the 1958 Civil War, the Palestinian controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the 1975 Civil War — bear stark testimony to the failure of the National Pact as a means 
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toward societal integration.78  In this regard, John Entelis, a prominent "Lebanologist," wrote 
about the Pact: 
The Mithaq al-Watani, National Pact, managed to resolve only part of the identity 
dilemma. It was, in fact, a pragmatic arrangement which, by establishing coexistence 
rather than conflict as the basis of relations between the religious communities, 
discouraged the rise of "irrational" confessionalism and, consequently, prevented 
the possible dissolution of the state. Nevertheless, the Mithaq (Pact) was not meant 
as a long-term formula for national unity; rather it was a temporary accommodative 
measure by which conflict could be minimized 79 
Thus, the National Pact merely perpetuated the power of the privileged. The Pact, combined 
with the system of zu'ama clientelism, guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo and 
the continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites.80 
The significance of these new developments was not lost upon the Maronite 
community. A section of the Maronite community correctly saw that it was just not possible 
to establish a Christian state in the Lebanon without backing of the French. Preserving the 
territorial integrity of greater Lebanon and the Maronite gains already mage was now more 
important. This realization brought to before a moderate group which advocated 
pragmatism. Led by Bishara al-Khoury, it felt that it was urgently necessary to co-opt 
nationalist Muslim Leaders into the political power structure and win their confidence in 
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order to preserve the viability and independence of Greater Lebanon. The response of the 
Muslim leaders to this offer of cooperation was positive.81  
Under British tutorship, Bishara Khoury and the Lebanese Sunnite pan-Arab leader 
Riyad Solh hammered out an unwritten agreement know as the National Pact which 
provided the basis for Lebanon's independence from the French in 1943. 
The essence of this agreement was Moslem renunciation of the aim of Arab union 
(their enosis complex) in return for Christian renunciation of Western (French) protection 
(their metropolitan complex), Corollary to this was a reinterpretation of the constitution 
provisions for the "equitable" distribution of seats in the executive and legislative branches 
of government in such a way as to approximate more closely to proportional 
representation. The ratio agreed upon was 6:5 in favor of the Christians. This may or may 
not have reflected the actual distribution of the population between Christians and 
Moslems. But it was based on the assumption that the Moslems had acquiesced in this 
weighting of the system in favor of the Christians, irrespective of demographic realities, in 
order to allay Christian minoritarian fears of engulfment by the overall regional Moslem 
majority. The implied reason for this Moslem "concession" was that the relatively large 
Christian community of Lebanon made it sui generis among the predominantly Moslem 
Arab countries, requiring the adoption of a "noblesse oblige" attitude towards Lebanese 
Christian and particularly Maronite susceptibilities.82 
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The Modern Lebanese system evolved out of a unique historical experience. Fully 
aware of this background, two Lebanese leaders, Bishara al-Khouri (a Maronite Christian) 
and Reyad al-Sulh (a Sunni Muslim) drafted the National Pact of 1943 with the British help. 
The Pact formally addressed two thorny problems that the new stated face: internal 
distribution of power, and national character with respect to external relations.83  
The "National Pact" expressed the difference as well as the unity of the sects. All 
might speak of a Lebanese nation, and of equality among the sects, but they meant different 
things. For some, Lebanon was still essentially a Maronite national home, for others a 
Christian refuge, a secular state based on a scarcely existing national unity, or perhaps a 
temporary expedient until a broad, secular Arab state should be ready to absorb it. These 
concepts expressed themselves in different nationalist movements and parties—Lebanese, 
"Syrian," and Arab—but behind them there lay different religious loyalties, still the 
fundamental reality in Lebanese society. 
This clash of political views was taking place in a society in the process of rapid 
change, where the balance of population between Christians and Muslims was shifting to 
the advantage of the second, and where the balance between town and countryside was 
also shifting. 
A small, weak country, lying in an important position, cannot prevent its internal 
conflicts from becoming the channels through which great powers win influence and pursue 
their rivalries; by its position and the nature of its population, Lebanon lay open to waves of 
influence from America, western Europe, and from the Arab world lying all around.84 
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Under pressure from Britain the Gaullists were forced to hold free elections to the 
Lebanese parliament in the summer of 1943. The elections resulted in a victory for Bishara 
al-Khoury's constitutional Bloc over Emile Republic on 21 September 1943. One of his first 
acts as president was to conclude a verbal agreement with the popular Sunni Prime 
Minister, rid al- Sulh. This agreement is known as the national Pact. It said that the Lebanon 
would be a completely independent sovereign State and that the Christians would not seek 
foreign protection or tries to place the country under foreign control. Likewise it provided 
that the Muslims would not maneuver the Lebanon into any political union with Syria or 
into any form of Arab union. Further, the National Pact laid down that public offices in the 
Lebanon were to be distributed equitably among the recognized sects, that the president of 
the republic would invariably be a member of the Maronite community, and that the prime 
Minister would be a member of the Sunni community. This verbal agreement was followed 
by a unilateral declaration of independence by the Lebanese chamber of deputies, which 
met on 8 November 1943 and amended the constitution so as to eliminate all mandatory 
restrictions. Though the National Pact enabled the country to become independent, it did 
not lead to a resolution of the deep-seated sectarian differences.as 
The National Pact institutionalized a distribution of political power along 
confessional lines, based on each group's proportional size in the census of 1932 which 
found Christians to be a majority and Muslims a minority. Thus, the President would always 
be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies a Shiite Muslim, and the Deputy Speaker a Greek Orthodox Christian. Similarly the 
position of Ministry of Foreign Affairs went to a Greek Orthodox, the Ministry of Defense to 
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a Druze and the Commander of the Military to Maronite Christian.$6 The representation in 
the Parliament and in the Cabinet was also allocated along confessional lines — six Christians 
for every five Muslims. The system was designed, in large part, to alleviate Christian fears 
that their regional minority status would somehow impinge on their historical national 
majority status in Lebanon. In return for some advantages in internal affairs, the Christians 
agreed to membership in the Arab community with special reservations. 87 
Theoretically, confessionalism, if administered well, institutionalizes channels of 
cooperation, places high national value on accommodation and unity, and promotes 
moderation rather than extremism. Because Lebanese confessionalism recognizes the 
religious identity of communities and guarantees multiple channels of access to the national 
leadership, it can be a stabilizing and integrative force. But, political, ideological, and 
strategic polarization in the West Asia produced turbulence in the area which found its way, 
in one form or another, into Lebanon and consequently made a mockery of confessionalism 
and breached the sprit of the National Pact repeatedly.88 
Full formal independence for Lebanon in 1946 did not mark a new beginning, 
although it finally removed the French as players in its internal affairs. It was the National 
Pact of three years previously that was a more important milestone in the development of 
modern Lebanon. In essence the Pact was an (unwritten) constitutional arrangement 
accommodating sectarian differences prevalent at that time, and marked the culmination of 
a growing rapprochement between Maronite and Sunni elites. Although an important 
reference point in the short history of Lebanon, it represented in practice, as far as domestic 
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politics were concerned, little more than fine tuning of previous sectarian power-sharing 
formulas between the two principal participants, with provision for participation by other 
religious groups. Domestically it entrenched a rigid system of sharing out the three top jobs: 
a Christian President, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shi'a Speaker of Parliament. The Druze, 
further down the pecking order, were to provide the Foreign Minister as their allotted perk. 
This system of government by triumvirate remained in place at the end of the twentieth 
century. The Pact, despite attempts by the French to retain some say in Lebanese affairs, 
paved the way for an independent Lebanon this being a goal for-.Christians and Sunnis alike. 
Yet from 1943 until 1975, with one hiccup in 1958, the Lebanese political system was 
seemingly successful in providing a basis for considerable political freedom and prosperity.89 
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Role of Maronite Christians in the Politics of independent Lebanon: 1943-1975 
1. The Christians' Political Role in Independent Lebanon, 1943-75 
After emerging triumphant over the French in 1943, Lebanon set a course of 
economic and foreign relations designed to ensure its stability in the Mediterranean area 
and in the world at large. The national pact, designed to provide adequate representation of 
Lebanon's major religious communities in the political system, and the Lebanese 
constitution were to guarantee that the country's affairs would not fall under the control of 
any one religious group. 
The Christians were able to outpace Lebanon's other religious communities in the 
race for political and economic strength for a variety of reasons. First, their close relations 
with the West generally, and France in particular, combined with the entrepreneurial 
traditions and commercial philosophies of Lebanese culture to produce a situation in which 
modernization in its most Western aspects was acceptable and indeed coveted, not suspect. 
In addition, the Christians took maximum advantage of Western educational institu- 
tions both in Lebanon and in Europe, recognized how to obtain maximum benefit from the 
position of national leadership in which they found themselves at the time of independence, 
organized effective political and paramilitary organizations bent on maintaining the status 
quo, optimally exploited governmental structures and processes favorable to Christian 
interests, played an instrumental role in establishing a service-based economy designed to 
take advantage of managerial and business skills belonging to the educated elite of Lebanon 
(largely, though not entirely, composed of Christians), and, almost paradoxically, did not 
attempt to dominate completely the country and its affairs. This last element is significant 
because the fact that the other communities did have a strong (although perhaps not strong 
enough) voice in planning Lebanon's course gave them, too, a real interest in the state. 
Thus, Christian political domination of Lebanon has not been the result of a 
conspiracy. In fact, many Lebanese Christians, regardless of their denominational affiliation, 
are much less concerned with politics than they are with day-to-day survival, Many of them 
live in religiously mixed villages, are of the same economic status as the poorest elements of 
the non-Christian communities, and are much more tied to family loyalties than they are to 
the Lebanese state. Rather, actions that have tended to increase Christian political power 
and economic security have been as much reactionary as planned and have often been 
undertaken with the poor in mind as well as or rather than the rich, Many also have been 
taken with the sake of the state of Lebanon in mind, if only to ensure Lebanon's survival as a 
Christian homeland in the Middle East. The political role of Lebanon's Christians up to the 
start of the civil war can best be described by an analysis of the Christian-led political 
parties, their leaders, support, and policies.90 
1.1 The Power Structure: Political Parties 
In Lebanon, political parties have little influence on the outcome of elections. The 
feudal-sectarian elements of political power are so strong that they have been able to limit 
party influence. Nevertheless, parties do play an important role. First some of them have 
kept a close watch on the traditionalist political leaders, thereby forcing these leaders to 
unite in a time of crisis. By attempting to woo the masses of people to their side, they have 
forced the traditionalist leaders to pay some attention to the demands of the people. Thus, 
there had been no political parties in Lebanon, the traditionalist, leaders would have been 
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less responsive to popular demands for political participation and more rigid in the use of 
political, authority, and Lebanese political parties have been an. important factor in 
changing the traditionalist leader from a feudal ford to a modern political "boss." Secondly, 
political parties, mainly the doctrinal parties, have influence outside the government. Some 
of them, like the Syrian Social Nationalist party (P.P.S.) and the Communist party have 
strong organizations, and their appeal, though limited, is politically significant. Their 
effectiveness cannot be measured by their numerical size; it is their militancy that makes 
them important. Sometimes, their activity threatens the life of a government and, more 
important, the country's sovereign existence. 
The most important Lebanese doctrinal party is the Syrian Social Nationalist party. It 
was the first genuine partly—having an organization, a program, and a comprehensive 
ideology—established in any part of the Fertile Crescent. It was founded by Antun Saadeh, a 
Lebanese intellectual who spent part of his life in Latin America as an immigrant. Well read 
in political and social literature, Saadeh attempted to formulate a political and social 
philosophy to suit a Middle Eastern environment. He saw in the geographic environment of 
"natural Syria" the necessary elements for constructing a national identity to include all of 
the people of that environment. 
The party has organizations in Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq. Before the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1967, Nasser's appeal in these countries diminished the influence of the P.P.S. Since 
the war, the party has tried unsuccessfully to rejuvenate its organization. Most of its leaders 
have been in prison since the attempted coup in 1961. In any case, no leader of Saadeh's 
capability has emerged. A second party, of a different kind, is the Phalanges (Kata'ib) party. 
It was established in 1937 as a youth movement but after independence, it became a party 
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with an organization and a program. The leader of the Phalanges possesses virtually 
absolute authority over the members, and the party maintains a paramilitary force. 
The Phalanges believes in the sovereign independence of Lebanon. It considers the 
country to be a complete geographic and historical entity and the people of Lebanon, to 
constitute a nation. Consequently, the party opposes the incorporation of Lebanon into any 
Arab or Syrian unity. Although the party's official doctrine is secular, it is identified with the 
Maronite community. In fact, the party's emphasis on Lebanese independence and its 
negative attitude toward the Arab world arc largely motivated by its desire to keep Lebanon 
a Christian country dominated by the Maronites. 
Lebanon has other parties but they are basically groupings made up of personal folio 
wings of some traditional leaders; they support the stains quo, which is sectarian and 
feudal. Among these are the Constitutional Bloc and the National Bloc, both of which were 
founded in 1934 by two former presidents, Bishara al-Khoury and Emile Edde. There is also 
the National Liberal party, which was founded in 1958 by Camille Chamoun, also a former 
president. These parties are more successful in elections than the parties which are mostly 
doctrinal. Their success, however, is limited and is due to the traditionalism of the power 
structure and the modernism,of the party concept.91 
1.2 Political Structure 
The system of government bequeathed to the Lebanese by the French "at the time 
Lebanon gained its independence was modeled after that of France but took into account 
the peculiarities of the Lebanese situation. The two principal pillars on which the Lebanese 
governing system is based are the constitution and the informal National Covenant. While 
91 W. F. Abboushi University of Cincinnati, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20t~' Century, ( Dodd, 
Mead & Company New York,1971,) p.296-298. 
E, 
the constitution generally establishes a three-branch governmental system, Article 95 gives 
it a peculiarly Lebanese flavor by providing that religious communities shall be equitably 
represented in government, employment, and key ruling bodies including the cabinet and 
the Chamber of Deputies. 
The unwritten National Covenant of 1943, however, is the vehicle through which this 
idea has been elaborated and the unique political system fashioned. The system was one in 
which each of Lebanon's independent-minded religious communities felt its interests were 
adequately defended and a fair share of government largesse--bureaucratic positions, 
public works projects, scholarships, etc.—was received. The impact of this confessional 
system was felt throughout society. 
The unicameral legislature, the Chamber of Deputies, is the primary vehicle used for 
preserving communal interests. There are ninety-nine deputies in the chamber. The seats 
are distributed on both a confessional and a geographical basis. They are allocated to the 
various religious communities on the basis of the 1932 census. A new census has not been 
taken primarily because several groups fear that their influence might be reduced by the 
redistribution of power that would follow a new census. 
The Lebanese central government was given only limited powers. The central 
Lebanese government in contrast to most modern states provided only a minimum of 
services. It was truly laissez-faire. Private organizations, mainly religious, were permitted to 
provide a wide range of functions such as education, welfare, health services, and when one 
considers the paramilitary forces of semi feudal regional leaders, even internal security.92 
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In the first period, three regimes may be identified: Khoury (1941-52), Chamoun 
(1952-58) and Chehab (1958-64). The first regime was over-thrown through mass action in 
the form of pressure from capitalist class fractions that were not dominant in the power 
bloc, with other classes acting as supporting classes (workers, peasants and petty 
bourgeoisie). The second regime fought a civil war against opposition that perceived 
Chamoun to be working to undermine its political and economic interests. The Chehab 
regime allowed space for the old Chamoun opposition to develop some strength. For the 
first time in Lebanon's history certain kinds of political and economic reforms were 
attempted under Chehab. These attempts strengthened the position of the progressive 
forces within the opposition on the mass level. 
The second period includes two regimes: Helou (1964-70) and Franjieh (1970-75). 
Helou's regime witnessed economic dislocations and political upheavals that anticipated the 
1975 conflict. This regime and Franlieh's are particularly important to study in order to 
determine the relations of forces at the conjuncture on the eve of the 1975 conflict. It was 
stated earlier that the political and economic structures in Lebanon developed to such an 
extent that they became conducive to the ascendancy of the comprador bourgeoisie at the 
expense of the other classes in the Lebanese social formation. The political economy of 
Lebanon also shows that the services sector was dominant and that even the industrial and 
agricultural sectors were mainly geared towards exports.93 
1.3 The Khoury Administration: 1943-1952 
Under the administration of President Bishara Khoury the rules of the game of the 
confessional system were applied and developed in the new circumstances of 
independence. The leaders of the various sects were clearly the principal players and 
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beneficiaries of the system. The three' highest posts, in order of precedence according to 
protocol, of President, Speaker of the House, and Prime Minister went respectively to the 
Christian Maronites, Moslem Shiites, and Moslem Sunnites. (The Speaker's role was more 
ceremonial than political.) It also became clear that none of the sects was monolithic and 
that intense rivalries existed among the leaders of each sect, generating cross-cutting 
influences which bolstered the system, the crucial role of the President" emerged, as well as 
the importance of a working rapport between Maronite President and Sunnite Prime 
Minister. The President was faced with the challenge of preserving the privileged position of 
the Christians while appearing to transcend his loyalties to them. The Prime Minister had to 
reconcile his position as Number Two with his role as an equal partner to the President in 
his capacity as the representative of the Moslem party to the National Pact of 1943. 
Khoury's foreign policy balanced moves popular in Moslem circles with moves 
popular with the Christians. His involvement in the Palestine War of 1948 and his admission 
of some 150,000 Palestinian refugees was of the first kind, although many Christians also 
approved these policies. The termination of the economic union with Syria in 1950 (a relic of 
the French joint mandate over both countries) was of the second kind. 
With the end of economic union with Syria the laissez-faire and service-oriented 
trend in the Lebanese economy became firmly entrenched. The 1948 Palestine War brought 
with it a considerable influx of the talent and wealth of the Palestinian bourgeoisie, as well 
as the diversion of the regional transit traffic (because of the establishment of the state of 
Israel) from Haifa to Beirut. But Khoury's Achilles heel was his -- nepotism and the growing 
corruption of his administration. These, and his decision to amend the Constitution to 
secure his reelection, eventually rallied a powerful coalition of sectarian leaders, both 
Christian and Moslem, against him. When a national strike was declared demanding his 
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resignation, Khoury called on the Maronite Army Commander General Fuad Chehab to 
break it. In a coup d d'etat by omission, Chehab demurred and Khoury resigned. His 
successor was Camille Chamoun, a former supporter of Khoury under the French 
Mandate.94 
1.4 The Chamoun Administration: 1952-1958 
President Camille Chamoun, who succeeded Khoury in 1952, tried to reduce the 
rural za'ims' power and also moved against some of the traditional urban bosses. This may 
have been part of an attempt to rationalize the Lebanese state and make it a more effective 
instrument for the bourgeoisie. Chamoun's encounter with what some Lebanese came to 
call 'political feudalism' (al-iqta 'as-siyasi) provoked many of the urban and rural za'ims into 
allying with the Nasserists in Lebanon's first civil war.9$ 
Lebanon's first civil war is one of the conflicts which should be mentioned here is 
Muslim disaffection from the regime of Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon between 
1952 and 1958. Chamoun was overtly pro-Western in his foreign policy, having no sympathy 
for the Egyptian President's neutralism and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. His 
opposition to President Nasser gave rise to the charge that Chamoun was acting against the 
terms of the National Pact of 1943; and in Beirut and other cities Nasserism quickly became 
the ideology of the Muslim menu people, who were not only attracted by Nasser's 
charismatic leadership of the Arab world but also felt the post-war economic boom was not 
benefiting them as much as the more prosperous Christian community. Muslim za'ims 
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responded to this by claiming to be Nasserists themselves, and although they sought to 
contain their clienteles, a combination of popular pressure and presidential incompetence 
led eventually to a full scale insurrection which lasted throughout the summer of 1958. With 
some justification, President Chamoun charged that Lebanese independence was being 
undermined by the UAR (United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria) and called for American 
assistance under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine.96 
By lending Chamoun his support, Jumblat had expected to exercise a large share of 
authority over the policies of the new government. As the British ambassador in Beirut at 
the time, Edwin Chapman-Andrews wrote shortly after his meeting with the Druze leader: 
As you know, he declined to take part in the government after the election of 
President Chamoun except on his own terms. From what he said yesterday, it is clear that 
he feels that he, and those who think like him, should either have complete control of the 
government or should stay outside and exert pressure upon the government on behalf of 
the programmed which they favour. Immediately after Chamoun's election, Jumblat 
demanded that Khoury be brought to trial and that a full investigation of the regime's 
misdeeds be launched. Chamoun, however, was not willing to go this far; neither was 
Chamoun, a staunch defender of free enterprise, prepared to support Jumblat's socialist 
programmed. Chapman-Andrews wrote. Born at Dayr al-Kamar in the Chouf, in 1900, 
Chamoun first entered parliament as a deputy for Mount Lebanon at the age of 29. Nemr 
Chamoun, his father, had served as an Inspector of Finance during the Mutasarrifate period; 
because his sympathies for France during the Great War aroused Turkish suspicions, the 
Chamouns were exiled to Anatolia in 1916 and remained there for the duration of the war. 
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During this time Camille Chamoun prepared himself for entry into the College of Law at the 
Beirut University of St. Joseph. He received his LLB. in 1923, was called to the bar during the 
following year, and thereafter inaugurated his political career by writing political pieces for 
the Beirut French daily Le Reved.47 
Thus, Chamoun sought to cultivate a populist image, but one to which workers and 
men of trade or the professions could aspire. Chamoun was proud of his self-made influence 
and believed that a liberal economic and political system offered Lebanese citizens their 
best avenue of advancement. In partial recompense, Chamoun was a tireless and efficient 
organizer of electoral campaigns and of political coalitions in parliament. Later in business 
he proved himself to be meticulous and at times innovative. Above all Chamoun was a 
dynamic and charismatic personality: qualities which were accentuated by his handsome 
features.98 
Chamoun's populist style of politics continued even after his election as President. 
He frequently appeared at charitable functions, fund-raising events, or the opening of movie 
theatres, and constantly engaged shopkeepers and workers in conversation during his 
outings. Up to this time, Chamoun's foreign policies vis-a-vis the Arab states had met with 
no serious objection from Lebanon's Sunni Leadership. Nevertheless, at the outset of his 
Presidential tenure, Chamoun's foreign policies were violating the spirit and letter of the 
National Pact by placing Lebanon's external sovereignty in the hands of western and, in 
particular, British interests. It may very well be that in his letter to Eden, Chapman-Andrews 
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exaggerated the extent to which Chamoun 'preferred' to see Lebanon 'dependent' on the 
British. Ideally, Chamoun preferred to see Lebanon as a sovereign and independent state. 
After 1955, his opponents increasingly came to the same conclusion. When Chamoun 
claimed that he was reluctant to join an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance because it would 
violate Lebanon's 'independent' foreign policy Sunni leaders were skeptical. Chamoun's pro-
western policy fully surfaced in March 1957 when he affirmed Lebanon's commitment to 
the Eisenhower Doctrine-a new programmer of economic, financial and military aid given by 
the United States to those Middle Eastern countries prepared to accept it as a means of 
defending themselves against 'communist aggression'. On the foreign policy level, 
Chamoun's difficulties were compounded by the merger between Egypt and Syria which 
formalized on 1 February 1958. The event evoked adulation from among Lebanese Sunnis 
and on the following day Lebanese schools run by the Makassed and attended by over 
15,000 students were closed. As celebrations took place throughout the country, portraits 
of Nasser and Syrian flags were hung inside homes, shops and on the sides of buildings.99 
By the start of 1958, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun's last year in office, 
Camille Chamoun had succeeded in aligning a wide range of Druze and Muslim leaders 
against him, very much as a result of his own desire to remain more powerful than they. 
Coalition formation against a president is hardly an unusual occurrence in parliamentary 
politics, and often it leads to a democratic change in government. However, other factors 
were at work which virtually polarized Lebanon along sectarian lines. These developments 
created an atmosphere in which violence became increasingly prominent in and common to 
political issues. The two most important elements in this volatile mixture were the 
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popularity of Egyptian President Abd al-Nasser's pan-Arabism and Camille Chamoun's desire 
to amend the constitution to allow him to succeed himself as president. 
Meanwhile, Nasser was beginning to make overtures to communist powers. 
Chamoun countered Nasser's efforts immediately by courting the United States for its aid 
against real and imagined Egyptian insurgents. In 1957 Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, thus virtually isolating himself from his internal opposition and almost leading to a 
break in relations with Egypt.1°° 
Camille Chamoun's term of office was marked by his attempts to consolidate the 
economic and political dominance of the commercial-financial bourgeoisie. His policy was 
essentially twofold: he helped the bourgeoisie economically by continuing the liberal 
policies of his predecessor; and he sought to increase the political dominance of this class by 
weakening the power of the landlords. Freedom of trade and foreign exchange encouraged 
the growth to the Lebanese trading and banking sectors in the 1950s. Net National Product 
grew at a rate of around six per cent per annum and fortunes were made by merchants who 
operated in the import and re-export trade. The relative political stability of Lebanon 
attracted foreign capital and foreign firms, and many of the latter established the 
headquarters of their Middle East operations in Beirut Towards the end of his regime 
Chamoun's government introduced a bank secrecy law, which further strengthened Beirut's 
position as the leading financial centre in the region. 
Chamoun, by contrast, sought to eliminate the established za'ims from the political 
system. The 1952 election law broke up the large electoral districts into 22 single-member 
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constituencies and 11 two-member constituencies, in an attempt to break the power of the 
'grand lists' controlled by the za'ims. The reform was relatively successful in the 1953 
elections, but although it weakened the traditional leaders it did not bring about their 
defeat. For the 1957 elections, however, Chamoun expanded the size of the Parliament by 
22 seats and made a determine effort to ensure the election of his supporters. This time he 
was more successful. Ahmad al-As'ad lost his seat in South Lebanon. Kamal Jumblat was 
defeated in the Shuf by a newcomer who had the backing of the President, and this surprise 
result inevitably led to charges of corruption and intimidation of the part of the regime. The 
results of the election pushed the opposition notables, already annoyed at their lack of 
influence over the distribution of patronage, into extra-parliamentary and increasingly 
insurrectionary tactics. The suspicion that Chamoun had fixed the elections, so as to ensure 
his re-election for a second term of office, recalled the events of 1947-52. But for a variety 
of reasons, the situation in the late fifties was much more serious and it led eventually to 
civil war. 
The war of 1958 was due to a number of factors. At one level it was a factional 
conflict in which those za'ims who had been excluded from high political office were seeking 
to limit and ultimately destroy the power of President Chamoun and his supporters. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the candidates in the 2.953 and 1957 elections reveals, first, 
that most of the major za'ims were opposed to Chamoun, and second, that the President 
was attempting to bring into the Parliament middle-level politicians from less notable 
families and, where possible, 'political unknowns' who were directly beholden to him as 
clients. Thus, in part, the civil war was, as some intellectuals described it, a 'Revolt of the 
Pashas' in which the country's most prominent za'ims sought to re-establish their political 
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power. Because Chamoun tried to weaken some urban bourgeois za'ims as well as 
landlords, it could be argued that he was no necessarily acting in the interests of the 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie against the landed upper class in the countryside.101  
The interaction between domestic and foreign policy issues during Chamoun's 
administration revealed the country's high permeability to regional developments and 
influences. By 1956 the population had almost doubled as compared to 1932." The disparity 
of living conditions between Christians and Moslems was reflected in mounting Moslem 
grievances against the socio-economic order. These were exacerbated by inadequate 
governmental social services, administrative corruption, and the Maronite-dominated 
political system. Nasser's charismatic spell enabled him to establish direct "plebiscitary" 
links with the Moslem Lebanese urban masses, raising their level of expectations, and 
activating their feelings of pride and defiance. Chamoun fell out with his Moslem Sunnite 
Prime Minister over the issue of the diplomatic action to be taken in support of Nasser 
during the 1956 Suez War. By pushing on with an anti-Nasser foreign policy, exemplified by 
his endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine propounded in early 1957 to contain both 
communism and radicalism in the Middle East, Chamoun only aggravated the Christian-
Moslem cleavage. The ensuing civil war took a toll of some '2000 lives. The country had 
been saved from an open religious conflict by Chamoun's genius for antagonizing Christian 
as well as Moslem members of the establishment. 
But the title of savior of the republic must be awarded to the Maronite Army 
Commander, General Fuad Chehab. He now repeated his coup d'etat by omission of 1952 by 
refusing to obey Chamoun's order to pit the army against the predominantly Moslem rebels. 
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Chehab's policy greatly strengthened the trans-sectarian centripetal influences resulting 
from Christian opposition to Chamoun and paved the way for his own Presidency.1°Z 
In 1958, these tensions flared into civil war. Most of the Shiite south took up arms 
against Chamoun under the leadership of Ahmad al-Assad and his son Kamel. The Shiite 
tribesmen of the Bekaa-Hermel mountain area went into opposition behind Sabri Hamadeh. 
The pro-Chamoun Shiite leaders were unable or unwilling to raise any significant 
forces on his behalf, as were Chamoun's dwindling Sunni supporters. The Muslim front 
against Chamoun was almost solid. Both the Sunni Mufti and the Shiite Imam of Lebanon, 
joined by the Druze religious leadership, issued joint anti-Chamoun statements. There never 
was, however, a corresponding Christian solidarity behind Chamoun. The Maronite 
Patriarch, Paul Meouchy, even before the civil war had charged Chamoun with hardening 
sectarian divisions and had drawn praise from the Assads.'°3 
In 1958, during the last months of President Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke 
out, intensely aggravated by external factor. On July 15, 1985, in response to the Lebanon 
government's appeal, United States forces were sent to help the country safeguard its 
independence. These forces were completely withdrawn by October 25, 1958, after the 
inauguration of President Shihab and the beginnings of general improvement in the 
international aspects of the Lebanese situation.104 
2. The Class Nature of the 1958 Conflict 
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Lebanon's political economy provides much evidence to support the argument that 
one of the basic problems of the country was its uneven development. The comprador 
fraction of the bourgeoisie, which had been heavily represented in the state, supported the 
development of the services sector and mainly opposed the development of industry and 
agriculture. This kind of political and economic development resulted in a cost-of-Using 
index increase of 75 points between 1955 and 1957. This increase struck where it hurt most 
- at the poor and the middle class. 
Another illustration of some of the effects of uneven development that revealed its 
intensity, even at this early stage in the fife of the polity, was the Doxiadis Associates' study 
of 1957, which estimated that 3% of the workforce (14,000) earned $3,300 annually, while 
5,136 earned $500 or less. Furthermore, the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) study of 1959 indicated that per capita income in Lebanon was $147 
among low-income groups, while the national average was $327. While this study was 
conducted several months after the civil war, it could be viewed as an indicator of the 
situation on the eve of the war. 
Another indicator of the class nature of the conflict was the fact that the areas which 
were held by the pro-Chamoun forces during the conflict were the most affluent, while the 
opposition were, for the most part, in control of severely underdeveloped areas of the 
country. 
It was clear that those who allied themselves with Chamoun were class fractions or 
groupings that benefited from the regime at the expense of other fractions or groupings in 
their respective classes. The alliance of the Syrian Nationalist Party with Chamoun was 
prompted by SNP enmity towards the United Arab Republic (UAR — Syria's union with 
Egypt). The LKP, despite its secondary differences with Chamoun, allied itself with the 
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regime because of overriding factors such as its perception that the anti-Chamoun 
movement was against Maronite interests and hegemony over their power bloc. 
Just before the civil war Pierre Gemayel, the LKP chief, toured Mexico and the United 
States to drum up support for the regime among the Lebanese emigres (mostly Maronite) 
and to secure a guarantee from the United States for the 'protection' of Lebanon (i.e. 
protection of Maronite and US interests in the region). The LKP's support of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine must be seen in this light. 
The financial interests in the Third Force, such as Pharaon, Abu-Chahla and Taqla, 
actually attacked the LKP for its support of Chamoun. The perceptions and the actual 
stances of the two groupings of the financial bourgeoisie indicate that the character of the 
conflict was not along confessional lines, as is strongly asserted by many writers such as 
Entelis and Salibi. In the first place, the two groupings were, for the most part, Christian. 
in the second place, the two groupings' perceptions were shaped by their material 
conditions of life. In Chamoun's case, he felt the need to transcend the National Pact (which 
emphasized that no alliances could be sought with foreign powers and that Lebanon's 
'neutrality must be maintained) by seeking foreign alliances to increase the power of his 
regime. 
As was mentioned earlier, Chamoun's bourgeois grouping allied itself with the SNP, 
the LKP and other zuama. Of these the LKP was the most significant because of its class 
make-up. The mass base of this party, as mentioned earlier, was mostly in the Mount 
Lebanon area. It was mainly comprised of small and rich peasants and urban petty-
bourgeois elements who enjoyed a higher standard of living than their respective 
counterparts in other areas of Lebanon. As suggested earlier, this was one of the main 
reasons that the party supported Chamoun and could not get over its sectarianism. It is 
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clear that the party had deeply-rooted confessional characteristics. These characteristics 
have been a main component of the LKP's ideology, which rationalized its stance on the 6:5 
Christian-Muslim ratio in Lebanon's political representation. The LKP's sectarianism 
rendered the class basis of the conflict nebulous. For the most part, this sectarianism was 
reinforced by the fact that, by and large, Maronite areas were developed and non-Maronite 
areas were not. The development of under development assumed in large measure a 
confessional facade.105 
2.1 The Presidency of Shihab 
In 1958, during the last months of President Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke 
out, intensely aggravated by external factor. On July 15, 1985, in response to the Lebanon 
government's appeal, United States forces were sent to help the country safeguard its 
independence. These forces were completely withdrawn by October 25, 1958, after the 
inauguration of President Shihab and the beginnings of general improvement in the 
international aspects of the Lebanese situation. 
While the Moslem- Christina balance in Lebanon remains delicate and precarious, 
responsible groups who have vivid memories of the 1958 crisis are believed to feel that their 
interests are best served by the preservation of that balance. 
The history of the people of Lebanon and, in a way their future hopes spring from 
the land itself. The land is the meeting place of three. continents, of Seaand Mountain and 
desert, of East and west. It is the meeting place of cultures and commerce. Bold men came 
105 
BJ. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, (Zed Books Ltd., 57 Caledonian Road, London Ni 92U, in 
1985),p.98-100. 
63 
across the seam, along its coast and down its valleys, to teach, to conquer, or to trade. And . 
if ever any man came in fear, the mountains gave him refuge.106 
2.2 The Shihab Administration: 1958-1967 
Tensions began to ease in the country toward the end of 1958, but the task of 
reasserting Lebanon's external and internal sovereignty which Chehab had assumed still 
seemed overwhelming. Yet, as President from 1958 to 1964, Chehab gave Lebanon its most 
stable period of sovereign rule. What constituted a particularly striking aspect of Chehab's 
leadership for our study was the manner in which he was able to gain the support and 
loyalty of men as disparate in their political and socio-economic outlook as Gemayel and 
Jumblat. In a unique fashion, Chehab combined a complementary vision of order and justice 
for Lebanon's political society which appealed to each leader and which served well the 
cause of the country's sovereignty. 
Born in the town ofJounieh in 1903, Chehab was descended from perhaps Lebanon's 
most illustrious of families, having ancestors that could be traced to the Qurayshi tribe of 
the Prophet Mohammed. Chehab himself was a direct descendant of Bashir Chehbab II, a 
factor giving his leadership an unusual degree of prestige. He received his secondary 
education in the College des Freres Maristes in Jounieh and at the age of 19 entered the 
Military Academy in Damascus. After graduation Chehab became a lieutenant In the Mixed 
Troops. By 1931, at the age of only 28, Chehab had assumed command of the garrison in 
Rashaya. In 1945 he was promoted to the rank of general, at which time he also became 
commander of the Troupes Specials. A year later, Riad 5olh persuaded Chehab to assume 
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command of the Lebanese army. Chehab's neutral stand during Chamoun and Jumblat's 
quasi-coup' of 1952 against Khoury greatly enhanced his political prestige. Chehab's 
influence continued to grow during Chamoun's tenure. This was especially evident during 
the general elections of 1957, when Chehab conveyed to Chamoun his desire to see one of 
his closest personal friends and political associates, Takieddine Solh, given a seat in 
parliament. As a result, Chamoun supported Solh's successful bid to become M.P. for Zahle. 
While Chehab's policy during the crisis of '58 incurred Chamoun's deep enmity, it was 
Takieddine Solh who strongly encouraged Chehab to present himself as candidate for the 
presidency; but only after the Army Commander had been given assurances by Lebanese 
deputies, and by Nasser and the Americans, that he would secure an overwhelming 
mandate.'°' 
As president, Chehab knew that for the Lebanese state to remain viable, it was 
necessary for all its citizens to sense the government's concern for the principle of 
distributive justice. Despite evidence of Lebanese prosperity during the 1950s, large areas of 
the country had remained marginalized. Much of the Akkar, northern Bekaa and the South 
lacked modern roads, irrigation system, electricity, educational facilities or decent housing. 
In 1959 Chehab commissioned IRFED, a leading French research organization, to 
prepare an extensive report on socio-economic conditions in Lebanon. In the circumstances, 
Chehab came to rely most on Gemayel, Jumblat and Karami to serve as links between the 
Chehabist edifice and that traditional power structure. Chehab's reliance of Pierre Gemayel 
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as his principal Maronite ally in Lebanon is best understood by examining the President's rift 
with Raymond Edde in 1959-60.b°$ 
2.3 Counter-Revolt and the Rise of Pierre Gemayel 
The prudent and statesman like leadership of General Fuad Chehab as Army 
Commander had saved the Lebanese state from total disintegration during the crisis of 
'1958. Nevertheless, Chehab's popularity among Maronites was by no means secure. Most 
Maronites and a sizeable number of other Christians believed that Chamoun had waged a 
courageous battle against Nasserism, but had been undermined by Chehab's 'collusion' with 
Cairo and Washington. Many believed that their worst suspicions were justified when on 24 
September; Chehab formed a new eight-man cabinet in which the opposition was heavily 
represented. As Prime Minister, Chehab appointed Rashid Karami, the leader of the revolt in 
Tripoli. Upon assuming office, Karami declared that his government had come to "harvest 
the fruits of the revolution. This statement provoked uproar in Maronite quarters and no 
leader personified the extreme concern which was generated better than Kata'eb party 
president Pierre Gemayel.109  
Chehab's refusal to use the army in a repressive role endeared him to the Moslem if 
not the Maronite masses. But this welcome Christian-Moslem symbiosis through Chehab 
was tempered by a growing estrangement between the senior leader of the Moslem Beirut 
rebels, Saeb Salaam, and Chehab himself. This development was partly the result of 
idiosyncratic factors; it was also due to their differing conceptions of the relationship that 
should obtain between Maronite President; and Sunnite Prime Minister. For the greater 
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part of his term, Chehab relied for Moslem oligarchic support on Rashid Karami as his Prime 
Minister, as well as on the dynamic Druze leader Kamal Jumblat. (Karami had been the more 
pliant Sunnite rebel leader during the Civil War" of 1958). 
Chehab conceived of a grand strategy for the invigoration and con-solidation of the 
system. In foreign affairs he followed an avowed policy of detente with Nasser. 
Domestically, he aimed at a paraetatisme paternalisticaHy centered on his person. In this 
way he hoped to bypass the bulk of the oligarchs both Christian and Moslem, whom he 
contemptuously dubbed 'fromanists"— cheese-eaters. He concentrated power in a kitchen 
cabinet led by "a" trusted Maronite technocrat, Elias Sarkis. Sarkis was to oversee a series of 
ambitious socio-economic reforms designed to improve the conditions of the deprived 
Moslem areas. The ultimate objective was to win over the Moslem population to 1 the 
concept of Lebanese (as opposed to Pan-Arab) nationalism. 
But the seemingly inherent immobilism of the system and the extent of 
administrative corruption soon caught up with Chehab. He sought to cut the Gordian knot 
by increasing resort to the Deuxieme Bureau (Military Intelligence Branch of the Army) 
which was effectively under his command. 
Small wonder that a grand Moslem-Christian coalition was eventually formed whose 
aim was to block Chehab's alleged intent (by now a customary charge against an incumbent 
president) to seek reelection. Too fastidious or weary to make a bid for himself, Chehab 
succeeded in having his nominee, Charles Helou, elected as the next president.110 
During the week which followed, violence reached the highest level of the '1958 
crisis. President Chehab now intensified his efforts at mediation. On 9 October Chehab held 
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a series of Meetings with Gemayel, Karam!, Salam, Jumblat and Yafi. Five days later, after 
Chehab had concluded his seventh meeting with Gemayel and after Karami had completed a 
two-hour meeting with the Kata'eb leader, the Prime Minister announced the formation of 
a new four-man 'National Salvation Cabinet' on the basis of a 'No victor, No vanquished' 
formula. This new cabinet included Karami, who remained as Prime Minister, Gemayel, 
Raymond Edde and Hussein Uwayni, all-of whom were basically conservative leaders who 
met with the Kata'eb leader's approval."' 
2.4 The relative political autonomy of the Shihabist state 
At the same time as he weakened the Parliament and cabinet, President Shihab 
proceeded to build a power base for himself in other arenas of the state apparatus and to 
use this base to govern over the heads of elected representatives of the dominant classes. 
The three arenas which were important were the President's 'core group' within the 
Presidential Office, the Deuxieme Bureau, and the middle-level bureaucracy. The latter 
formed part of a social category which extended beyond those officials employed in the civil 
service and development agencies to include other professionals, experts and intellectuals 
who were broadly sympathetic to the President's reformist programme. It is this category 
which I call the `technocrats'. 
Soon after his election in 1958, Fu'ad Shihab began to recruit a core group of 
presidential aides and advisers who were loyally committed to him and his programme of 
reforms. The most prominent member of this group was Ilyas Sarkis, a Maronite who was 
later (in 1976) to become President of Lebanon himself. A graduate of Beirut's St Joseph 
Law Faculty, Sakis had worked as a legal adviser to various government departments. In 
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1959, at the age of 35, he was appointed by Shihab as legal adviser to the Presidency and in 
1962 was promoted to be head of the President's Office, an extremely influential position 
which enabled him to control access to the President as well as involving him in high-level 
decision —making. Sarkis continued to act as head of the Presidential Office for a short time 
under President Helou, 'thus maintaining a Shihabist influence after the departure of 
Shihab, and in 1967 he was appointed as Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon. 
The inclusion of military officers in Shihab's core group indicated the more central 
role the army was playing in Lebanese politics. President Shihab seemed to be setting up his 
own clientele under the control of the Deuxieme Bureau in order to help him bypass and 
compete with clientelist structures controlled by the za'ims. During the 1960s the Bureau 
carried out covert and overt operations to undermine the power of certain za'ims and to 
ensure that all parts of the Lebanese state apparatus remained loyal to Shihab. One 
important tactic was to intervene in elections to help Shihabist politicians and to control and 
even eliminate those za'ims who actively opposed the regime.11z  
Shihab started to reform the civil service immediately after he came to office. 
Because the changes introduced in 1958-59 limited the power of the za'ims by attempting 
to remove their control over recruitment and promotion, it is doubtful they would have 
been enacted if they had been submitted to Parliament. In order to circumvent this 
difficulty, the laws relating to the administration were introduced by presidential decrees. 
First, the responsibility for recruitment of civil servants was removed from the individual 
ministries and given to a new and relatively autonomous Public Service Council. Second, 
entrance requirements were raised and a new system of examinations was introduced. 
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Finally, promotion was to be based on merit and length of service. By introducing such 
reforms, Shihab cut off the opportunity for direct patronage not only from za'ims but also 
from himself and his supporters. 
President Shihab's attempts to build a modern state apparatus in Lebanon were 
certainly limited by confessional and clientelist considerations. What was significant about 
the regimes of Shihab and Helou, however, was the growing importance of a category of 
intellectuals and professionals whose attitudes could be described as rational bureaucratic 
in the Weberian sense. The influence of this category in the Shihabist era was most 
apparent in the parastatal development agencies which were largely independent of the 
official civil service. They were staffed by young professionals or technocrats-many of them 
employed on contract at high salaries- who owed their loyalty directly to the President. 
Their importance reflected the increased concern for state direction of the economy 
and, by way of illustration, they included the Public Service Council, the Institute of Public 
Administration, the Planning Board, the Central Office of Statistics, the National 
Reconstruction Agency, the Office of Social Development, the Litani River Authority, the 
Executive Board for Large Scale Projects, the Beirut Water Authority, the Electricity and 
Transport Agencies, and the National for Scientific Research.113  
2.5 Chehab's Reforms and Mounting Opposition 
Chehab's election reflected the need for reforms if the confessional system were to 
function without major dislocation. One of the reforms the new regime called for was 
expenditure on an irrigation and land-reclamation project to alleviate some of the 
consequences of uneven development. The project was initially conceived to allow southern 
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farmers to own a few acres of land. Other reforms concerned universal and free education, 
health insurance, the social security code and administrative reforms. All of these were 
demands put forward by the progressive forces (communist, socialist and nationalist) in the 
country over a span of several years. These forces, however, were not part of the capitalist 
state. As such, they were unable to share in the implementation of these programmes. They 
were forced to operate through zuama such as Jumblatt and Karami. 
Consequently, for the first time in Lebanon's political development, a major 
contention arose within the dominant class and its zuama institution. Despite the fact that 
more contending zuama were elected in the 1960 parliamentary elections, this did not lead 
to an increase in zuama representation within the power bloc, even though parliamentary 
seats had increased to 99. 
Realizing that these moves by the regime were designed to 'rob' them of their 
power, various traditional zuama, both Muslim and Christian, started to come together in 
opposition. These major rivals, who represented the dominant class fractions in the various 
regions, were Al-Asaad, Chamoun, Salam, Edde and the Maronite Patriarch. All of these 
figures (except Al-Asaad) formulated a semi-formal coalition against the regime.114 
The Lebanon, under its predominantly Christian leadership, also sought to isolate the 
country from the tensions of the region, turning its back on crisis in the Arab World brought 
about by the Arab-Israeli conflict, although the country became reluctant host to 150,000 
Palestinian refugees after the 1948 war. The events of 1958, however, demonstrated that it 
was not possible to keep the world at bay indefinitely. The 1958 crisis was at one level just 
another indication of the struggle for influence between Lebanese elitist factions, and was 
114 
B.J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, (Zed Books Ltd., 57 Caledonian Road, London N19B(J, in 
1985), p.102-103. 
71 
eventually solved in the same way as earlier inter-confessional confrontations by means of 
an adjustment of ministerial posts to include groups previously excluded. But its main 
significance was a reflection of growing popular opposition to Maronite ascendancy from 
mostly Muslim factions united in demonstrating the disenchantment of the urban poor at 
not sharing in the country's apparent prosperity."Is  
The reformist trend was able to develop due to the relative calm of regional politics 
in the first three years of Chehab's regime (1958-64). It was briefly interrupted by an 
attempted coup against Chehab, instigated in December 1961 by the SNP, and by the earlier 
coup in Syria, in September 1961, led by anti-nationalist forces opposed to Syria's unity with 
Egypt in ; the UAR. These events, however, did not result in serious dislocations in Lebanon-
Furthermore; the anti-imperialist trend in the area still maintained momentum, as 
exemplified by another coup in Syria against the earlier anti-Nasser coup of September 
1961. This Baathist coup of March 1963 came hard on the heels of another Baathist coup in 
Iraq, which took place in February of the same year against the Qassem regime. 
The significance of these Arab events to Lebanon lay in the fact that Chehab did not 
have to make any serious decisions on formal alliances or affiliations with Lebanon's Arab 
neighbours. He was able to keep Lebanon on a neutral course and on friendly terms with all 
of them. He was, therefore, able to spend most of the regime's energies dealing with the 
domestic situation. As mentioned earlier, the hegemonic fraction in the new power bloc 
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allied itself with other progressive political figures and with those traditional zuama who 
were more inclined towards reforms than the majority of zuama.116 
2.6 Limitations on the autonomy of the state 
Some of the reforms introduced during the Shihabist period seem to have been 
directed towards providing an infrastructure for a more diversified economy. New trunk 
roads were built, and. electricity supplies were extended to the outlying regions of the 
country; educational and medical facilities were expanded; and some state investment was 
directed towards the development of agriculture. A number of these reforms may have 
been designed to promote industrialization. Improved roads could have transported raw 
materials and manufactured goods, an increased supply of electricity and water could have 
met the demands of industry; and a thriving agriculture could have fed an industrial 
workforce. Industry, however, required protection, and although the Association des 
Industrials Liberians continued to press for higher tariffs and other restrictions on imports, 
President Shihab's regime did little to reduce the dominance of the commercial sector. 
Freedom of foreign trade was maintained, and the climate of political stability encouraged a 
strong currency which meant exports were relatively expensive while imports were 
correspondingly cheap. 
He pointed out that pressure from merchants had successfully influenced 
government, which had `so far resisted the demands of the industrialists', and he concluded 
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that 'Lebanese economic policy thus favors trade, which is the most important sector of the 
economy.117 
The economic dominance of the commercial-financial bourgeoisie, and the 
Shihabists' reluctance to confront powerful vested interests in Lebanon, ultimately led to 
the defeat of Shihabism in 1970. A crucial factor in that defeat was the opposition of the 
Sunni bourgeoisie in Beirut to the Shihabist state, and in particular the opposition of Sa'ib 
Salam. The latter's role in the politics of the 1960s illustrates many of the weaknesses of 
Shihabism, and a discussion of his leadership of a faction within the Sunni bourgeoisie 
forms.11a 
When General Fu'ad Shihab took offices as President of Lebanon, he had to deal with 
the immediate repercussions of civil war. Perhaps his most pressing task was to reestablish 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the National Pact and restore confessional balance to 
the political system. In order to stop the war in Beirut he appointed, in October 1958, a 
government of 'national reconciliation' composed of two Sunni Muslims and two Maronite 
Catholics. The insurgents were represented by Premier Rashid Karami, the Sunni za'im of 
Tripoli, and Husayn al-'Uwayni, a Beiruti Sunni notable and one of the more moderate 
members of The United Nation Front which had organized the opposition to President 
Chamoun. The loyalists were represented by Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Kata'ib Party 
which had led the Christian counter-revolution in Beirut, and by Raymond Edde who had 
been a somewhat reluctant supporter of Chamoun. Other ministers were added later, and 
the government remained in office until 1960 when a new cabinet was formed to supervise 
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a general election. One of the more notable achievements of the post-war government was 
the 1959 Personnel Law which included an affirmation of the constitutional requirement 
that Christians and Muslims should be equally represented in the state bureaucracy. Such 
concessions to the Muslim community, coupled with a foreign policy which was markedly 
more friendly to President Nasser and Egypt, were opposed by many Christians and 
especially Camille Chamoun's supporters, who distrusted Shihab because he had not 
ordered the army to intervene on the side of the loyalists in the civil war. Nevertheless, 
most Lebanese-including the leadership of the Kata'ib- recognized that a new approach was 
necessary to create some semblance of national unity.119  
Connected with the attempts to establish a confessional balance in the government 
and bureaucracy was an increase in the size of the Parliament from 66 to 99 seats, so as to 
give 'a broader representation of Lebanon's za'ims and transfer their rivalry and conflict 
from the streets and mountains into the arena of institutional politics. President Shihab did 
not feel strong enough to remove the za'ims. Learning from the mistakes of his predecessor 
and realizing that any overt attempts to defeat political feudalism would lead to another 
war, he preferred to neutralize the politicians by granting them the formal dignity of 
parliamentary representation, while at the same time transferring more power into the 
hands of the regime. The consolidation of executive power, however, did not mean that the 
cabinet became more important as the decision-making arm of the state.120 
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President Shihab's reputation amongst the za'ims as the neutral who had `saved' 
Lebanon from the anarchy of civil war, and his widespread popular support, gave him the 
opportunity to purse much more interventionist policies than his predecessors. 
In 1964 many people urged him to continue the job he had started. But though the 
army, some elements in the bureaucracy, and a majority faction of politicians, wanted to 
see him re-elected for a second term of office, Shihab refused to stand. Instead, he ensured 
the election of Charles Helou, a journalist and lawyer, who had also been a parliamentary 
deputy, minister and diplomat. Faced with new political problems (particularly the growing 
strength of the Palestinian liberation movement) Helou proved to be rather timid than 
dealing with them and also began to move away from the Shihabist camp. So although the 
Shihabist era did not come to an end until Parliament elected Sulayman Frangieh as 
President in 1970, stresses and strains within the state did develop before then. 
In a sense, a more autonomous state was necessary after 1958 in order to respond 
to contradictions in the Lebanese social formation. The later had been manifested in super 
structural conflicts between Muslims and Christians, and among different factions of 
politicians, but there were also latent class conflicts between the sub-proletariat and 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie, and between the bourgeoisie and the landlords. When 
these contradictions erupted in a costly civil war, a strong state was essential to re-establish 
some degree of super structural unity and to deal with the threats from the urban crowd 
and the landlords. This necessitated confining factional and confessional conflict to the 
parliamentary Assembly, imposing more direct political controls on the Beirut street, and 
implementing a programmed of state-managed economic development in the peripheral 
regions of Lebanon. Economic and political reforms gave rise to a Lebanese state which was 
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more developed and more autonomous that in the pre-1958 period. Its political autonomy 
was evident in the increased activity of military intelligence and in the important role of 
President Shihab's advisers and clients in the bureaucracy, while its limited economic 
autonomy was seen in the expansion of parastatal development agencies. The state can be 
said to have 'developed' under Fu'ad Shihab both in terms of the more efficient 
organization of such apparatuses as the Deuzieme Bureau and Public Service Council and in 
terms of its size. During the early 1960s there was an expansion in the number of officials 
employed in the civil service and development agencies, and a significant rise in 
governmental expenditure expressed as a percentage of domestic products.121  
3. Rise and Growth of Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) 
With the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Munazzammat a!- 
Tahrir al-Filastiniyya) in May 1964, the Arab countries changed their policy of the previous 
decade and a half by recognizing a separate Palestinian entity (Kiyan). King Husain of Jordan 
supported the creation of the PLO and its army in spite of its potential threat to his own 
kingdom, in which two-thirds of the citizens were Palestinian. The PLO leadership was given 
to Ahmad shuqayri, a traditional politician, who was Egypt's nominee and served 'Abd al-
Nasir's interests in his rivalry with Jordan. In Fact, some Palestinians were beginning to think 
that Palestinians should take the initiative and responsibility in the struggle against Israel. 
They were encouraged by the success of Algeria's FLN in 1962 against the French to adopt 
the idea of armed struggle to achieve their objectives. Prior to this, another group had 
emerged, composed of educated Palestinians mainly from a petit bourgeois background: 
the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Harakat a(-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini). 
121 
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Their organization. was known as Fath. However, fromrly T-965" until the Arab-Israeli war 
of June 1967, three other guerrilla organizations emerged, two of which, the Vengeance 
Youth (Shabab a!-Tha'ir) and Heroes of the Return (Abtal a!-Awadat), were connected to the 
Arab Nationalist Movement, led by George Habash. The third group, the Palestinian 
Liberation Front (Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filastini) was formed by Palestinian officers trained in 
the Syrian Army, such as Ahmad Jabril and 'Abd al-Latif Shruru. Fath and the three other 
guerrilla groups (which later merged into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
under George Habash) constituted the base of what came to be known since late 1967 as 
the Palestinian Resistance Movement, the PRM (Harakat al-Mugawama al-Filastiniya), or 
the Palestinian Revolution (al-Thawra al-Filastiniya). Both names referred to all the 
Palestinian groups involved in the armed struggle against Israel. The popularity of the PRM, 
particularly among the Palestinians but also among the Arab masses in general, rose, not 
surprisingly, after the disastrous defeat of the regular Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan in June 1967. 
Fath and the three other guerrilla groups (which later merged into the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine. under George Habash) constituted the base of what came to 
be known since late 1967 as the Palestinian Resistance Movement, the PRM (Harakat a!- 
Muqawama al-Filastiniya), or the Palestinian Revolution (al-Thawra aI-Filastiniya). Both 
names referred to all the Palestinian groups involved in the armed struggle against Israel. 
The popularity of the PRM, particularly among the Palestinians but also among the Arab 
/6 
masses in general, rose, not surprisingly, after the disastrous defeat of the regular Arab 
armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in June 1967. 122 
The rise of the PRM after June 1967 transformed the camps into strongholds of the 
guerrilla organizations, and already by April 1969, clashes began taking place between 
Palestinian demonstrators and the Lebanese security forces. In October of that year fighting 
broke out between the Lebanese army and the PRM forces in the various parts of the 
country and eventually led to the signing of the agreement between the Lebanese 
authorities, represented by the commander of the army, General Emile Bustani, and PLO 
leader Yasir 'Arafat in Cairo on November 3, 1969. The Cairo Agreement legitimized the 
military presence of the Palestinians in the 'Arqub area in southern Lebanon. It also allowed 
the Palestinians resident in Lebanon to participate in the PRM, although their armed 
struggle was to remain, in the rather general terms of the agreement, within "the principles 
of Lebanon's sovereignty and security.i123 
3.1 The Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) Ideology 
Fath's ideology consisted of four basic principles. First, the Palestinians should have 
an independent political movement and take the initiative in their struggle for the liberation 
of Palestine. This implied that the PRM had to safeguard its independence with respect to 
attempts by some Arab governments to control it. Second, the PRM was not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of any Arab country and therefore was not promote or assist movements 
or parties the avowed objectives of which were the overthrow of existing Arab regimes. 
Third, the struggle against Israel was to be first and foremost an armed struggle. Fourth, at 
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this early stage of the Palestinian Revolution, "national unity" was to be emphasized; 
consequently, a social ideology that could antagonize certain Palestinian classes and groups 
from the PRM was best avoided. However, the PRM, they believed, "is not expected to 
substitute for the national liberation movement in the Arab countries, but it is expected to 
openly criticize the stands adopted by the Arab governments towards the Palestine problem 
and put the blame on those responsible for the defeat [of 1967]." Second, the PFLP and the 
PDFLP criticized the fourth principle of the strategy put forward by Fath (and others) of 
"Palestinian National Unity," on the grounds that the leadership of the PRM would 
eventually be dominated by members of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie. 
They believed that true "national unity" was that of classes under the leadership of the 
workers and the peasants.
124  
3.2 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon 
Lebanon's involvement in the Palestine question entered a new phase with the 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its military arm, the 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), by the Arab League in 1964. Whereas, the other Arab states 
sharply restricted the movements of the Palestinians and controlled the resistance through 
government-sponsored groups, Lebanon's laissez-faire political system permitted neither 
the national consensus nor the authoritarian system necessary to enforce such measures.125  
The emergence of the Palestinian movement as the standard bearer of Arab 
resistance after the Arabs' military defeat in the June 1967 war was the next phase of 
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Lebanon's involvement in the Palestine question. The defeat had so discredited the Arab 
governments and the Arab masses had become so demoralized that the Arab public opinion 
looked to the skirmishes and commando operations of the Palestinians against Israel for 
some consolation.126 The rise of the Palestinian resistance, however, contained within it the 
seeds of division between the Palestinians and the established Arab governments. The 
Palestinians recognized this danger from the beginning but, determined to pursue the cause 
of their own national identity and develop the organizations necessary for their political and 
military operations largely ignored it. In Lebanon they established guerrilla bases and began 
recruiting them from the refugee camps.127 
The Palestinian resistance movement accentuated the deep social and political 
fissures between the Muslim and Christian confession in Lebanon.128 The specter of refugee 
camps being turned into fortified arsenals and of young Palestinians being trained for 
commando operations threatened most Christian Lebanese and even some of the more 
conservative Muslims.129 When the Lebanese authorities attempted to restrict these 
activities, the Palestinians took advantage of the social and sectarian cleavages between 
Christians and Muslims to establish a firm basis of support in the century among Muslims 
and leftist Lebanese of both confessionals. 130 
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Soon after the 1967 War, Palestinian commandos began to infiltrate Lebanon from 
Syria with the encouragement of Damascus. This resulted in the steady polarization of 
Maronite and Moslem opinion about the commandos' presence and activities. The 
vehemence of the opposition to the Palestinian presence of certain Maronite oligarchs (e.g., 
Raymond Edde and ex-President Camille Chamoun) was partly aimed at Chehab, perceived 
to be the "efficient" power—through the loyalist Deuxieme Bureau—behind the "dignified" 
facade of Helou. The Deuxieme Bureau was seen as playing a subtle game of frightening the 
Maronite oligarchs and even President Helou himself (because of the latter's presumed 
attempt to shake off the Deuxieme Bureau's tutelage) with the Palestinian bogey, by turning 
a blind eye to Palestinian commando infiltration into the country in the service of some 
ulterior purpose of Chehab.13z 
As Israeli retaliatory raids in response to Palestinian operations from -Lebanese soil 
extended their area of devastation, matters came to a head between President Helou and 
his Prime Minister Karami. Rather than sanction army containment of the Palestinian 
commandos (whose presence and activities were passionately supported by his Sunnite 
constituency), Karami tendered his resignation in May 1969 while accepting to continue to 
serve ad interim. When the Lebanese army, stung by Maronite charges of collusion with the 
Palestinians, exploited this hiatus in government and started a series of vigorous operations 
-against the Palestinian commandos, the indignation of Moslem and radical opinion, now 
led by Jumblat, mounted ominously. Karami, characteristically clinging to both his 
resignation and his premiership, appealed in desperation to Nasser. On 3 November 1969 
Nasser, success fully mediated the so-called Cairo Agreement between the PLO and the 
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Lebanese army. The essence of the agreement was the agreement was the legalization and 
control of the commando presence and of operations against Israel. Palestinian armed 
presence was henceforth to be restricted to certain localities while operations against Israel 
were to be secretly "coordinated" with the Lebanese army.132 
The period between May and October 1969 witnessed violent clashes between the 
Lebanese Army and the Palestinian militias in various parts of the country, particularly in the 
areas adjacent to Israel and Syria, where the Palestinian commando movement had been 
establishing its bases. The fact that the Lebanese State had ceased to exercise its rightful 
sovereignty over these sensitive areas, because of the forceful presence of the Palestinian 
commandos there, was as intolerable to the Lebanese Army as it was to Christian Lebanese 
opinion and at least to a sector of Muslim Lebanese opinion.133 
3.3 Clashes between the Army and the PLO 
In October 1969, violent clashes between Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese 
army, which was attempting to restrict their activities, threatened Lebanon's fragile political 
system and brought down the Government.
134 
 In November, General Bustani, the Lebanese 
army chief, and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, negotiated an agreement in Cairo with 
the help of President Nasser of Egypt. Under the so-called 'Cairo Agreement' Lebanon made 
important concessions to the PLO.135 The Palestinian guerrillas were given complete control 
over their military bases in southern Lebanon and also the right to administer and maintain 
132 
Ibid,p.41. 
133 Kamal S. Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, (Ithaca Press London 1976),p.25- 
134 
Helena Cobban, The Palestine Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984) p.47. 
135 
Reinhard Schulze, N.32, p.191. 
83 
law and order in the refugee camps, where most of the 250,000-300,000 Palestinians in 
Lebanon lived.136 The residents of the camps had complained bitterly about harassment 
from the Lebanese police and army intelligence services. The agreement legalized the 
uneasy existence of a Palestinian state-within-a-state in Lebanon, highlighted the weakness 
of the Lebanese Government and further aggravated the deep divisions within Lebanese 
society. Many Lebanese, especially, the poorer Muslims, Sunni and Shiite, were sympathetic 
to the Arab solidarity and revolutionary aspirations represented by the Palestinian 
resistance.137 They supported the Palestinian struggle, hoping for their assistance in 
bringing about changes in the Lebanese state that would give them a fairer share of wealth 
and power. The Lebanese right feared that the Palestinian resistance was undermining the 
character of the Lebanese state, whose institutions and power structure they wished to 
preserve. The Lebanese Government, meanwhile, was afraid that if it sent the Lebanese 
army against the Palestinians, it would provoke open revolt. The agreement did not bring an 
end to clashes between the Lebanese army and Palestinian guerrillas. 
In September 1970, the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan finally turned against the 
Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) in Jordan and began to subdue them -- a process 
which was to take over twelve months to complete.138 The Palestinian guerrillas were 
reduced, step by step, in a succession of encounters until their power in the country was 
completely destroyed and the Palestinian popular support for them was silenced. The 
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crushing defeat of the PLO at the hands of the Jordanian army considerably weakened the 
Resistance Movement both in military as well as political terms.
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During what is known as Black September, the Jordanian army attacked refugee 
camps, forcing those who were lucky enough to escape, over the border into Lebanon and 
Syria. Lebanon now was the only state left that shared a border with Israel and had 
insufficient means to control the PLO.
140 
 And Lebanon now remained the only Arab country 
where the PRM could operate with some degree of autonomy.
141  
As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon was perceived as a 
threat to the Lebanese, especially by the Maronits. Not only did the resistance provide a 
model for the oppressed Lebanese to follow, it was their only natural ally in the state. These 
long-neglected Lebanese masses, especially in the south, believed the state should protect 
their villages, from Israeli raids and give support to the Resistance in its struggle against; the 
Zionist entity. 
The state and the army, however, saw things differently. They proceeded to prepare 
to end the PLO threat. The army sought to assert its role through a series of clashes with the 
Palestinian Resistance forces between May and October 1969. The polarization of Lebanon 
assumed dangerous proportions. Many of the Muslim elite, such as Prime Minister Karami, 
had no choice but to side with the Resistance. This was so mainly because the power base of 
such zuama rested upon people who were also pro-Resistance. The Prime Minister had to 
come up with a compromise solution which he found in the concept of co-ordination'. This 
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concept referred to co-ordination of activities against Israel between the army and the 
Resistance.142 
For a short time after the move of the PLO headquarters to Beirut from Amman, 
Lebanon enjoyed a brief respite. The Palestinians were reluctant to face another 
confrontation and the Lebanese were still satisfied with their new choice of president. 
However, the newly-increased Palestinian presence had not gone unnoticed by Israel. 
Indeed, because of this Palestinian presence Israel expanded its contact with the Maronites 
to include Maronites and other Christians living in the territory of South Lebanon, giving the 
minority-alliance new life.143 And when the Guerilla attacks against Israeli increased, Israeli 
commandos began to attack Palestinian guerrilla training camps in Lebanon and to 
assassinate Palestinian guerrilla leaders at their homes in Beirut.144 
3.4 The Slide towards Civil War 
Before the civil war began in April 1975, political mobilization and recruitment 
usually involved only those Christians who were at least moderately well off and thus had a 
reason to support the status quo. However, not long after the civil war began, many 
Lebanese Christians saw the major issue as Christian survival. As more and more Christians 
saw the civil war becoming a threat to their existence in Lebanon, the poor elements of 
Lebanese Christian society began to take an active role in the conflict. "Survival" became the 
biggest mobilizing factor on the Christian side. Whereas before the conflict recruitment and 
mobilization were effected on the basis of helping to maintain the status quo and were 
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done under the guises of abstruse political ideas, the issue had become focused on the 
future of all Christians in Lebanon. However, many of those who did seek refuge from the 
fighting were a least sympathetic to the Christian side.145 
Two main components of the unrest in Lebanon at the end of 1973 were the 
domestic political and economic problems, and the larger regional issue (the Palestinian 
question). These two components were inseparable: those Lebanese social forces that 
fought against Kissinger's Middle East policies were the same forces that fought to amend 
the Lebanese labor laws to make them more favourable to the workers. Labor unions, with 
heavy socialist and communist influence, along with nationalist parties were the main forces 
in this fight. The influence of these parties was also evident in a major stratum of the 
population (high-school and university students), most of whom fought for social and 
political reforms, supported the Palestinian Resistance and opposed the Kissinger-
sponsored Middle East policies.146 
it was perhaps more than symbolic that the Civil War in Lebanon had been sparked 
by the ambushing of a bus in 'Ain al-Rummana, on April 13, 1975, by the Phalangists, which 
resulted in the killing of 26 persons and the wounding of 20 more, most of them Palestinian 
(although some had been Lebanese) who had been attending a Palestinian rally and were on 
their way back to Tat al-Za'tar. According to the Palestinians, the attack had not been a 
surprise. The crisis had been building up from the beginning of 1975, when more arms were 
being brought in for the Phalangists, and Sham'un's militias and when demands began to be 
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made by the Phalangists for a plebiscite on the armed Palestinian presence and on whether 
the Cairo Agreement ought to be upheld.;47 
While Lebanese society did undergo major transformations (the population of its 
capital, for example, tripled between 1958 and 1973), parliamentary representation tended 
to congeal. The rate at which parliamentarians were renewed from one election to another 
was decreasing: 55 per cent in 1943, 52 per cent in 1960, 40 percent in 1972; and the 
confirmation of the seats of notables already elected was hardly a reflection of social and 
geographic mobility. The expansion of Capitalism at the expense of the traditional rural 
economy, as well as rampant and chaotic urbanization, also had contrasting results in terms 
of national representation: the proportion of large landowners diminished (43per cent of 
the deputies in 1951,24 per cent in 1964,21 per cent in 1972) in favour of businessmen (10 
per cent in 1951, 19 per cent in 1964,21 per cent in 1972) and members of the liberal 
professions, particularly lawyers (47 per cent in 1951, 54 per cent in 1964, 67 per cent in 
1972). The success of Capitalism thus clearly favoured its "cherished children" namely 
tradesmen, lawyers, and engineers, and penalized wage earners and workers. 
The credibility of Parliament as an organ representing society as a whole was 
therefore shanken well before the beginning of the war. The massive increase in 
urbanization was hardly reflected in an electoral system requiring that a large number of 
Beirut's residents vote in their village of origin father than in their place of residence. Geo-
confessional districting made it difficult to elect a leftist or even a centrist liberal. The major 
importance of personal wealth and family ties hardly increased the prestige of the 
institution. 
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When is religion, language, or ethnicity most likely to prove polarizing? When will 
class take primacy and when will denominational combinational commitments and religious 
identities prove equally important cleavage bases? These questions do not have easy 
answers in Lebanon, where the hierarchy of cleavage bases are extremely complex and tend 
to undergo permanent change.148 
3.5 Lebanese Front and Lebanese National Movement 
By the mid-1970s the country was divided between two large coalitions: the 
Lebanese Front, a Maronite Christian alliance between the private armies of the rival 
Gemayel, Chamoun and Franjieh families, who wanted to retain the existing political 
system, favored links with the West and opposed direct Lebanese involvement in the Arab-
Israeli conflict; and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was mainly Muslim and 
consisted of a loose coalitions of mostly small left-wing parties who demanded a more 
representative political system, closer links with Arab world and a more active role for 
Lebanon in the conflict with Israel. The LNM was led by Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze-
dominated Progressive Party (PSP), and enjoyed PLO support.149 
The growing strength of the Palestinian guerrillas prompted the Maronite 
organizations to seek to boost their own military power. National Movement (LNM). The 
LNM, under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, was pressing for reform of the political 
system to end Christian dominance and ultimately abolish confessionalism. The LNM argued 
that an improvement of the Muslims' economic lot was impossible while the Christians 
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dominated the political structure. The left-Muslim alliance also proclaimed unresery 
support for the PLO. The Maronite feared that political reforms would destroy the existi 
guarantees of Christian security and they also resented the freedom of action enjoyed 
the PLO, as the indidents between Palestinian guerrillas and Maronite militiamen becar 
more and more freqient around Palestinian refugee camps sited in Christian area. 
Radical Maronite leaders believed that it was important to reduce the Palestiniai 
power before PLO military might could be combined with Muslim superiority in numbers 
threaten Christian privileges and security. The Maronite also gambled on receiving suppo 
from outside forces-Arab states, Israel and the West-in the task of cutting the PLO dowi 
toseze.150 
In late February 1975, trouble broke out in Sidon over a controversy about fishing 
right which had been smoldering for several months. Camille Chamoun (Prime Minister 
1952-1958) headed a new concern, funded by Lebanese and and Kuwaiti capital, that had ' 
been licensed for commercial fishing along the southern coast of Lebanon. The Proteine 
Company, as it was called, was to be an upscale enterprise using modern equipment and a 
mechanized fishin fleet. The local fishermen, still working the waters much as they had for 
thousands of years, were afraid that the new company would take most of the fish and 
destroy their livelihook. Although, some protections against such an outcome were offered, 
the issue was soon politicized into a stuuggle between the Muslim poor of Sidon and the 
mainly Christian rich who were to operate the Proteine Copany. 
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On February 26, a protest march led by the redoubtable Sidon rebel Ma'ruf Sa'd was 
halted by local police and elements of the army; the standoff soon deteriorated into a riot. 
Shots were fired, a soldier was dilled, and several of the demonstrators were wounded, 
including their leader, Ma'ruf Sa'd, who died a few days later. Lide magic, thousands 
demonstrated Beirut and Tripoli the following day, and the government responded by 
temporarily removing the governor of the southern region where Sidon is located. Although 
the issue had to do with the grant of an exclusive license to Chamoun and his busivess 
associates, it soon became a test of the government's authority in south Lebanon.151 
3.6 Civil War and External Interference 
Tensions started to increase in early 1975. In February, a prominent Sunni Muslim 
politician, Ma'ruf Sa'd, was assassinated in Sidon as he led a march to protest against a new 
Fishing project planned by Camille Chamoun. The killing sparked off, a round of fighting 
•etween the army and local Muslim militias, backed by PLO guerrillas.152 On 13 April, 
4aronite militias killed 27 Palestinians passing through the Christian 'Ayn al-Rummana 
uarter of Beirut.153 The incident followed an attack by unknown gunmen earlier in the day 
n Kataeb leader Pierre Gemayel. Soon after that fighting broke out between Palestinians 
id the Kataeb in 'Ayn al-Rummanan and around the Palestinian camps in Christian east 
eirut.154  The political crisis caused by the fighting was briefly resolved by the formation of a 
ew cabinet at the end of June by the new Prime Minister Rashid Karami. At the same time, 
cease-fire agreement was signed between the the commader of the army and PLO 
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chariman Yasser Arafat. But in September, heavy fighitin broke out again, and by the end of 
1975 Lebnaon was in the throes of all-out Civil War.155 Attempts at inter-Lebanese political 
dialogue came to noting, as the Maronites pressed for army intervention to restore security 
and the LNM, viewing the army as biased in favour of the Christians, insisted that political 
reform should come frost. Arafat kept the buld of the PLO's fighters out of the conflict, but 
the PLO was active in arming and training LNM militiamen. The main beneficiaries of PLO 
help were the Sunni, Nasserist Murabitun and Amal.'56 
- Syria's Intervention 
The escalation of the in January 1976 impelled Syria to step up its mediation effects. 
)ro-Syrian PLO military units were sent into Lebanon to be used as a counterweight against 
krafat's fighters. Syria also tried to defuse political tensions by helping draft-a compromise 
kage of political reforms, unveiled by President Franjieh on 14 Febuary. The package 
?red the Muslims equal representation in parliament, but otherwise fell far short of the 
;es sought by the LNM. On 11 March, Brigadier 'Aziz al-Ahdab occupied Beirut's 
;ion station and demanded Franjieh's resibnation. This was taken as a signal for a 
on the presidential palace by units of Ahmad al-Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army, which 
~cently split from the regular army. This move was blocked by pro-Syrian PLO units, 
were playing an increasing role in checking LNM efforts to secure an outright military 
r over the Maronite.157 
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Although Syria watched the dangerous security on its border intently, over a year of 
bloodletting and destruction passed before it intervened. Its inaction, in part was a result of 
the ingerent cautiousness of its Ba'thist leadership and the need for international 
acceptance of its intervention by Israel, the other Arab countries, the US, belied the 
pressure Syria was undergoing from various sources to stop the killing.158  
On 8 May 1976, under Syrian prompting, the Chamber of Deputies elected Elias 
Sarkis to become the next president when Franjieeh's term ran out in September. By this 
stage relations between the LNM and Syria had badly deteriorated.159 However, in May 
Syria, which had tried unsuccessfullly to mediate in the conflict, sent troops into Lebanon 
against the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, whom it had previously supported. Syria 
feared that if the PLO and LNM were victorious, it would be unable to control them and 
their victory would inevitably provoke an Israeli intervention, with the possibility of a new 
confrontation between Syria and Israel. Having been rescued by the Syrians, the Christian 
militias began a new offensive against Muslim and Palestinian areas.16o  By the end of 
September, the LNM and PLO had been subdued."" In the meantime the Maronite forces 
took advantage of the Syrian action against the LNM and PLO to attack Palestinian and 
Muslim enclaves in east Beirut. In early August, the Shiite Nab'a quarter fell. On 12 August, 
after a three-month siege, the Palestinian Tal al-Za'tar camp fell. More than a thousand of 
the camp's inhabitants were massacred during its evacuation.162  The Palestinians were 
forced to retreat from Beirut to their bases in the south. It was not until October that a 
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lasting cease-fire came into effect at a summit meeting of the League of Arab States (Arab 
League) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.163 
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CHAPTER - III 
CHAPTER-Ill 
The Maronite Christian in the Aftermath of the Civil War: 
1. The Slide toward Civil War 
Lebanon was divided between two large coalitions: the Lebanese Front, a Maronite 
Christian alliance between the private armies of the rival Gemayel, Chamoun and Franjieh 
families, who wanted to retain the existing political system, favoured links with the West 
and opposed direct Lebanese involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM), which was mainly Muslim and consisted of a close coalitions of 
mostly small left-wing parties who demanded a more representative political system, closer 
links with Arab world and a more active role for Lebanon in the conflict with Israel. The LNM 
was led by Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze-dominated Progressive Party (PSP), and enjoyed PLO 
support.164  
The rising strength of the Palestinian guerrillas prompted the Maronite organizations 
to seek to increase their own military power. The Maronite feared that political reforms 
would destroy the existing guarantees of Christian security and they also resented the 
freedom of action enjoyed by the PLO, as the incidents between Palestinian guerrillas and 
Maronite militiamen became more and more frequent around Palestinian refugee camps 
sited in Christian area. The Maronite leaders believed that it was important to reduce the 
Palestinians' power before PLO military might be able to be combined with Muslim 
superiority in numbers to threaten Christian privileges and security. The Maronite also 
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gambled on receiving support from outside forces-Arab states, Israel and the West-in the 
task of cutting the PLO down to size.165 
1.1 Beginning of the Civil War 
In early 1975, tensions started to increase. A prominent Sunni Muslim politician, 
Ma'ruf Sa'd, was assassinated in Sidon as he led a march to protest against a new fishing 
project planned by Camille Chamoun. The killing sparked off a round of fighting between the 
army and local Muslim militias, backed by PLO guerrillas.166 
In late February 1975, trouble broke out in Sidon over a controversy about fishing 
right which had been smoldering for several months. Camille Chamoun, headed a new 
concern, funded by Lebanese and Kuwaiti capital, that had been licensed for commercial 
fishing along the southern coast of Lebanon. The Proteine Company, as it was called, was to 
be an upscale enterprise using modern equipment and a mechanized fishing fleet. The local 
fishermen, still working the waters much as they had for thousands of years, were afraid 
that the new company would take most of the fish and destroy their livelihood. Although, 
some protections against such an outcome were offered, the issue was soon politicized into 
a struggle between the Muslim poor of Sidon and the mainly Christian rich who were to 
operate the Proteine Company. 
On February 26, a protest march led by the redoubtable Sidon rebel Ma'ruf Sa'd was 
halted by local police and elements of the army; the standoff soon deteriorated into a riot. 
Shots were fired, a soldier was died, and several of the demonstrators were wounded, 
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including their leader, Ma'ruf Sa'd, who died a few days later. Like magic, thousands 
demonstrated Beirut and Tripoli the following day, and the government responded by 
temporarily removing the governor of the southern region where Sidon is located. Although 
the issue had to do with the grant of an exclusive license to Chamoun and his business 
associates, it soon became a test of the government's authority in south Lebanon.167 
On 13 April, Maronite militias killed 27 Palestinians passing through the Christian 
'Ayn al-Rummana quarter of Beirut.168 The incident followed an attack by unknown gunmen 
earlier in the day on Kataeb leader Pierre Gemayel. Soon after that fighting broke out 
between Palestinians and the Kataeb in 'Ayn al-Rummanan and around the Palestinian 
camps in Christian east Beirut.169 
The political crisis caused by the fighting was briefly resolved by the formation of a 
new cabinet at the end of June by the new Prime Minister Rashid Karami. At the same time, 
a cease-fire agreement was signed between the commander of the army and PLO chairman 
Yasser Arafat. But in September, heavy fighting broke out again, and by the end of 1975 
Lebanon was in the throes of all-out Civil War,17° Attempts at inter-Lebanese political 
dialogue came to noting, as the Maronites pressed for army intervention to restore security 
and the LNM, viewing the army as biased in favour of the Christians, insisted that political 
reform should come first. Arafat kept the bold of the PLO's fighters out of the conflict, but 
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the PLO was active in arming and training LNM militiamen. The main beneficiaries of PLO 
help were the Sunni, Nasserist Murabitun and Amal.171  
During 19 months of civil war (April 1975-Nvovember 1976) some 25-40,000 people 
were killed in the various rounds of fighting. The over-whelming majority were non-
combatants. One estimate made by doctors in Beirut suggested that the ratios of militia to 
civilian deaths were 1:4 in the Christian community and 1:9 amongst the Muslims, indicating 
a more indiscriminate policy on the part of the predominantly Maronite militias of the right 
as compared with the Palestinian commandos and their mainly Muslim allies. These high 
rates of civilian mortality were partly due to the nature of street fighting in densely 
populated areas, for both sides fired mortars, rockets and shells at each other, often with 
scant regard for local inhabitants lying on the floors of their homes or huddled together in 
basements. But one of the more atrocious aspects of the war was the taking and killing of 
civilian hostages.'72 
2. The Israeli connection 
2.1 Israeli intervention 
In the summer of 1975, fighting broke out in Lebanon and it went against the 
Maronite Christians and the Phalange. Israel's response was to strengthen its ties with the 
Christian minority. Israel gave covert military aid to the Christians and, through the "Good 
Fence" policy along the Lebanon-Israel border, provided jobs and medical assistance to 
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residents of southern Lebanon.173 During Lebanon's bloody civil war (1975-1976), 
inhabitants of southern Lebanon-Christian, Druze and Moslem-turned to Israel for 
assistance after the savage fighting cut off the region's services and markets. Villagers came 
to Israel's border seeking medical assistance, fuel and water. In a humanitarian gesture, 
Israel opened the border, initiating its "Good Fence." In the first year of the Good Fence, 
over 25,000 Lebanese received medical attention at Israeli first-aid stations and clinics, with 
over 1,000 hospitalized in Israel.174 Israel had several reasons for supporting the Maronites 
at the beginning of the conflict, the border with Israel had been quiet and Lebanon had 
been a fairly stable country. In addition, the primary obstacle to the achievement of Syrian 
aims in Lebanon and the driving force behind opposition to the PLO was Camille Chamoun. 
President Sarkis, the Phalange led by Pierre Gemayel, and former president Suleiman 
Franjieh favored a continued Syrian presence within well-defined limits. Although 
Chamoun's militia numbered only some 4,000 compared to a Phalange militia of 10,000, 
Chamoun remained the most important Maronite leader and the only Lebanese figure 
willing to mobilize a general rightist resistance to Syria. Without external support his 
movement lacked the resources to challenged Syria. Israel became the main source of that 
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support.175  Israel watched the developments in Lebanon with concern. To the Likud 
government, the fighting provided an opportunity to weaken the Palestinian resistance,176 
Israel also sought to check Syrian influence in the country. It prevented Syria from 
extending its pacification efforts southward by establishing its "Red Line," defined as a point 
somewhere midway between Sidon and Tyre on the coast and the Syrian border. Although 
this area was controlled by the PLO-leftist coalition, Israel preferred their presence to having 
Syrian troops on its northern border.177 
Since the Palestinians constituted a well-trained force, Israel always felt threatened 
by them. And during the 1975-1976 Civil War when the Maronites considered partition and 
withdrew to Mount Lebanon, it was the Syrian forces whose intervention in favour of the 
Maronites led to the Palestinian defeats but for Israelis then, the removal of the Palestinians 
was crucial to the establishment of the Marontie state.178 Between 1975 and 1977, the 
Israeli Labour government invested $150 million in building up Maronite forces.179 
The overriding goal of Israel's new policy was to unify and strengthen the Christian 
troops vis-a-vis the PLO and its allies; however, Israel avoided direct military intervention on 
behalf of its Maronite friends. It hoped that its new alliance with the Maronites would 
further weaken the PLO and present vehement opposition to Syria's designs to establish 
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hegemony over Lebanon. Israeli attempts to create local Christian militia in the south were 
further sustained by a decision to keep the Israeli-Lebanese borders open under the "Good 
Fence Policy" in which Lebanese Christians were encouraged to seek job opportunities and 
medical treatment in northern Israel.18o  
Under the Good Fence arrangement the inhabitants of the southern Lebanon were 
able to obtain five basic services at the Lebanese-Israeli border: (1) they could receive 
medical aid, (2) participate in trade and commerce, (3) send and collect mail via the regular 
Israeli postal service, (4) visit relatives in Israel and (5) seek employment within Israel. 
Medical clinics were established along the Lebanese-Israeli border at Metulla, Dovev and 
Hanita and serious cases are transformed to Israeli hospitals.'8' 
With the coming to power of the Likud coalition in May 1977, Israeli links with the 
Maronites were further consolidated. At the same time, Syria's relations with The Christian 
Maronites began to deteriorate whereas relations with its former adversaries, the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese Leftist forces, improved. As a result, the new Israeli Prime 
Minister, Menachem Begin, extended a moral commitment to protect the Christians in 
Lebanon against what he termed "the war of annihilation" and pledged to increase military 
support to them. In other words, Israel's aid to the Maronites from now on was no longer 
on the dimension of "helping them help themselves" but had taken on the dimension of 
"helping the Maronites to help the Israelis eradicate the PRM threat".182 
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Israeli troops participated more actively in fighting against PRM forces in southern 
Lebanon and joined Christian militia forces in patrolling area. In response, the PRM militants 
joined their troops with those of the Lebanese Leftists, outnumbering the Christian forces. 
PRM fighters stepped up military activities against Israeli targets in the wake of the Begin 
government's intensification of settlement policies in the occupied territories and Begin's 
declaration that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "liberated territories" and integral parts 
of Israel. Such military operations culminated in a PRM attack upon an Israeli bus on the 
coastal road between Haifa and Tel Aviv, where in the ensuing battle with Israeli security 
forces thirty-four Israelis and six PRM commandos were killed, and seventy-four more 
wounded.183 
2.2 Syria Influence 
In January 1976, impelled Syria to step up its mediation effects. Pro-Syrian PLO 
military units were sent into Lebanon to be used as a counterweight against 'Arafat's 
fighters. Syria also tried to defuse political tensions by helping draft-a compromise package 
of political reforms, unveiled by President Franjieh on 14 February. The package offered the 
Muslims equal representation in parliament, but otherwise fell far short of the changes 
sought by the LNM. On 11 March, Brigadier 'Aziz al-Ahdab occupied Beirut's television 
station and demanded Franjieh's resignation. This was taken as a signal for a move on the 
presidential palace by units of Ahmad al-Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army, which had recently 
split from the regular army. This move was blocked by pro-Syrian PLO units, which were 
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playing an increasing role in checking LNM efforts to secure an outright military victory over 
the Maronite.184 
Although Syria watched the dangerous security on its border intently, over a year of 
bloodletting and destruction passed before it intervened. Its inaction, in part was a result of 
the inherent cautiousness of its Ba'thist leadership and the need for international 
acceptance of its intervention by Israel, the other Arab countries, the US, behind the 
pressure Syria was undergoing from various sources to stop the killing.1$' On 8 May 1976, 
under Syrian prompting, the Chamber of Deputies elected Elias Sarkis to become the next 
president when Franjieh's term ran out in September. By this stage relations between the 
LNM and Syria had badly deteriorated.186 However, in May Syria, which had tried 
unsuccessfully to mediate in the conflict, sent troops into Lebanon against the Palestinians 
and their Lebanese allies, whom it had previously supported. Syria feared that if the PLO and 
LNM were victorious, it would be unable to control them and their victory would inevitably 
provoke an Israeli intervention, with the possibility of a new confrontation between Syria 
and Israel. Having been rescued by the Syrians, the Christian militias began a new offensive 
against Muslim and Palestinian areas.187 By the end of September, the LNM and PLO had 
been subdued.188 In the meantime the Maronite forces took advantage of the Syrian action 
against the LNM and PLO to attack Palestinian and Muslim enclaves in east Beirut. In early 
August, the Shiite Nab'a quarter fell. On 12 August, after a three-month siege, the 
Palestinian Tal al-Za'tar camp fell. More than a thousand of the camp's inhabitants were 
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massacred during its evacuation.199 The Palestinians were forced to retreat from Beirut to 
their bases in the south. It was not until October that a lasting cease-fire came into effect at 
a summit meeting of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.19° 
2.3 1976 Riyadh-Cairo Arab Summit Conferences 
In October 1976, while the fighting continued the Saudi King Khaled invited five Arab 
leaders for an emergency conference to be held in Riyadh. The six leaders as member of the 
Arab League met in a limited Arab Summit in Riyadh from 16-18 October 1976. The Mini-
summit then worked out a series of agreement to resolve the Lebanese crisis. It called for an 
immediate ceasefire and for the establishment of a 30.000 man Arab deterrent Force (ADF) 
from their six Arab states. This force was composed of 24,000 man Syrian contingent, under 
the command of President Elias Sarkis.193 This was to strengthening the Arab Security Force 
(ASF) already in Lebanon in agreement with the Lebanese President who would be free to 
determine the size of each contributing country's force. The Riyadh resolutions were then 
ratified by the full plenary summit of the Arab League in Cairo on 25 and 26 October, 1976. 
The Riyadh-Cairo Arab Summit conferences amounted to a partial victory for Syria. It 
legitimized Syria's continued military presence in Lebanon. Syrian units made up most of the 
ADF coordination committee composed of representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
Kuwait besides the Syrians. By the end of 1976 a relative calm descended of Lebanon as the 
Civil War gradually came to an end. Though tensions continued to linger throughout the 
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country, the ferocity of violence of the past eighteen months subsided.192 In July 1977, the 
Syrians persuaded the Maronites and Palestinians to come to the conference table to sigh 
the Chtaura Agreement, which stipulated that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon would be 
monitored. Sarkis, in order to pacify the Muslims and Druze, also set up a Board of 
Reconstruction and Development in their welfare.193 
After the Riyadh Summit, Lebanon re-emerged with a confessional system and state 
as before. It re-emerged, however, maimed and divided. No longer did one hear the name 
Beirut without the adjectives 'East' or 'West'. These were right-wing areas and LNM areas. 
Confessionalism, thanks to Arab reactionaries and imperialism, had been maintained. This 
confessional state, however, by this time had lost its major feature: cohesion. Without 
cohesion such a state ruled only with the direct support of external forces. 
Most significant perhaps was the fact that the LNM had been contained. It still, 
however, enjoyed the allegiance of the majority of the Lebanese. It had also matured under 
fire and most important of all, it never relinquished its guns.194  
- Major Factors in the Crisis of 1975-76 
With the Palestinian issue as a catalyst, the following political processes were 
intensified. 
1. The impact on Lebanon of broader developments in the Arab world 
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2. Social developments in Lebanon 
3. The rise Syrian influence 
4. The mobilization of the Shii'te community 
5. Malfunctioning of the System.195 
3. Aftermath of the 1978 Israeli Invasion 
3.11978 - Operation Litani 
With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970, the collapse of the central 
Lebanese government, and the dismemberment of its army, the value of holding the 
Lebanese government responsible for. PRM attacks diminished.196 From an Israeli 
perspective, the onset of the civil war in Lebanon was not overly distressing because PLO 
troops were tied down in the conflict and PRM raids upon northern Israel were affected. In 
addition, Syrian intervention in the civil war, initially on the side of the Christian Maronites, 
tipped the local balance of Power against the Palestinians and Lebanese Leftists. This new 
situation forced the Israeli government to modify its tactics to meet the exigencies of the 
new order in Lebanon. In addition to continuing its policy of military reprisals against 
Palestinian positions, Israel initiated a policy of promoting local allies to fight the PRM 
groups; the policy took the form of overt military aid, training and backing for some local 
Christians in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Israel began covertly to support the 
Christian Phalang party of Pierre Gemayil and the national liberals of former Lebanese 
195 
Iramar Rabinovich and Hanna Zamir, Lebanon (AI-Jumhuriyya aI-Lubnaniyya),(Mecs Vol. 1 ed. Colin Legum 
1976-1977),p493-494. 
196 
For a useful study of Israel's military policy between 1975 and 1978, see Lewis W. Snider, P. Adward Haley, 
Abrahm R. Wagner, and Nicki J. Cohen, "Israel" in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis 
(Syracuse, 1970), pp. 91-112. 
106 
President — Camille Chamoun in the north.197 Between 1975 and 1977, the Israeli Labour 
government invested $ 150 million in building up Maronite forces.198 
- The Good Fence policy 
The overriding goal of Israel's new policy was to unify and strengthen the Christian 
troops vis-a-vis the PLO and its allies; however, Israel avoided direct military intervention on 
behalf of its Maronite friends. It hoped that its new alliance with the Maronites would 
further weaken the PLO and present vehement opposition to Syria's designs to establish 
hegemony over Lebanon. Israeli attempts to create local Christian militia allies in the south 
were further sustained by a decision to keep the Israeli-Lebanese borders open under the 
"Good Fence Policy" in which Lebanese Christians were encouraged to seek job 
opportunities and medical treatment in northern Israel.199 
Under the Good Fence arrangement the inhabitants of the southern Lebanon were 
able to obtain five basic services at the Lebanese-Israeli border: 
(1) They could receive medical aid, 
(2) participate in trade and commerce, 
(3) send and collect mail via the regular Israeli postal service, 
(4) visit relatives in Israel 
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(5) and seek employment within Israel. 
Medical clinics were established along the Lebanese — Israeli border at Metulla, Dovev and 
Hanita and serious cases are transformed to Israeli hospitals.200  
With the coming to power of the Likud coalition in May 1977, Israeli links with the 
Maronites were further consolidated. At the same time, Syria's relations with the Christian 
Maronites began to deteriorate whereas relations with its former adversaries, the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese Leftist forces, improved. As a result, the new Israeli Prime 
Minister, Menachem Begin, extended a moral commitment to protect the Christian in 
Lebanon against what he termed "the war of annihilation" and pledged to increase military 
support to them. In other words, Israel's aid to the Maronites from now on was no longer 
on the dimension of "helping them helps themselves", but had taken on the dimension of 
"helping the Maronites to help the Israelis eradicate the PRM threat.201  Israeli troops 
participated more actively in fighting against PRM forces in southern Lebanon and joined 
Christian militia forces in patrolling the area. In response, the PRM militants joined their 
troops with those of the Lebanese Leftists, outnumbering the Christian forces. PRM fighters 
stepped up military activities against Israeli targets in the wake of the Begin government's 
intensification of settlement policies in the occupied territories and Begin's declaration that 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "liberated territories" and integral parts of Israel, Such 
military operations culminated in a PRM attack upon an Israeli bus on the coastal road 
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between Haifa and Tel Aviv, where in the ensuing battle with Israeli security forces thirty-
four Israelis and six PRM commandos were killed, and seventy-four more wounded.202  
On March 11, 1978, eleven terrorists belonging to the Fatah organization set out 
from Damour on the Lebanese coast and landed in two rubber boats on the Israeli coast, 
about 30 km south of Haifa near Kibbutz Maagan Michael. There they killed a woman 
strolling along the beach. Continuing on to the nearby Tel Aviv -- Haifa highway, they 
stopped a Haifa — bound bus with Israeli weekend travelers, boarded it, and forced the 
driver to turn around and head towards Tel Aviv. Firing at the traffic passing in both 
directions, they killed and wounded a number of people.203  
On March 13, 1978, the Israeli government ordered its armed forces to occupy a 10 
kilometers strip in southern Lebanon to create a "security belt", free from PLO forces along 
its northern, borders,204 and by March 19, Israel expanded its military operation northwards 
to the "Litani River". The Litani Operation took place just before dawn on 14 March, when 
Israeli artillery opened up on Lebanese villages held by the Palestinians and Leftists. The 
shelling was followed by a ground attack with approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers 
advancing on five axes.205 The objective of the invasion was to wipe out all PRM 
concentrations along the entire length of the Israeli-Lebanese border and to destroy all their 
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special bases from which the PRM commandos set out on missions deep inside Israeli 
territory.206  
According to Ezer Waizman, the Minister of Defence, Israel had extended its military 
control all the way to Litani River to define the zone that UN-Peace-Keeping Troops would 
monitor.207 Both Israel and the PLO accepted UN Security Council Resolution 425, which 
called upon Israel to withdraw its troops, demanded that the PLO cease its military 
operations, and proposed the introduction of UN Peace-Keeping Forces.208 On 19 March 
1978, hours after the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had begun to move towards the Litani, the. 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425. The two key points of the resolution which was 
sponsored by the US, were: 
(1) A call upon Israel to immediately "cease its military action against Lebanese 
territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese 
territory", and 
(2) The establishment of a United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon for 
the purpose of "confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring 
international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in 
ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area".209 
206 See text of the special communique issued by Israel on the eve of the invasion, Arab World Weekly 
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Despite its vehement opposition to the US-sponsored Resolution 425, Israel declared 
unilateral ceasefire two days later. The Israeli Defence Minister met with Commander of 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and Commander of the newly 
appointed UNIFIL. At the meeting three points were agreed upon between Israel and the UN 
officer. 
1. The area overrun by the IDF in the second stage of the invasion would become a 
'Buffer Zone'; 
2. UNIFIL would be responsible for patrolling the buffer zone; and 
3. The strip of territory lying between the Israeli-Lebanese Boundary and the UNIFIL 
buffer zone would be designated a "peace zone" to be patrolled by the militia of 
Major Hadad and units of the Lebanese army. Israel would be permitted to 
continue its "Good Fence Policy" with the Lebanese inhabitants of the border 
regime. 
Consequently, instead of being pressured into turning over its ten-kilometre "Security Belt" 
to UNIFIL, Israel simply bargained away its additional conquests, thereby buying time in 
which to solidify Hadad's grip on the strip of Lebanese territory.210 The UNIFIL encountered 
serious difficulties in the field, and proved incapable of accomplishing the task assigned to it. 
The South Lebanese Army (SLA) of Major Saad Hadad and the Israelis opposed any 
deployment of UN soldiers in the zones under their control in the south. 
In addition, there were numerous clashes between the Palestinian Progressive and the SLA 
in which UNIFIL has been involved. Although the UN troops installed themselves in the north 
of 'Hadadland', they were unable to separate the Sla completely from its Palestinian 
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Progressive opponents because a gap remained in the narrow Litani Valley around the 
Beaufort Castle, allowing the two sides to cross swords. This gap was also one of the 
principal routes of Israeli penetration during Operation Peace in Galilee.211  
In late 1979 the PRM commandos began a process of entrenchment in Lebanon. 
Guerrilla-type operations, which had constituted a nuisance for Israel, were replaced with 
establishing long-range potential through the deployment of Katyusha rocket launchers and 
artillery. The PLO had started to change its strategy to concentrate on establishing an 
intensive civilian and military infrastructure. It was creating what came to be referred to as 
its "state within a state", including a semi-regular army?lz 
The one change, which Begin did introduce, and which was a sign for the future, was 
that Israel could conceivably assist the Maronites on the battle ground as well.2U As a result, 
in spring and summer, 1981, the Begin government noticeably increased its military 
pressure against the PLO and stepped up military assistance to its Christian allies. In reaction 
to Syria's attempt to implement a limited programme for national reconciliation inside 
Lebanon, which would allow more power for Lebanon's Muslim majority Israel deployed 
some of its troops to preserve the privileged position of its Christian friends and to protect 
them from Syrian military moves initiated to end Phalange opposition. Begin's government 
did not welcome Syrian moves and, as a warning, shutdown two Syrian helicopters carrying 
their supplies in the Bekaa Valley. The Israeli operation was codenamed "the French 
Corridor". In response, the Syrian government installed anti-aircraft missiles (SAM-6) in 
central Lebanon and additional batteries were placed on the Syrian border with Lebanon. 
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Scud surface-to-surface missiles were placed on the outskirts of Damascus bringing within 
their range much of Israeli territories. The Syrian action brought Israel and Syria on the brink 
of war.214 Meanwhile, the Israeli government maintained its pressure upon the PLO in an 
attempt to force it out of southern Lebanon and launched a large ground assault in June. A 
month later, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) waged a massive aerial bombardment against the 
PLO's headquarters in West Beirut. In return, the PLO began shelling Israeli's northern 
settlements in the Galilee region. Israel's air raids resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties, 
prompting the administration of Ronald Reagan to dispatch Philip Habib as a presidential 
envoy to mediate a ceasefire agreement between Israel and the PLO. The US appealed for 
immediate ceasefire in south Lebanon and Habib attempted to reach one, with the help of 
Saudi Arabia. Israel initially refused to go along reiterating its long-standing refusal to deal 
with the PLO and claimed that it was Syria, which instigated the PRM attacks. Yet, in the 
end, Begin had to yield to American pressure and agree to a ceasefire negotiated by Habin 
on 24 July; 1981.215  
The ceasefire proved to be a political setback for Israel. One of its terms forbade 
both Israel and the PLO from attacking each other across the Israeli-Lebanese border and 
more important "constituted de-facto Israeli recognition of the PLO, despite Israeli denials 
and Habib's inventive obfuscation that the truce was concluded between Israeli 
territory".216 
3.2 Consequences of the invasion 
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Pointless "terrorism" rhetoric aside, the Israeli invasion triggered a flood of refugees 
away from South Lebanon that totaled 285,000, according to the Lebanese government. 
Three-quarter of them were Lebanese, the rest were Palestinian, They settled on the 
outskirts of Beirut, many of them in South Beirut—the Shiite stronghold that, within a few 
years, would incubate a then-unknown organization: Hezbollah. 
Within seven weeks of the attack Israel withdrew from two-thirds of the territory it 
had captured, occupying a strip of territory along the border with Lebanon that it 
euphemistically began to call a "security zone." It would not give up that strip until 2000. A 
United Nations contingent of peacekeepers, the 6,000-strong United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon, took up posts in the territory between the Litani River and Israel's occupation 
zone. 
Israel's aim was to clear South Lebanon of Palestinian guerillas in hopes of ending 
Palestinian attacks on Israel. But the invasion merely moved the Israeli-Palestinian front 20 
miles north—and laid the groundwork for the much bloodier, more extensive invasion to 
come four years later, in June 1982.21' 
4. 1932  Israeli Invasion and the Role of Maronite Christian 
4.1 Towards the Mounting Crisis of 1982 
As has been seen the second Likud government, which came to power in June 1981, 
was the most hawkish regime since the creation of the Jewish State. Prime Minister Begin, 
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Israel Chief-of-Staff Rafael 
Eitan-the four men who determined Israel' foreign and security policies – strongly believed 
in finding military solutions to Israel's security problems. They shared an unyielding hostility 
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towards the PLO, a propensity towards adopting extreme military solutions, a belligerent 
foreign policy, and distrust and hatred of the Arabs.218 According to their shared view, the 
PLO was Israel's greatest enemy and should be destroyed by military means". They did not 
believe in the ceasefire, which they saw as providing only an excuse for the PRM militants to 
rearm. 
219 
Indeed, Ariel Sharon declared that he had been planning the operation since he took 
office in summer 1981.220 In addition, the need to destroy the PLO's political and military 
infrastructure was advanced by senior Israeli military officers who wanted to establish a 
strong central Maronite government that would closely cooperate with Israel to expel the 
PLO and the Syrians from Lebanon. On December 2, 1982, Sharon was reported to have 
discussed his plans to destroy the PLO in Lebanon with Philip Habib, but the State 
Department in Washington did not take Sharon seriously. A month later, Sharon secretly 
visited Beirut where he discussed with his Christian allies his plan for the forthcoming war 
against the PLO.221  Shortly after Sharon's trip, Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence Yehoshua 
Saquy visited the US and met with senior military and civilian officials in the Reagan 
administration, including Secretary Alexander Haig. The aim of the Meeting was to inform 
US officials about a possible military operation against the Palestinians in Lebanon and to 
define what constituted a breach of the July 1981 ceasefire agreements between Israel and 
the PLO. Saguy also hoped to convince the US officials that the ceasefire agreement should 
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not only be applied to the Israeli-Lebanese borders. Around the same time, Israel's former 
ambassador to the US, Moshe Arens, announced that the Israeli invasion was a "matter of 
time".222 In spring 1982, Journalists used various scenarios, maps, and commentaries in the 
US media to speculate about the scope, nature, and intensity of the inevitable Israeli 
military operation in Lebanon.
223  
The timing for the invasion caused controversy inside Israeli ruling class. Before April 
25, 1982, the date for the final Israeli pullback from Sinai, a group of Israeli policy makers led 
by Sharon and Israeli Chief of Staff Eitan wanted to send the Israeli army into Lebanon.224  In 
their view a large-scale military operation against the PLO in Lebanon would probably 
trigger a hostile reaction in Egypt that would countervail the peace treaty. Israel could then 
use this reaction as a pretext to perpetuate its control of Sinai. Sharon did not want to delay 
implementation of his war plans or wait for clear PLO violations of the ceasefire. From this 
perspective, any provocation emanating from Palestinian sources anywhere would suffice. 
Another group of Israeli policy makers, led by Prime Minister Begin, was more cautious 
about the timing of the war and favoured returning Sinai on time because the war against 
the PLO could be waged at a later date to compensate Israel for the "national trauma" that 
it experienced as a result of its evacuation from Sinai.
225  
On several occasions, Israel tried to provoke the Palestinians in Lebanon into a 
breach of the 1981 ceasefire agreement by striking at Palestinian positions. On April 21, 
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1982, the IAF bombed PLO bases in response to an Israeli soldier. As similar bombing raid 
took place on May 9. In both cases, the PLO exercised considerable restraint so as not to 
provide the advocates of the war in the Begin government with the pretext to implement 
their military plans. Through different channels, PLO leaders were well aware of the details 
of Israel's plan to invade Lebanon and instructed their forces in the front to refrain from 
responding to Israel's provocations. When the PLO failed to clearly breach the agreement, 
senior Israeli officials, as has been noted before, insisted that the ceasefire agreement 
should not be confined to Israeli-Lebanese borders but should include Israel proper, the 
occupied territories, and the world at large. This loose interpretation widened the 
opportunities for Israel to strike back at the PRM, as this arrangement was bound to be 
violated by any radical group within or outside the PLO that was dissatisfied with the 
agreement. 
The shots fired, on June 3, at the Israeli Ambassador, Shlomo Argov in London were 
extremely tenuous grounds for justifying the "retaliatory" bombings of June 4 on the 
Lebanese capital, Beirut and on Palestinian refugee camps in the south of the country. Two 
hundred dead against one man seriously sounded — this awoke memories of punitive mass 
executions in the Third Reich.226  The justification for a large-scale invasion was even 
thinner-and the Israelis realized this. So the Israeli government used the PRM reaction to 
their air-raids, i.e. the attacks on settlements in north Galilee on 4 and 5 June 1982 (only 
one Israeli Killed) as the pretext and explanation for their invasion of Lebanon. The 
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operation was codenamed "Peace for Galilee" and the watchword was "40 kilometers .(25 
miles) north.
227  
4.2 Operation Peace for Galilee-1982 
The 1982 Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon was not an accident, nor was it launched in 
response to a major military provocation or crisis. The Israeli invasion could be termed as a 
"flagrant and barbaric" aggression against the PLO, which Israel attempted to disguise under 
the spurious label of a "Peace for Galilee" operation. In actuality, the invasion under active 
preparation since august 1981 when Aerial Sharon, architect of the war, was appointed 
Israeli Defense Minister.228 General Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, disclosed that "the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon had been planned to take place in July 1981 and had been postponed 
after the ceasefire arranged by Philip Habib, the US envoy".229 Israel's belligerent intention 
was seen clearer when the General, in a well-publicized speech to a school gathering in 
Tiberias, said: "only a military operation can give us peace it is not true that there is no 
military solution of the problem of the terrorists".230  
In addition to the destruction of the PLO as a military and political force, and 
crushing Palestinian nationalism, Israel also sought to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To eliminate the PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza in the expectation that, being 
deprived of PLO support, the Palestinians in the occupied territories would drop their 
227 
Ibid. 
228 
Rowley, n. 5 p. 141. 
229 
Financial Times, 3 July 1982. 
230 
Quoted in Michael Jansen, The Battle of Beirut. Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London, 1982), p. 2; See also 
Jerusalem Post, 30 May 1981. 
118 
opposition to Israeli rule, submit to the Camp Dave formula of autonomy and facilitate 
Israel's annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Z. To expel the PLO, its armed forces and the Palestine refugees from Lebanon. This 
objective was shared by Israel's Phalangist allies. 
3. To inflict a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army Lebanon so as to effect its total or 
partial withdrawal. 
4. To install Bashir Gemayel as the President of Lebanon and impose Lebanese Front control 
throughout the Lebanese polity. 
5. And to sign a peace treaty with Lebanon, similar to that which was made with Egypt. 
It should be noted at this point that the invasion was ambitiously conceived as 
triggering a chain reaction, each stage leading logically and inevitably to the next. The 
destruction of the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon and the defeat of the Syrian army there 
was expected to pave the way for the reconstruction of the Lebanese state and political 
system under the hegemony of Israel's allies. The Israelis calculated that once the PLO was
crushed and the Syrian military power in Lebanon destroyed, the internal balance of power 
would tilt in favour of the Christians. The Lebanese Front led by the Phalangists would 
emerge as the predominant force in the country and with the leverage provided by the IDF's 
presence it would be in a position to install Gemayel as the President of Lebanon. 
The government of Gemayel, dependent as it would inevitably by on Israel, would 
then sign a formal peace treaty with the latter. This treaty would satisfy two-long standing 
119 
ambitions with regard to Lebanon. First, it would accord Israel full diplomatic recognition 
and second, it would provide effective Israeli control over south Lebanon.231  
Israel's control over southern Lebanon would give it access to the Litani River, which 
could be exploited to meet Israel's water needs.232  Further, Lebanon could serve as a market 
for Israeli products and a bridge for economic penetration into the Arab world. 
Finally, domestic political considerations were also operative in the Israeli decision 
to war. The support given to Prime Minister Begin by the Israeli public following the Israeli 
strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and Begin's reelection in June 1981 emboldened the 
hawkish elements in the Likud administration to launch a campaign against the PLO, 
particularly as the overwhelming majority of the Israeli public harboured no sympathy 
towards the PNM. 
4.3 Beginning of the Invasion 
The war began by massive aerial bombardment of Beirut and south Lebanon on 4 
and 5 June 1982. These bombardments were followed by a land invasion on 6 June. On the 
same day the Security Council issued resolution 509 which demanded that Israel withdraw 
its military forces "forthwith and unconditionally" to the internationally recognized 
boundaries of Lebanon. Israel stated it would not comply and the IDF continued to blast its 
way towards Beirut destroying towns, villages and Palestinian refugee camps. The invasion 
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took the form of a four-pronged attack that aimed at Beirut, the Beirut-Damascus road, 
Syrian Position in Bekaa valley and alongside Mount Hermon.
233  
It is estimated that the Israelis rapidly deployed in Lebanon a force of 120,000 with 
1,600 tanks, 1,600 armored personnel carriers, 600 multiple rocket launchers (including at 
least 500 self-propelled howitzers or field guns). The Israelis also put into operation modern 
combat aircraft with intensive naval support.234 Compared to this the PLO with only 14,000 
guerrillas was poorly equipped and its heavy weapons included obsolete T-34 tanks, 122 
mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm howitzers, Bm-21 mobile, 30 or 40 — tube multiple rocket 
launchers, BRDM-2 scout cars, BTR-152 personnel carriers, SA-7 and SA-9 missile launchers, 
and ZSU-23-4 mobile radar-guided anti-aircraft it guns.Z35 Unlike Israel, the PLO did not 
have the resources to fight such a war, which was no less than the 1956, 1967 or 1973 Arab-
Israeli war. 
It is firmly evidenced that the US not only supplied the Israeli forces with the latest 
cluster bombs, incendiary phosphorous bombs band vacuum (suction) bombs but also the 
American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean collaborated in the war. Some of the war's much 
heralded F-15s and F-16s flew missions from the air bases in Negev, Uvda and Ramori was 
US financed. The US transferred some of extremely lethal anti personnel weapons such as 
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cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs to the IAF from the Pincintinny Arsenal before the 
war. 236 
4.4 Main Phases of the War 
Israel's Northern Command under Major General-Amir Drori committed to battle a 
total of six divisions in addition to two independent task forces below the division level. Of 
the six divisions four were designated for the western and central sectors. The remaining 
two divisions and the two task forces were designated for eastern sector. The objective of 
the two divisions operating in the western sector was the destruction of the PLO and 
establishing links with the Lebanese Forces in East Beirut. The two divisions operating in the 
central sector were responsible for cutting off the Syrian troops stationed in the Bekaa 
Valley from the PLO and Beirut area. Once this was achieved the Syria troops in the Bekaa 
would be faced with the threat of an encirclement from the west. The two divisions and the 
two task forces earmarked for the eastern sector would then begin their assault on the 
Syrian army from below, i.e. from the south northwards into the Bekaa.237 
For analytical purposes and as a way of ordering the rapid succession of events the 
invasion can be divided in four distinct phases each with its own particular emphasis. 
(a). The First Phase: Sweep Across Southern Lebanon 
During the first three days of the invasion Israel's major war effort was confined to 
the western and central sectors. in the western sector the Israeli army joined by special IDF 
units landed from the sea rapidly advanced forwards Damor, a PLO stronghold. The coastal 
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towns on way to Damour were bypassed, besieged and then captured later on — a strategy 
necessitated due to the twin requirements of rapid advance and keeping Israeli casualties 
down to the minimum. The PLO put up only a limited resistance and sought to withdraw as 
much of its men and material to the north as possible.23$ 
As compared to the western sector, the advance of the Israeli army in the central 
sector was relatively slower due to the rugged mountainous terrain. The aim was to reach 
Beirut-Damascus highway and the to cut off the Beirut area and central sector from the 
main body of Syrian forces stationed in the east of Bekaa Valley. An important landmark of 
this phase of fighting in the central sector was the capture of Beaufort castle by the men of 
the elite Golani Brigade. The massive fortress, situated 717 metres above sea level had over 
the years become a symbol of Palestinian resistance. The IAF had in the past bombed it time 
and again, but the Palestinians defending the fortress fought to the last man even though 
they knew that there was no hope. Soon after the fall of the Beaufort, Begin and Sharon 
arrived at the castle and in a brief ceremony handed it over to Haddad.239 
(b) The Second Phase: War with Syria 
By the fourth day of the war the whole coastal region of Lebanon had become under 
Israeli control. The army in the western sector had reached the outskirts of Beirut's 
southern suburbs and established links with the Phalangists controlling East Beirut. In the 
central sector, the Israeli army had reached very near the Beirut-Damascus highway thought 
it had yet to take control of this strategic road. The Israeli forces in the eastern sector now 
began to exert pressure on the Syrian troops stationed in the Bekaa Valley taking full 
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advantage of the fact that the latter had already been encircled from the west by the 
advancing Israeli column in the central sector.2A° 
The aim was to dislodge or at least neutralize the Syrian army stationed here. Once 
this was done, the Syrian capability to influence political developments in Lebanon would be 
severely curtailed. 
On 9 June at 2 pm, the IAF went into action attacking the Syrian air defense missile 
system in the Bekaa. The Syrians responded by sending out scores of interceptors into the 
sky in a bid to protect their missiles from the Israeli attack. "The result was one of the 
biggest air battles in history. Some supersonic jet fighters targeting, dodging and firing at 
each other over an area of approximately 2,500 square kilometers. The Syrian Air force was 
no match to the IAF. The Syrian lost ninety of their Soviet-built Mig 23s and 21s with no loss 
to the IAF and nineteen of the SAM 2,3 and 6 batteries were destroyed.Zal 
The air attack on the Syrian missile batteries was accompanied by a ground attack 
against the Syrian army stationed in the Bekaa. Shorn of its air support and heavily 
outnumbered the Syrian army soon found itself in a very precarious situation. In three days 
of intensive battle, the Syrian army was pushed back several kilometers, lost a large number 
of 1-72  tanks and the IDF was on the verge of taking control of the Beirut-Damascus 
highway.242 In this moment of crisis, President Hafez al-Assad (Assad) secretly flew to 
Moscow and appealed to his soviet allies for immediate help and protection. This prompted 
Leonid Brezhnev to contact President Ronald Reagan on the hotline urging the American 
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president to restrain Israel. On 11 June under American pressure Israel ultimately agreed to 
a ceasefire in the eastern sector negotiated by Philip Habib.243  
The acceptance of the ceasefire was a tactical move on the part of the Israelis. lsrel 
had already inflicted a crushing defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon. Had it continued its 
drive against the Syrians, there was a likelihood of the war spreading to the Golan Heights 
and Soviet intervention. Israel wanted to avoid such unnecessary complications since it had 
already neutralized the bulk of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. 
Hostilities between Israel and Syrians ended temporarily with a cease fire which 
came into effect on 11 June. The ceasefire did not apply to the PLO. The ceasefire, however, 
prevented the IDF from gaining control over the Beirut-Damascus highway and the hills 
overlooking Beirut which were Syrian hands. To overcome such a drawback, Israel's Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon instructed his officers in the field to "creep" hill by hill in order to seize 
the Syrian positions at Aley and Bhamdoun. This was called the "creeping ceasefire". 
However, the "creeping ceasefire" did not creep fast enough to satisfy the defense Minister 
and Israeli forces were ordered to disregard the ceasefire and to attack AJey and Bhamdoun 
and to secure the highway as for as those two towns. After this was done another and more 
lasting Israeli-Syrian ceasefire was concluded on 25June. 
(c) The third Phase: Terror Bombing and Siege of Beirut 
Having thus ended its offensive against the Syrians, the IDF could now concentrate 
on the PLO which was completely surrounded in West Beirut. 
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On 10'June Israeli troops, which had moved along the coast road and bypassed Tyre 
and Sidon, penetrated one of Beirut's suburbs and linked with their allies , the Phalangists 
who controlled East Beirut. PLO forces were thus completely surrounded in West Beirut and 
then commenced their siege which was to last two and a half months. 
Israel's military leaders imagined that they would be able to reduce PLO forces and 
force them into surrender by massive terror bombing by land, sea and air. Accordingly, 
millions of bombs were poured on West Beirut between 10 June and 12August 1982. It was 
estimated that on certain days 170,000 to 180,000 shells and bombs fell on West Beirut, 
including residential quarters. It was said that the TNT equivalent of explosives directed at 
West Beirut by Israeli forces in 1982 was equal to that used in the two nuclear attacks on 
Japan in 1945. 
The bombardments were carried out with the latest deadly and destructive 
American weapons: air-burst bombs, fragmentation bombs and shells, cluster bombs, 
phosphorus bombs and suction (vacuum) bombs.244  
The bombing was indiscriminate: Palestinian refugee camps, residential quarters, 
apartment buildings, schools, air raid shelters, hospitals and embassies were hit spreading 
death and destruction everywhere in the city. 
To increase the terror, the bombing was accompanies by the dropping of leaflets 
warning the inhabitants to leave the city to save their lives. The international Commission 
stated that it considers that the Israeli plan was to terrorize the population, so as to make 
244 
For a description of these weapons and their devastating effects, see Report of the International 
Commission, Israel n Lebanon (London, 1983), pp.152 ff., and pp.230ff.; Kevin Danaher, "Israel's Use of Cluster 
Bombs in Lebanon", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 44/45, 1982, pp. 48 ff. One cluster bomb releases some 
600 to 700 bomblets which can kill every human being an area the size of a football field; 
126 
the situation for the PLO untenable by bringing to bear on it the wrath of the population for 
the horrors of the siege. But although 200,000 of the 500,000 living in West Beirut left, the 
terror bombing failed to break the spirit of those who remained of the PLO defenders.245  
What is incredible is that the Israeli authorities made of the terror bombing of 
Beirut, with its death scenes, raging fires and collapse of buildings, a tourist attraction, two 
Israeli journalists reported that: "the Israelis took to busing delegations of honored guests 
from abroad to an observation point in East Beirut to watch as planes dropped their bombs 
from high attitudes and plumes of black smoke billowed up from the city — treating the war 
a spectator sport".246 
Simultaneously with the terror bombing, the Israeli army imposed a blockade on the 
city: water, foodstuffs, electricity and petrol were cut off. Contrary to all civilized rules, even 
the entry of medicines, blood and medical equipment for hospitals, and, on certain 
occasions, of doctors, surgeons and nurses was not allowed into West Beirut.247 And this 
happened despite the protests of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRS) and 
UN resolutions. A complete famine was avoided by reason of the few convoys allowed to 
pass and because the PLO distributed free the food stuffs, especially flour, taken from its 
stocks.248 Like the bombardments, the blockade affected the civilian population above all. 
For this reason, it was contrary to the laws of war and to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949 which prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. 
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Although the PLO was the declared target of the siege strategy and a number of its 
fighters were killed and its installations destroyed in the bombardments, the strategy did 
not directly secure the PLO evacuation. 
The bombardments did not do the trick, not even during the stepped-up raids and 
shelling, which began on 1 August and ended on 12 after an uninterrupted 11 hours of 
pounding. It was reported that the bombardments had little effect on the Palestinian 
guerrillas in and around West Beirut — while large sections of the city — have been pounded 
into rubble, the guerrillas are emerging from basement shelters, holes and sandbagged 
positions almost unscathed — where the guerrillas have lost men, it has been mainly in fixed, 
exposed positions — Doctors at hospitals and first-aid centres say the over whelming 
majority of victims are civilians".249 
Nor did the blockade, after nearly a month of its imposition, it was reported that: 
The Israeli blockade has yet to have any effect on the guerrillas. While visiting 
position I (in the Ouzai area) a truck drove up dropping off piles of feshly baked loafs 
of Arabic bread, fresh figs, water and tinned meats and fish. The guerrillas said they 
have enough canned food and rice to last for six months and insisted that a visitor 
take some figs back with him to West Beirut."' 
Nor did the psychological warfare, it was apparent that the morale of PLO fighters had been 
always high, even in one of the most exposed and heavily attacked positions, at Tahwita 
near the Lebanese international airport. 
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Unlike in the city proper, the Palestinians have built no artificial defences here. Lush 
vegetation provides all the cover they need. There was an Israeli position just 200 
yard away. "Just volunteer from the Palestinian diasporas, who had returned to 
Beirut from a comfortable job in Phoenix, Arizona. The picture the guerrillas convey 
(of the IDF) is that of a great military machine hamstrung by fear of high casualties, 
and reliance on high technology. 
The commander, Abu Khalid, and his men, it was stated, "have no illusion like 
anybody else, about Israel's ability to defeat them (PLO) by destroying Beirut".251 
The whole world which followed the horrors of the war in press reports, on radio 
and television was appalled by Israel's barbarity during its siege of Beirut. Denis Walters, 
British Member of Parliament, expressed the revulsion felt everywhere in a letter to the 
times in which he said; 
For seven weeks now the Israeli Air Force, equipped with the full and latest might of 
American air power, has been pouring its high explosives and cluster bombs on 
military and civilian targets alike while the Israeli artillery and the navy bombard the 
city from land and sea. Cruel psychological warfare, involving the cutting of water 
and electricity, shooting up food conveys and holding up medical supplies, have all 
been used.252 
it must be noted that during this phase of Israeli campaign, there were elementary 
decency and humanity call for immediate action. The Security Council demanded from Israel 
on 19 June (Resolution 512), 4 July (Resolution 513), 22 July (Resolution515) and again on 12 
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August (Resolution 518) to lift the blockade on vital facilities, such as water, electricity, food 
and medical supplies for the civilian population. 
(d) The Fourth Phase: Assassination of Bashir Gemayil and the Massacre at Sabra and 
Shatila 
While the evacuation of Palestinians was underway, the Lebanese Parliament was 
convened on 23 August, 1982 under the shadow of Israeli guns to elect a new President. 
Hectic preparations had been going on during the weeks of siege for the presidential 
elections. Gemayil's candidacy was opposed by a formidable alliance of Sunni leaders from 
West Beirut, parliamentary representatives from Tripoli and northern Bekaa and deputies 
owing allegiance to Suleiman Franjieh. They gave a call to boycott the elections, which 
according to them was being held under conditions of occupation. 
in order to be successful Gemayel (then Commander of the Maronite militia) needed 
the support of sixty-two deputies (two-thirds of the total strength the Chamber) which was 
also the number that constituted a quorum necessary to start the election procedure. Since 
deputies openly opposed to the holding of elections numbered thirty, it became imperative 
for Israel and the Phalangists to ensure the presence and support of every one of the 
remaining sixty-two deputies from the south not to boycott the election while Gemayel's 
campaign manager Zahi Bustani sought to mobilize support by offering liberal suns of 
money as bribe. 
The venue of the election was shifted from the Parliament building in West Beirut to 
the Military Academy at Fayadiya barracks located in firm Christian territory. On the day of 
the polling Israel and the Phalangists managed to assemble sixty-two deputies. Squads of 
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heavily armed Phalangists were seen escorting some of them while the IDF airlifted some 
from the sotith.z53 in the first ballot Gemayil failed to win the support of all the sixty-two 
deputies. In the second ballot he required only a simple majority to win and this he got 
easily. Fifty-seven of the deputies voted in his favours while five abstained.254 
With Gemayel elected to the presidency of Lebanon, Israel was well on its way 
towards achieving its ambitious goals in Lebanon. Within a few months Israel had inflicted a 
humiliating defeat on the Syrian army, forces the PLO to withdraw from Beirut and managed 
to get its foremost ally elected to the highest office in Lebanon. Later developments, 
however, were to prove that the hopes engendered by these early successes were at best 
premature. 
The first setback to Israel's elaborately conceived grand design came in mid-
September. On September 14, the President-elect Gemayel was assassinated in a 
tremendous explosion in his party's headquarters in East Beirut.255 His murder came as a 
major shock to the Israelis. There were fears that his death might throw the Israeli position 
in Lebanon into turmoil and place question marks overall the Israeli success. A situation of 
uncertainty was created and Israel's immediate reaction was to occupy West Beirut so as to 
be in a position to control subsequent developments.7S6 Thus, within hours of Gemayel's 
death, the IDF moved into West Beirut in contravention of the agreement with Habib. Begin 
and Sharon justified the decision in terms of maintenance of law and order. The Israeli 
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cabinet subsequently issued a statement claiming that the occupation had been carried out 
"in order to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and anarchy, while about two 
thousand Palestinian commandos equipped with modern and heavy weapons remained in 
West Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement.257 
On 15 September as the occupation of West Beirut was under way a meeting was 
held between Chief of Staff Eitan and Phalangist officers in Beirut. It was decided that the 
Phalangists would enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila to clear the 
camps of Palestinian guerrillas, capture the PLO headquarters and collect arms. The 
following day General Amos Yaron, Divisional Commander of the IDF co-coordinated the 
details of the Phalangist entry into the camps with Elie Habeika, the Intelligence Chief of the 
Phalangists and a man with long-standing reputation for violent acts against Palestinians. At 
night the Phalangists entered the Shatila camp passing through the positions of the IDF. 
Following the entry of the Phalangists into the camps there were numerous signs 
that they had become quickly engaged in the killing of civilians. 
On Friday 17 September General Yehoshua Saguy was notified that the Phalangists 
were carrying out the massacre of civilians. On the same day Foreign Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir was informed by his cabinet colleague Mordechai Tzipori that the Phalangists had 
killed a large number of civilians in the camp. Both Saguy and Shamir completely ignored the 
information. When General Eitan received the same information he not only agreed to the 
continuation of the Phalangist operation until 5 am the next day but also allowed the entry 
of another Phalangist unit into Sabra. Sharon who was notified by the Chief of Staff by 9 pm 
on Friday that the Phalangists had indulged in large-scale killing of civilians also did not 
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order immediate removal of the Christian forces. By the time the Phalangists were finally 
ordered to leave the camps about a thousand men; women and children had been 
slaughtered.ZSB 
The news of the massacre at Sabra and Shatila led to a storm of criticism throughout 
the world. More important, it touched off a tremendous outcry within Israel. Spontaneous 
demonstrations took place in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Heifa and Eilat. The Labour party accused 
the government of indirect culpability and demanded a judicial commission of enquiry. in 
response to a call by the Labour party a massive demonstration against Begin government 
took place in Tel Aviv on 25 September. An estimated 400,000 people participated making it 
one of the largest protest demonstrations ever to be held in the country,259 
Faced with this upsurge of unprecedented public criticism Prime Minister Begin was 
forced to appoint a commission of enquiry on 1 October to investigate the responsibility for 
the massacres in the refugee camps in West Beirut.26o 
Embarrassed by the massacre and the reactions it had elicited, the Begin 
government hastened to withdraw the IDF from West Beirut. The MNF which had 
withdrawn from Lebanon after the evacuation of Palestinians was reassembled and again 
deployed in various parts of the city.261 Meanwhile, presidential elections were held once 
again in Lebanon to elect a successor to the outgoing President Elias Sarkis. Amin Gemayil, 
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elder brother of assassinated Bashir Gemayil was chosen to be the Phalangist presidential 
candidate. Unlike his brother, Amin Gemayil had remained untainted by close relations with 
Israel. He was, therefore, more acceptable to the Lebanese Muslims. On 21 September he 
was elected President of Lebanon by a near consensus vote of 77-73.262 
4.5 Results of the War of 1982 
Clearly, Israel's military presence in Lebanon had resulted in tremendous losses in 
terms of life and material both for the Lebanese although the Israelis, like many previous 
attempts, could not destroy and eradicated the PLO and Palestinians identity as a nation. 
The obvious results of the war in connection with "Israel versus PLO and Palestinians" can 
be put as follows. 
1. In 1982, Israel failed in its new attempt to destroy the PLO and to Likudate the 
Palestine Question. On the contrary, the savage bombardment of Beirut, the 
systematic of Palestinian refugee camps, the huge losses in civilian lives, tragically 
crowned by the Sabra and Shatila massacre, brought more vividly to the world's 
attention the tragedy of a people forcibly displaced from its homeland. 
2. Although the PLO withdrew from Beirut and thus lost its territorial base in Lebanon, 
it retained its political structure and its international status. If by its war against the 
PLO in Lebanon, Israel did not succeed in destroying the Palestinian national 
movement, it did succeed in "tarnishing its image in world public opinion". In the 
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words of two Israeli journalists: "The war had not crowned their country with a great 
political and military victory but had stained its honor indelibly".263 
The 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon wakened the PLO by denying it a base from 
which to direct its operations. Al-Fatah's relocation to Tunis and the PFLP's move to 
Damascus distanced both organizations from Israel's northern border, although their units 
continued to operate in the country, and Lebanese Shiite groups-which had hitherto been 
hostile to the Palestinians and tolerant of Israel-attacked and shelled northern towns more 
Zealously than the PLO had over done. 
From 1984 until 1986, Arafat who was left with few options, explored the possibility 
of establishing a Palestinian Confederation with Jordan on the West Bank. The PFLP, 
however, regarded this as treason and took steps to torpedo the process by denouncing 
Arafat as a traitor and by carrying out a campaign of intimidation and assassination against 
West Bank Palestinian leaders who favoured the concept.2M  
4.6 Israeli — Lebanese Peace Treaty 
In September 1982, under US pressure, President Amine Gemayel, soon after 
assuming office agreed to enter into talks with Israel provided the US acted as the mediator. 
This led to an agreed draft of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel in early May 1983 
known as 17th May Agreement of 1983.265  It formally ended the state of war between the 
two countries, and banned Lebanon from allowing the use of its territory or airspace for the 
passage of troops or military equipment from any state that did not have diplomatic 
263 Schiff and Ya'ari, n. 2. P. 280. 
264 Harold M. Cubert, Ph.D., the PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East (London,1997), pp. 59-60. 
265 Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Residence (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) p.145. 
135 
relations with Israel.266 It  also required Lebanon to abrogate any regulations, laws or treaties 
that were in conflict with the Lebanese-Israeli accord, including all the commitments that 
Lebanon had made as a founder member of the Arab League since 1945. It curtailed the 
Lebanese government's power to station troops between the Zahrani and Awali rivers, and 
required it to recognize the Israeli-backed Christian militia, commanded by Major Saad 
Hadad, as the sole force authorized to patrol the area up to Zahrani, and allow the 
stationing of Lebanese-Israeli supervisory teams charged with detecting and destroying any 
armed guerrillas in the area.267 
The document was denounced by left-of-centre forces in Lebanon and Syrian 
President Hafez Asad. It's passing by 64 Lebanese members of parliament (to two opposing), 
followed by the signing of it by Israel, and made little difference to their stance. They 
continued to express their opposition publicly. Protesting at Israel's continued occupation of 
a large part of Lebanon in the aftermath of June 1982 Israeli invasion, President Gemayel 
withheld his signature on the treaty.2 
4.7 The Resurgence of the PLO and the 'War of the Camps' 
In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, fighting was renewed 
between Christian and Muslim militias along the 'Green Line', which had effectively divided 
east and west Beirut between Christian and Muslim communities since early 1984. 
The withdrawal of Israeli Forces also facilitated the return of an estimated 5,000 
Palestinian guerrillas to Lebanon, as the PLO, under Chairman Arafat, was attempting to re- 
266 
Lawrence Ziring, N.74, p.332. 
267 
Avraham Sela, ed., N.1o8, p.481. 
268 Nip Hiro, N.14,p.183. 
136 
establish its power base there. Syria was strongly opposed to the PLO revival in Lebanon 
because the presence of Palestinian guerrillas loyal to Arafat challenged its own hegemony 
over the country and efforts to bring the Palestinian resistance movement under Syrian 
control. Amal also wanted to prevent the PLO from re-establishing itself in Lebanon, fearing 
that this would provoke new Israeli reprisal raids and challenge its own control over 
southern Lebanon. 
Subsequently in May 1986, fighting between Palestinian guerrillas and Amal 
militiamen for control of the refugee camps in south Beirut escalated. In June, a cease-fire 
was imposed around the Beirut camps, as part of a Syrian-sponsored peace plan for Muslim 
west Beirut. The deployment of Lebanese and Syrian troops in west Beirut succeeded 
temporarily in curbing the activities of the Amal, Druze and Sunni militias in the area, but 
failed to prevent fighting across the 'Green Line'. In October there was further conflict 
between Amal and Palestinian fighters around refugee camps in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut. A 
Syrian-supervised cease-fire at the camps entered effect in April 1987 but was short-lived.269 
In May the Lebanese National Assembly voted to annul the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which 
defined and regulated the PLO's activities and legitimized its presence in Lebanon.270 In 
September, Amal and the PLO announced an agreement to end the 'War of the Camp', in 
which more than 2,500 people had died. However, differences over the withdrawal of some 
5,000-8,000 Palestinian guerrillas led to renewed fighting to the east of Sidon by October. In 
January 1988, avowedly as a gesture of support for the uprising (Intifada) by Palestinians 
resident in Israeli-occupied territories, which had began the previous month, the Amal 
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leader, Nabih Berri, announced an end to the siege of the Palestinian refugee camps in 
Beirut and southern Lebanon.271  
After having its withdrawal from the Palestinian camps, Amal turned its forces 
against its rival, Hezbollah, and sporadic fighting occurred between the two militias in Beirut 
and southern Lebanon for control over areas of Shiite population. In May 1988, Syrian 
troops encircled the southern suburbs of Beirut to enforce a Syrian- and Iranian-mediated 
cease-fire agreement between Amal and Hezbollah.272  
- Concluding Thoughts 
Lebanon today is passing through a transitional stage with the push-and-pull of 
forces affecting its contemporary fate. The first two models for Lebanon that we considered 
— the Islamic and Syrian ones — constitute a massive defeat for both a Christian Lebanon 
and, by consequence, for a secure Israel in the rapidly changing political and gee-strategic 
contours of the Mideast. Certainly the tenacity of the Muslim and Syrian forces contrast 
favorably with the gloom of Christian deterioration and the self-questioning Israeli position 
on Lebanon. 
The latter two models — the Israeli connection and Christian resistance — have 
suffered a blow since September 1982. Nonetheless, Israel. demonstrated a determination in 
maintaining the "security zone" and, as summarized, there are signs of Christian revival. The 
possibility of "Lebanonization" in southern Lebanon, by promoting a more autonomous 
native Lebanese political entity and a "Free Lebanese Army", recalls America's 
"Vietnamization" policy in South Vietnam: that is, to strengthen the local population to 
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defend itself, while reducing the military. role of the foreign ally.273 Israeli policy has avoided 
any precipitate withdrawal from Lebanon, specifically southern Lebanon, and this has 
served to protect the Christian population in the south. But no Israeli government adopted 
as a complementary policy the cultivation of "Lebanonization" or promoted a Lebanese 
liberation struggle. American support for the Contras and Afghani wars of liberation in the 
1980s, or for the Iraqi anti-Saddam Hussein opposition in the 1990s, are examples of policies 
that Israel might consider in evaluating the viability of supporting a Lebanese liberation 
struggle. Israel may be supporting, as reported in July 1998, an anti-Syrian underground 
- Christian network in Lebanon.274 But this is hardly comparable with a bold strategic plan — 
more political than military in design — to promote Christian autonomy and Lebanese 
independence no less in peace and friendship with Jewish Israel. 
Syria's military strategy of domination and penetration, controlling foreign and 
security policy, and acting as "the arbiter of power in Lebanon", has been manifestly 
successful.275 
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CHAPTER-IV 
TAIF ACCORD AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
1. Taif Accord and Its Outcome 
1.1 Background of the Accord 
On October 22, 1989, signed The Taif Accord, also known as the carter of National 
Reconciliation, Having an important place in city of Taif in Saudi Arabia in the history of 
modern Lebanon. Before a settlement agreement implemented, it took fifteen years of 
never-ending fighting and destruction of country. It symbolizes the end of the turbulent civil 
war 1975-1989 that turned Lebanon into a daily violent new item.
276 
Before the Taif Accord, due to various factors including the combinations of 
international, regional and the internal one, each peace making effort becomes collapsed. 
External powers had used Lebanese groups to promote their own interests. At the same 
time, Lebanese factions had exploited Arab government internal strife to forge external 
alliances to support their political and military programme. It demonstrates that Lebanese 
war was a series of proxy wars.277  
In the earlier peace attempts during 1967-1975 period were unable to contain the 
inter locking conflict issues, domestically, traditional mechanisms for dealing with the 
conflict. When the war started, these issues became even more irresolvable because 
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Lebanon's traditional elite became marginalized and the number of armed domestic actors 
began to grow rapidly. 278  
The Taif Accord was not radically different from previous attempts to reform the 
Lebanese political system. In 1975, the most serious attempts were the National Dialogue 
Committee to settle the conflict, the Constitutional Document in 1976, the Arab Summit 
Conferences at Riyadh and Cairo in 1976, the Geneva-Lausanne Conference 1983, 1984 and 
the Damascus Tripartite Agreement in 1985. Many of the features of the accord were 
anticipated by the Constitutional Document accepted by the President Franjieh in 1976 and 
the Tripartite Agreement of 1985, both of which were mediated by Syria. In this way the Taif 
Accord was rooted in a well established "tradition" that renders Lebanon more of a 
contractual consolidative counting than one based on a Constitution. 
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The departure of Amine Gemayel as president of Lebanon in September 1988 
marked a new phase in Lebanon. It posed a new challenge for Lebanon's political factions, 
the US and Syria engaged in a bitter conflict over the election of an acceptable successor. It 
threatened to destabilize Lebanon and defied all outside attempts to end it. The.US and 
Syria moved more vigorously but in failed to agree on the election of an acceptable 
successor. The situation became more complicated and a constitutional crisis created when 
Amine appointed General Michel Aoun as interim PM of Lebanon. This step of Amine had 
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created constitutional crisis in Lebanon, Syria and Lebanon opposition did not approve the 
appointment of Gen Aoun's as interim Prime Minster rather refused to recognize him as 
Prime Minister of Lebanon. Lebanon's Sunni Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss refused to step 
down and in turn demanded more executive powers. These developments created internal 
division and situation in Lebanon started moving between these two legal authorities. 
In the beginning, General Aoun made efforts to gather the support of the Christian 
and Muslim population. He also attempted to expand the support base of these two 
communities. Gen Aoun reminded them of their sense of Lebanon's identity 
and condemned the presence of outside forces for their misery or distress, particularly 
Syria, they were facing. His efforts for national unity, rule of law, sovereignty, and 
withdrawal of all foreign forces, particularly Syrian, were welcomed by the Christian 
community but greeted cautiously by the Muslims.280  
Gen Michel Aoun on 14 March 1989 declared war of Lebanon against Syria. Arab 
leaders in his support adopted a resolution at the Casablanca Summit on 26-29 May 
1989.281 At the summit a Tripartite Arab High Commission was formed which included 
the kings of Morocco and Saudi Arabia and the President of Algeria. Syria was deliberately 
dropped to obviate the complication. The commission in its report had responsible Syria as 
an obstacle to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Syria, in turn, strongly opposed the 
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commission's report. The Syria's stand at this juncture halted the mediation efforts of the 
Arab commission. 
282 
The commission resumed, at the beginning of September 1989, its efforts to 
negotiate the Lebanese crisis between Beirut and Damascus. It convened a meeting at Taif, 
in Saudi Arabia, on 30 September 1989, of sixty-two deputies (31 Christians and 31 Muslim) 
of Lebanese National Assembly. At Taif, they examined and discussed in detail about the 
agreement that was proposed at Casablanca Summit as a basis for the resolution of conflict 
in Lebanon. 
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The Taif meeting succeeded in breaking out a Document of National Understanding 
which later known as Tafi Accord. At Taif, both the warring side reach to 
an understanding regarding the division of political offices among the country's various 
sects. They agreed to abolish confessionalism in the long run, but it was never taken 
seriously. This path-breaking agreement better known as the Taif Accord open the door for 
the resolution of conflict in Lebanon in the light of country's new demographic and political 
realities.
284 
The Cold War and the intense rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union 
particularly in the West Asia prevented an international solution of the Lebanese crisis or 
question. The end of cold war and demise of Soviet Union subsequently pave the way for 
the US sponsors solution to the Lebanese crisis in West Asia. The US through a close and 
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reliable Arab ally did make efforts to find out the solution of the Lebanese political strife. 
The obvious choice was Saudi Arabia and her role in the Lebanese reconciliation process 
marked the beginning of significant phase.285 The role of Saudi Arabia as host and sponsor 
of the talks, was generally considered as the beginning of shift in general political influence 
away from the Syrian to Saudis.
286 
1.2 Taif Accord and Constitutional Reforms 
This is a number of important principles on which the Lebanese state was built 
contained by the Taif Accord. Domestically, there are many important points to be noted 
that in a statement of general philosophy, the accord re-endorses that Lebanon is a country 
where various communities co-exist. It again sets forth the basic principles like 
independence, unity, sovereignty, a liberal, parliamentary democracy, Arabness and the 
definite nature of a "Lebanese homeland for all her sons". There is a structural regulation in 
the document which reads as follows: "in document there is a structural regulation which 
contradicts the pact of communal co-existence".287  
Regarding to institutions, the controversial aspect to the accord was the elevation of 
Deputies' chamber of the President, thereby an office, the President, traditionally reserved 
for a Maronite. The terms of the Speaker for a Shiite Muslims which is customarily reserved, 
as well as the nomination of the Prime Minister would be consulted by the Speaker in 
parliament there are 108 which were equally distributed between Christian and Muslims. 
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Thus in parliament a 54-54 seats balance between Christian and Muslims was maintained. 
The pre-eminence of the presidential post which is the symbol of the political predominance 
of the Maronites became a thing of the past.288 The third largest community which is Shiite 
Muslims compromised in favour of Sunni Muslims in Parliament where they equaled in the 
member of seats. Likewise two seats in parliament were gained by Alawi community. The 
confessional distribution of Lebanese parliament was given in table 1. 
Table -1: Confessional Division of the Lebanese parliament 
1972 
Parliament 
1989 
Ta'if Accord 
1990 
Vacancies 
Confession Christians 
Maronote 30 30 12** 
Orthodox 11 11 4 
Catholic 6 6 0 
Armenian 4 4 0 
Orthodox 
Armenian 1 1 1 
Catholic 
Protestant 1 1 0 
Other*** 1 1 0 
Subtotal 54 54 17 
Muslim 
Sunni's 20 22 5 
Shia 19 22 3 
Druze 6 8 5 
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Alawi 
Subtotal 
0 
45 
2 
54 
0 
13 
Total 99 108 30 
Source: See Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon after Taif, Is the Civil War Over", Middle 
East Journal, vol., 45, No. 3, summer 1991, p. 463. 
The question of sectarianism has always dominated the Lebanese political scene.289  
The Ta'if accord went a bit further by suggesting certain steps for its gradual 
termination. For example the accord's text terminated certain criteria for recruitment of 
public servants, except for posts at high levels. Mentioning of religion on identity cards was 
also stopped. The Ta'if accord deals with important security and foreign policy provisions. 
The security plan's ultimate aim is for the state to "extend its authority over all the territory 
of Lebanon by means of its own forces", although Syrian forces "shall assist the legitimate 
Lebanese forces" in this task.290  
1.3 Provisions of the Taif Accord 
A. New Lebanese Order: 
Although the Taif Accord softened the "rules of the games" of the First Republic or 
Lebanon, it did not alter its basic charter. Consequently, consociation democracy did 
continue to operative in post war Lebanon in form and structure. The proportion of various 
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sects in the formation of government was still working. A slight change did occur in 
proportion of Muslim to Christian legislators and officials which increased to 50-50. it was 
agreed upon that for the foreseeable future President of the Republic would be from 
Maronite Christian community while the Prime Minister would be from the Sunni Muslim 
community. The powers of President have been reduced substantially. And the powers of 
the Council of minister, chaired by Prime Minister, have been increased. The term of the 
President of the Chamber of deputies, would be headed by a Shiite has been increased from 
one year to four. This is atomically remove the old provision and increased the influence of 
the President of the Chamber of deputies. The Taif Accord, at the same time clearly 
recommended for the gradual phasing out of the sectarianlism in the political system.291 
 
B. Disarming of Militias and Restoration of the Central Government Authority: 
The Accord paved the way for the election of a President and the formation of a new 
government.292 And also provided the implementation of the security plans in Lebanon in 
two phases-one within six months and the other within twenty-four months. The Syrian 
army was given the responsibility for a maximum period of two years to help the new 
government in implementing the security plan.293  
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The charter also defined the Lebanon's resolution with Syria, and went on to 
emphasized that Syrian troops would leave Beirut and would be stationed in the Lebanese 
Beqa Valley within two years after the formal ratification of the Accord.
294  
C. Taif Accord and Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon: 
Lastly, the Accord did explain the Lebanon's relation with Israel and urged used the 
implementation of UN's 425 resolution and also called for the withdrawal of Israeli troop 
from the South Lebanon. It further Taif Accord yelled or urged (the legal relation of Lebanon 
with Israel) the restoration of 1949 israeli-Lebanese armistice. It was also provided that, in 
the mean time, all the necessary steps would be initiated to the liberate the Lebanese 
territory from the Israeli occupation. 
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D. The Accord and the Syrian Armed Forces: 
There were 40,000 Syrian soldiers and assorted secret service agents in Lebanon. 
Although, Syrian troops were not accepted a permanent fixture in the Lebanese landscape, 
an armed Syrian presence was seen as a necessary condition for proceeding with the 
implementation of certain of the Ta'if accord's provisions, especially disbandment of the 
militias. 
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A. General Michel Aoun's Rejection of Taif Accord 
Indeed, General Aoun did opposed Taif Accord and made every efforts to implement 
it, particularly in the territory under his control. For Syria, he was the last and main 
opponent in Lebanon. However, Syria maintained restrain and avoided direct action against 
General Aoun Syria, reaction could have led bloodbath in Lebanon. On political front such 
step could have proved fatal to Syrian arouse stiff resistant opposition within Lebanon and 
were important in the Arab world and international arena.297 It was only at the end of 1990 
situation became favourable for military move against General Aoun, which Syria seized 
with tactically. 
Meanwhile, Syria successfully won the support of most of the political and military 
forces in Lebanon for the Taif Accord. Importantly, Hezbollah, Lebanese forces under Samir 
Ja'Ja, and the Maronite religious establishment in Bkerki supported the Taif Accord. Even 
the President Hrawi, at the beginning of October, appealed or solicited assistance of Syria 
against the Maronite general.298 
During the Gulf crisis in 1990, Syria's image improved immensely in the inter-Arab 
and international arenas.299 The joining of Syria to the US led anti-Iraq coalition brought it 
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close to the Western fold especially the US. They, during James Baker's visit to Damascus in 
September 1990, got green light to move against Aoun in Lebanon.300  
Syrian forces, accordingly, on 13 October 1990 moved against General Aoun and 
attacked latter's enclave around the Baabda presidential palace in Beirut and after capturing 
it occupied all of East Beirut over. General Aoun took shelter in the French Embassy and 
later went into exile in France.
301  
B. Dany Chamoun as Aoun Supporter 
Dany Chamoun was the staunch supporter of General Aoun. He was the son of 
Camille Chamoun and was assassinated in October 1990 by the Syrian intelligence after the 
capture of Aoun's enclave. He was murdered along with his wife and two sons during the 
takeover of Beirut and clash with pro-Syrian militias and army. His assassination was the 
clear signal that Syria would not tolerate resistance put by anyone and was ready to 
eliminate unmanageable person in the way of implementing the Taif Accord and also his 
influence and presence in Lebanon.302  
C. The Shiite Muslim Resistance 
The Shiite community in general was not satisfied with the provisions of the Taif 
Accor. A group of Shiite community named Hezbollah and their Iranian masters particularly 
too showed their displeasure over the Taif Accord. Their concern and resistance regarding 
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Taif Accord was indirectly providing advantage to the Maronites and Sunnis and causing 
damage to their own gains and interests accrued during the prolong Civil War 
303 
 They were 
not satisfied with the concessions provided to them in the Taif Accord, though the accord 
enhanced their position and put them almost of par with the Maronite president and Sunni 
prime minister. They considered the indemnity as scant and were not in accordance with 
their population-- which according to them had become largest in the country. 
Besides, the Shiite community did face and insurmountable problem during the 
process of rehabilitation of the Lebanese state. This had entailed revival of the corridors of 
political power and their metamorphosis into different sphere of influenced or principal 
sphere which ultimate necessitated the struggle for sharing of power. 
In these struggles, however, the Shiite community found themselves in capacitate in 
filling the political offices and positions of power assigned to them with educated members 
of their community. Consequently, they were at a disadvantage position in the struggle for a 
share of the national pie. 
Hezbollah, a new entrant into the Lebanese polity, started feeling threat an account 
of the situation emerged after the Taif Accord and weaknesses of the members of their 
community. Some political analysts believed that the Taif Accord had been laden with seeds 
of discontent and real threat to Hezbollah. However, they, one may say to some extent, 
managed to live with this new situation and started asserting to breath new life into the 
Lebanese polity. Therefore, the vacuum that existed for years started filling by them. They, 
before the Taif Accord, did face identity crisis as an alternative to the Lebanon's Shiite 
community. They in fact failed to propose the alternative to the deprivation faced by the 
303 
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members of Lebanon's Shiite community — the Islamic alternative. 304  Indeed, the Taif 
Accord accorded a clear to leverage or upper hand, to "Aural", a rival organization of 
Hezbollah. Amal group, in fact, was prepared or got ready to harmonize itself with the new 
Lebanese framework and thus was more efficient to play a role in the new system or 
framework.305  
D. Iranian Government and the Taif Accord 
During the Taif Conference Iran was not invited to attend it despite its deep 
involvement in Lebanese affairs. The Taif Conference which was holding on 29 September 
1989, was attended by many Arabs government except Iran, who was not invited despite its 
deep involvement in Lebanese affairs. The Iranian government categorically expressed its 
anguish over the affairs of Lebanon and future of Muslims particularly Hezbollah. Iranian 
prime minister, was not very much optimistic about the role of Muslim in the government 
and stated during a press conference openly showed his apprehension about the prospects 
for the struggle against Israel. He was of view that the government should be in hands of 
Muslims became of because of their majority in the country. 
On 5th October 1989, Iranian President Rafsanjani conveyed Iranian viewpoint to 
Lebanese and Palestine delegations. He further said that the Taif Accord favoured more 
Christians or Maronites rather Muslims and Muslim should not accept it as it was against the 
"Muslim Nation of Lebanon". Iran, in this way joined the Iraqi's camp. Who also opposed 
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the Taif Accord on the grounds, that it would strengthen Syria's control and influence in 
Lebanon?
306  
1.5 Samir Farid Geagea: Shifting Alliance 
The Christian militia leader Samir Geagea's shifting alliance in Lebanon undoubtedly 
changed the balance of the Syrian-Lebanese conflict. His move was community or generally 
considered as the pro-IF-Damascus cooperation. 307  
Geagea was generally known as a progressive and far sighted visionary. The Civil War 
compelled forced him to change him alliances and stands because as the question of him 
survived of the militia's power and his people was at stake or concern. There was struggle of 
power with the Christian Community. despite the existence of a common external force i.e. 
the Syrian - Islamic alliance. Geagea, to the surprise of many solicited an alliance with the 
"other side" or Syrian — Islamic front. The Phalangist leader Geagea, in fact, favoured in 
seeking the Syrian support to eliminate the General Aoun rather Maronite Christian support 
to expel Syria from Lebanon. Geagea argument in conceding, the Syria support was based 
on Aoun's army policies or mistake instead of his move and deviation or choice. He accepted 
the Taif Accord including its stipulation which expunged the objectives of the Lebanese 
Christian resistance during several open appeals to Hrawi's government and meeting with 
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Syrian officials. The pragmatist was also ready for a military collaboration with Syria or 
Damascus to oust Aoun from Baabda with the purpose of little arm twisting. In mid August 
1990, a series of meeting between Geagea' aides the Syrian intelligence held openly for 
military collaboration. 
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2. Implementation of the Taif Accord 
2.1 Lebanese — Syrian Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination 1991 
A Treaty of "fraternity, cooperation and coordination" was by Lebanon and Syria in 
May 1991. The Treaty was in her many with the Taif Agreement. The treaty affirmed or 
asserted that Syria and Lebanon had "distinctive brotherly relations" and this relation 
existed on account of geographic proximity, common interests, shared destiny, and sense of 
belonging and historical, cultural and linguistic affinity. The treaty further elaborated the 
mechanism and were to manage, developed and executive these relations,309  
Hafez Asaad `s gave a long speech after the signing of treaty which brought a sense 
of satisfaction and relief, and explained his view of Lebanon, unfortunately or especially 
Syria's interests and goals in Lebanon: 
"We [the Syrians] did not create [that which binds] us to Lebanon. [This bond] is 
God's handiwork. We all share a common history, a common geography, and [ties of] 
blood. Therefore, the ties we establish today between the two countries are a 
reflection of our common heritage. This heritage cannot be erased, nor will it 
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disappear with the passage of time, for, brothers are brothers, whether or not they 
live in the same house. We are one people, even if we live in two separate states. 
This is the truth, and no one can ignore it. Turning away from this truth does not 
serve the interests of either of the two independents states, or of the people who 
live in them 310 
A Higher Council was formed which embodied the President of Lebanon and Syria, 
their Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers and the Presiding officers of their respective 
Legislatures. The Higher Council was responsible ensure the coordination and cooperation 
of the two states in socio-political, economic, security and other fields. The decisions of the 
Council were decided to be binding, though within the constitutional and legal framework of 
both countries. In political circle of Lebanon, treaty was not overwhelmingly accepted with 
enthuse. There was a mixed reaction in the political spheres. It was considered (the joint 
council,) as violation of Lebanese sovereignty and in sum regarded as annexation of 
Lebanon to Syria. Political observers of Lebanon regarded the treaty as unbalanced on 
account of due to Syria's military strength and heralded or foresaw it as on infringement 
upon Lebanon's independence, its democratic practices and its traditions. Samir Maronite 
leader Nasrallah Sfeir, admonished that the treaty conflicted with the National Pact of 1943. 
Supporters of the treaty, however, disputed that close relation with Syria were essential for 
political stability of Lebanon and it would not hampered the Lebanese freedom. Both 
Lebanon and Syria in September 1991 structurally deduced a security arrangement as 
provided in the bilateral accord. The bilateral accord, indeed, allowed them to seek mutual 
military assistance in the event of security threat either of the country. To strengthen, the 
bilateral relation, President Hrawi in mid October visited Damascus to the attend the first 
310 Eyal Zisser, N. 17, p.129. 
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session of the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council. In late March 1992, Syrian government 
started withdrawing its forces from Beirut for redeployment in eastern Lebanon by 
September, (in accordance with the Taif Agreement).
311  
The Lebanese - Syrian agreement of 22 May 1991, marked the beginning of new era 
in the history of the countries relationship. it followed the environment mutual distrust and 
discontent between them. Meanwhile, Syria accomplished in implementing its strategic -- 
historical goals in Lebanon and also succeeded in securing or commanding the position of 
influence and hitherto full control over Lebanese affairs. An evaluation of Syrian-Lebanese 
relation in historical perspective shows that Syria's conduct or influence in Lebanon had 
been remained different than prevailing view of the pre-agreement period.312 The 
Lebanese government's call to various militia groups for disarming and the latter's 
cooperation with the central government in Beirut and their move to switch over their 
military activity to the political sphere (attests this view). Hezbollah, in view of the security 
reasons, was allowed continue arm struggle against Israel in South Lebanon while their 
members were not granted or permitted to carry arms in other parts of Lebanon or country. 
The Lebanese government, in a parallel development, began to deploy troops throughout 
the country particularly in South Lebanon, for purpose of maintaining the sovereignty and 
authority of the centre.313 Syrian government indeed backed the campaign of the Lebanese 
security forces against the illegal drug growers and smugglers and also supported Lebanon 
government's dashing move against political opponents and opposition elements or groups. 
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These activities of the Lebanese government demonstrated or showed their determination 
to establish authority throughout the country, and its success partially.
314 
2.2 The Parliamentary Elections Since 1992 
A. National Assembly Election 1992 (First after Taif Accord) 
The National Assembly on 16 July 1992, through a new electoral law increased the 
number of Assembly seat from 108 to 128, equally shared between Christian and Muslim 
deputies i.e. 68 seats each faction.
315  
The allocation of the 128 seats is shown in the table: 
Table 2: Distribution of seats in parliament Total seats 128: 64 Christians, 64 Muslims. 
Christians 	 Muslims 
Sects Seats Sects Seats 
Maronite 34 Sunni 27 
Greek Orthodox 14 Shiite 27 
Greek Catholic 6 Druze 8 
Armenian 6 Alawi 2 
Other Christians 	4 
Total 	 64 	 Total 	64 
Total seats = 	128 
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Ta'if Clocks and Early Elections", Deirdre Collings, Peace for Lebanon (London, 1994), p.52. 
The Christian groups threatened to boycott of the elections or polls because of the 
presence of Syrian forces in the eastern part of the Biqa Valley. However, as per Taif Accord 
Syrian forces had to withdraw from Biqa Valley of Lebanon. In mid —1992, the government 
of Lebanon decided to hold the legislative elections. The government stated or reiterated 
that the Lebanese army was not able to provide security of the country in the absence of 
Syrian force.316 However, Lebanon's first legislative elections after twenty years, despite 
these suspicion or anxiety of the Christian groups, were held in three phases: on 23 August 
in the governorates of the North and the Biqa Valley, 30 August in Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon and on 6 September 1992 in South and An-Nabatiyah regions. The turnover was 
extremely law, averaging 32 percent, especially in districts where Maronite Christian leaders 
called for boycott the election.
317 
The result of the election was announcing Hezbollah who participated in election for 
the first time, won the eight seats notably from the Southern constituencies. Nabih Gerri, 
Amal leader, was appointed as speaker of the House or parliament (President of the New 
National Assembly) in October 1992. Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese — born Saudi Arabia business 
executive, was invited by Hrawi to form the government after speaker election, as Prime 
Minister. He was chosen to form the government with the optimism that he would bring 
back the Lebanese economy on the right trade and would consequently unravel the 
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reconstruction of country.
318  Unlike previous administrations, Hariri's cabinet comprised 
may technocrats, on the basis of ability and the portfolios were distributed not on an 
entirely "confessional" ground or basis. Shortly after election, President Hrawi and President 
Hafez Al Asad of Syria, after meeting, a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian forces by the 
end of October. However, later it became clear appeared that withdrawal of forces would 
not take place without signing of peace treaty between Syria and Israel.
319  
Prior to the Taif Accord, President had enjoyed considerable powers and 
prerogatives, the Taif Accord, in fact, reduced the power of President. Although the term of 
the President did remain for six years, the incumbents were constitutionally not allowed to 
be succeeded by anyone. Proceeding to Taif Accord Presidency was the strongest political 
position in Lebanon, however, after Taif Accord Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and Speaker 
of Parliament a Shiite Muslim were given more powers. Thus, in effect, the top leadership 
was a troika of presidents: the president of the republic, the president of the cabinet (Prime 
Minister), and the president of the parliament (Speaker of Parliament). 
President Elias Hrawi, a second rank politician from the town of Zahie in the Biqa 
Valley, was scheduled to replace in the autumn of 1995. He was elected as President in 1989 
after the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, who was murdered 17 days after his 
election. Of the troika, his public profile of the troika was by far the lowest. He was a closely 
ally of Syria, and Syria was completely satisfied as was with the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
with his style of functioning. In contravention to the constitution, Hrawi's term of office was 
extended for further three years by the Parliament on 19 October 1995. Speaker Nabih 
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Berri, a staunch opponent of Hrawi, too extended his support to this extraordinary measure 
Syria craft fully showed her preference in favour of Hrawi, and the Lebanese leaders were, 
indeed, willing to support this move and even were ready to ignore the Lebanese laws in 
order to please their Syrian brothers and strived hard to peruse Syrian signal. Of the 128 
members only eleven members showed their courage to oppose the extension of Hrawi's 
term of office, which was about to expire in 1998.
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Although there tooled place some reform in the political system, the prospects for 
some comprehensive reform were not possible so long as power remained in the grip of a 
coterie of politician and their loyalty with Damascus. Consequently, the government 
became and acted as a giant patronage machine, and empowering newly elected political 
basses to create networks of clients and to grow richer.321  
B. National Assembly Election 1996 (Second after Taif Accord) 
Election of National Assembly in Lebanon was held in five rounds during August- 
September 1996.322  In the first three rounds of voting candidates supporting Hariri gained 
considerable success in Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon and Beirut governorates areas. 
Hariri Prime Minister too won the election with large numbers of vote, but his supporters 
were alleged to have been involved in malpractice i.e. vote — baying, in Beirut. The fourth 
and fifth rounds took place in South and An-Nabaliyeh and in the Biqa Valley, where Amal 
320 
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and Hezbollah alliance won 45 (seats) out of 46 seats. Syria, prior to the fifth round, 
redeployed nearly 12,000 of its estimated 30,000 troops in the eastern part of the Biqa 
Valley. However, under the provision of Taif Accord Syria should have completed the 
redeployment of forces in 1992. The overall voting was averaged around 45 percent, 
attesting the fact that voters had generally ignored the appeal of Aoun, Genmayel, Ede and 
other exiled leaders for boycott of election. Berri was once again re-elected President of the 
National Assembly by the legislatures in October 1996. Hrawi after consultation with Syrian 
leaders in November 1996, invited ten legislatures to form a new government and ten 
allocation of Portfolios in the new Cabinet were accomplished on the confessional basis, 
thus, interests of various groups did remain largely the same as follows.323  
Table 
The Confessional Allocation of Seats in Lebanese Parliament Before and After 
The Taif Accord 
Confession 	 Before Taif 	 After Taif 
Maronite 	 30 ' 	 34 
Greek Orthodox 	 11 	 14 
Greek Catholic 	 6 	 8 
Armenian Orthodox 	 4 	 5 
Armenian Catholic 
Protestant 
323 
Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, "N.5, pp.104-107. 
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Other Christians 	 1 	 1  
Total Christians 	 54 	 64 
Sunni 	 20 - 	 27 
Shiite 	 19 	 27 
Druze 	 6 	 8  
Alawite 	 0 	 2 
Total Muslims 	 45 	 64 
Total 	 99 	 128 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Lebanon 
C. National Assembly Election 2000 (Third after Taif Accord) 
The third election of the National Assembly held in two phases between 27 August 
and 3 September 2000 in Beirut, the Biqa Valley, in Nabatiyeh and Southern part. In this 
election for the first time since 1972, people of former Israel — occupied zone of Southern 
Lebanon were allowed to East their vote.
324 
 The voting pattern of the first round clearly 
indicated that voters had rejected the premiership of al-Hoss and Druze leader Walid 
Jumblatt, staunch supporter and allies of Rafiq Hariri, won the election with thumping 
majority in Mount Lebanon governorate. Furthermore, Deputy Prime Minister secured his 
seat in the Maronite dominated district of North i.e. Metn district. The election of Pierre 
324 
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Gemayel, son of Amine Gemayel did prove fatal to President Lahoud.
325  The turn-out of 
voters was estimated at 51 per cent of the registered electorate. This pointed to the fact 
that public or people had generally overlooked the appeal of the some Christian parties for 
a boycott of the election. In the second round of voting, Hariri party Ai-Karamah (Dignity) 
won 18 of the 19 Assembly seats in Beirut and the rest seat was won by the Hezbollah 
candidate while al-Noss lost his own seat in the election. This was the period of political 
cohabitation between Lahoud and Hariri. In the South Hezbollah and Amal alliance won all 
the 23 seats of 48 governorates. At the same time Hezbollah registered a similar success in 
the Biqa valley.326 
Numerous instances of electoral malpractice were observed by the independent 
monitors. Hariri, in all, won 97 seats of the 128 seats in the Assembly election. Later, 
President Lahoud formally appointed Rafiq Hariri as Prime Minister of Lebanon.327 An 
informal agreement was reached between President Lahoud and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
regarding the power-sharing. According to this, Hariri was responsible for economic policy, 
325 
Pierre Amine Gemayel (commonly known as Pierre Gemayel Jr., Pierre Amine or simply Pierre Gemayel; 
September 24, 1972 - November 21, 2006) was a Lebanese politician in the Kataeb Party, or the Phalange 
Party. Lebanon's second-youngest MP, he was a rising star in his party. He was a vocal critic of Syria's military 
presence in and political domination of Lebanon, and an active member of the anti-Syrian and pro-Western 
parliamentary majority, the March 14 Alliance. He was serving as Minister of Industry when he was 
assassinated on November 21, 2006. He was the third member of his family to be assassinated in 25 years. His 
uncle Bachir Gemayel was assassinated in 1982, also at age 34, and Bashir's 1-year-old daughter was killed in a 
car bomb attack in 1980, initially supposed to target him. Gemayel was the fifth prominent anti-Syrian figure 
to be killed in Lebanon in two years. 
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file President Lahoud was assigned the Portfolios of defence and foreign. However, there 
,ere reports of disagreement emerged between the two during the later part of 2000.
328  
I). National Assembly Election 2005 (Fourth after Taif Accord) 
On 29 2005 elections for a new National Assembly started in according with the 
existing electoral law introduced in 2000.329 Christian's leaders did oppose the election an 
ground that it would favour the Syrian's allies. They started demanding for a new electoral 
law dividing the country into smaller constituencies. However their demand was overlooked 
or rejected by the Government.
330 
The anti-Syrian opposition "Future Movement",331 in the first round of voting in the 
Beirut region registered the sweeping victory in the election won all the 19 seats, of which 9 
seats they won were uncontested as rival candidates had withdrawn before the voting.332 
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331 Future Movement (TayyarAl Mustagbal] (FM) is a Sunni Muslim political movement in Lebanon, led by 
Saad Hariri, younger son of the assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri. The movement is 
the largest member of the March 14 Alliance, which won a majority of the seats in the May 2005 
parliamentary elections. The current leader, Saad Hariri, has vowed to transform it into a political party when 
the country becomes stable and the regime without religious references. Most of its support comes from 
Sunni Muslims and it is allied to the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Druze Party, and Maronites who are 
associated with the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties (main 3 allies of FM). The main opponent of Future 
Movement is the March 8 Alliance, most important parts being Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by General 
Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. 
332 
Saad ed Deen Rafiq al Hariri (born April 18, 1970 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) is a Saudi-Lebanese 
businessman and politician, and the second son of Rafiq Hariri, the assassinated former prime minister of 
Lebanon. After his father's death, he inherited the helm of the Future Movement, an essentially Sunni 
movement that was created and led by his father. Saad Hariri is the son of Rafiq Hariri and an Iraqi mother 
(Nidal Al-Bustani). He has been born and raised in Saudi Arabia and managed part of his father's business there 
until his father's assassination. When his father was assassinated in Febmary 2005, he inherited some USD 4.1 
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This time turn-out was officially put as 28 percent, slightly less than of 2000 figures, low 
turn-out in Christian dominated districts than Muslim was the factor.333 In the second 
round of voting, pro-Syrian Amal and Hezbollah captured all the twenty three seats with 
huge margins in Shiite populated region of Southern Lebanon. Of the total seats won by 
Amal and Hezbollah, six candidates were declared victorious uncontested. According to 
official figure generally 45 percent voting took place in this region except in some Christian 
dominated areas where only 10 to 12 percent noting occurred as General Aoun's Free 
Patriotic Movement and prominent local politicians appealed to Christian for boycott of the 
elections.334 There was fierce fighting among candidates for 35 seats in Mount Lebanon and 
23 seats in the Biqa Valley regions 335  General Aaun's last minute alliance with pro-Syrian 
factions and his announcement that his conflict or grudge with Damascus ended with the 
departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon, changed the entire situation as he and his allies 
won twenty one seats. General Aoun's victory did prove set back to Hariri and his allies, who 
won 25 seats but was hoping to secure more in order to enjoy majority in the New 
Assembly.336 In the final round held on 19 June Hariri and his allies gained all the 28 seats 
with wide margin of votes and defeated General Aoun's allies decisively. According to 
billion in 2005 earning him and each of his siblings a place on the 2006 Forbes list of richest people in the 
world (released in March 2006). He was the Chairman of the executive committee of Oger Telecom, which 
pursues telecommunication interest in West Asia and Africa. In addition to heading Saudi Oger, Hariri was the 
Chairman of Omnia Holdings, and Board Member of Oger International Enterprise de Travaux Internationaux, 
Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi Research and Marketing Group and Future Television. After his father, Rafiq 
Hariri, was killed on February 14, 2005 by a car bomb hi central Beirut, Saad Harm returned to Lebanon and 
took up his father's political path engaged in politics. 
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official sources around 49 percent voting took place.337  The final result of election affirmed 
that Hariri's Future Movement had secured a clear majority in the New Assembly with 72 
seats; Amal and Hezbollah attained 35 seats and General Aoun and his allies secured 21 
seats. Elections, barring few minor incidents held peacefully and in a calm atmosphere and 
voters were free from any pressure or interference. 338  
The new Assembly, at the end of June 2005, re-elected Nabih Berri, a loyal ally of 
Syria as Speaker by a thumping votes or majority.339 President Lahoud, after two days, 
appointed Fouad Siniora, a member of Saad Hariri, Future Movement, as Prime Minister and 
invited him to form the new government.340 Siniora's government the support of 126 of the 
128 members of the National Assembly.341  He was a close ally of the late Rafiq Hariri and 
had been Minister of Finance in all five of his administrations. 
The National Assembly election of 2005 was, in fact, first election in thirty years took 
place without a Syrian military or intelligence presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese elected 
128 members of Parliament (MPs) in 2005 election with equal representation for Christians 
and Muslims. Many Lebanese considered this election as the end of Cedar Revolution which 
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Fouad Siniora (alternative spellings: Fouad Sanyoura, Fuad Sinivra, Fouad Saniora, Fouad Senora) is the 
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was won by an anti-Syrian coalition led by Saad Hariri. The election was the first to be 
monitored by the UN and first in the Lebanese history won outright by single electoral 
block.342  Lebanon, after withdrawal of Syria in early 2005, witnessed for the first time in 30 
years free of foreign occupation. Nevertheless election provided a historic opportunity to 
the people of Lebanon, it also at the same time presented many uncertainties and much 
. 343 
worries. 
E. National Assembly Election 2009 (Fifth after Taif Accord) 
On June 7, 2009, elections for new National Assemble were took place in Lebanon. 
The result of the election showed that Saad Hariri, who led March 14 coalition, won or 
secured 71 seats of the total 128 seats. Hezbollah — alliance, another group, could be able to 
capture only 57 seats in the National Assembly. Amal Party chief and Parliament Speaker 
Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah, said he "fully accepted" the result. Hezbollah's Christian 
ally the Free Patriotic Movement too confessed the defeat.
344 
According to official sources, total turn-out of the votes were around 53 percent. 
This election was considered crucial as it witnessed an alliance led by Hezbollah and Michel 
Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and they enjoyed an edge over the country's ruling 
pro-Western combination. The main contestants of this election were the opposition March 
8 forces and the March 14 coalition led by Saad Hariri, the son of late Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri who was assassinated. 
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observers said that Hezbollah lap fielded only 11 candidates of the total 128 
members Parliament, and divided along sectarian and communal lines, with Muslims and 
Christians occupying 64 seats each.
345 
Regional stability was the main concern and a very high stake in this election as some 
international players particularly the United State, showed their keen interests ahead of the 
election, although they pledged to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign countries. They, in fact, were apprehensive of victory of Hezbollah's led 
coalition or a combine. 
346 
Lebanon Election Rivals 
The platform was ready for fierce competitions between two arch rivals or blocs; the 
"March 14" alliance, dominated mainly by Sunnis and backed by Saudi Arabia and the US, 
and the "March 8" coalition, made up mainly of Shiites and sustained by Iran and Syria. 
March 14 Alliance 	 March 8 Alliance 
Future Movement: led by Saad Hariri 
	
Hizbollah: led by Hassan Nasrallah 
Progessive Socialist Party: led by Walid Jumblatt Amal Movement: led by Nabih Berri 
Lebanese Force: led by Samir Geagea 	 Free Patriotic Movement: led by Michel 
Aoun 
Phalange Party: led by Amin Gemayel 
	
Madara Movement: led by Suleiman 
Franjieh 
Source: The Hindu (New Delhi), June 7, 2009. 
345 
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The electorates in this election were disappointed with the policy of the governing 
March 14 alliance and instability, but still did not trust Hezbollah. The efforts of March 14 
alliance was to convince the electorates to come to the polling stations and east their ballot, 
which they did as substantiated by the turnout of the voters. According to official sources, 
54 percent of the 3.2 million electorate participated in this election, which was nearly 10 
percent more than during 2005 elections. in this election March 14 alliance did face a tough 
phase of political conciliation. 
The result of June 7 Election, it is generally believe, would ease the process of 
conciliation and compromise. However, it was possible only when the West led by the US 
did adopt the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Lebanon encouraging 
or discouraging the winness 347 
June 7 election was the fifth since the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989. The 
1990 constitution clearly specifies that representative in the Lebanese National Assembly 
should be divided between Muslims and Christians equally and further division followed by 
confessional branches. The 1990 constitution was, indeed, framed in accordance with the 
October 1989 Taif Accords.348 
There was demand for amendment in the electoral law in 2008 for lowering the age 
from 21 years to 18. However this move, during negotiations, was not accepted at least for 
the 2009 election. It was decided that during municipal elections of 2010, voting age 18 
would be considered. During 2009 election expatriates were barred to vote ether proxy or 
347 
The Hindu (New Delhi), Tuesday, June 9, 2009. 
348 http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/lebanons-parliamentary-elections-june-7-2009/p19578#p4[29-12-2012] 
169 
the rough postal ballot. However, the 2008 electoral law allowed them to cast their vote 
during next general election, which would be held in 2013.349  
During 2009, elections on all 128 seats were held for Lebanon's National Assembly 
which functions as the country's Parliament. Total seats i.e.. 128, were, according to 
September 2008 election law, distributed among twenty — six (26) electoral districts. A 
record number of candidates nearly six hundreds participated in this election. Lebanon have 
eighteen (18) different religion sects ad each district was mandated to have a fixed number 
of representatives from different religious sects. Tripoli district, for example, was allotted a 
total of eight seats with following break-up, five to be filled by Sunni Muslims, one by an 
Alawite Muslim, one by a Maronite Christian, and one by a Greek Orthodox Christian.
350  
In 2009 general election more electoral districts were created than general election 
of 2000 and 2005, in which only 14 designated electoral wards existed. During 2009 total 
128 Parliamentary seats were distributed across the 26 electoral districts each of which 
represents or corresponds to a particular religious confessional branches.351  
- Election Results 
The March 14 coalition got clear mandate in the 2009 Lebanese election. They 
capture 71 seats of the total 128 seats in the National Assembly. This time they secured 
three more seats than previous election. The March 8 coalition declared successful on 57 
seats. The result, however, did not bring any major shift than what was existed for the last 
four years. Hezbollah and its allies once again consigned to an opposition status, while 
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March 14 alliance emerged with the majority status. The follow-up table explains the status 
of different group. 
Distribution of parliamentary seats by political membership 
March 14 	 March 8 
Party/Movement /Group Number of Party/Movement /Group Number of 
Delegates 	 Delegates 
Future Movement 29 
Democratic Gathering/PSP 11 
Non-Partisan 9 
Lebanese Forces Party* 8 
Kataeb Party 5 
Independents (allied with March14) 3 
Hunchak Party 2 
Armenian Democratic Liberal Party 2 
Democratic Left Movement i. 
Jamaa Islamiya 1 
National Liberal Party 
March 1 
March 14 Total 71 
Free Patriotic Movement (Aounist) 19 
Amal 	 13 
Hezbollah 	 13 
Marada** 	 4 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation 2 
Baath Party 	 2 
Lebanese Democratic Party 	2 
Syrian National Socialist Party 	2 
March 8 Total 	 57 
3 deputies joined the LF Party block following the elections ** 1 deputy joined the Marada block following 
the elections. 
Source: http://www.licus.org/liclib/LICRD/elections09/POST%2GELECTION%20PAPER%20-%20Political. 
- Estimate the Doha Electoral Law 
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The 2009 elections were held according to the new electoral law of 2008. The 
reforms and changes were tested during in this election. The new electoral law contained 
the Supervisory Committee on Electoral Campaigns (SCEs) which was responsible for 
monitoring campaign finance and media advertising and completing the election process in 
one day. The SCEC in many ways failed to check the violations and irregularities took place 
during the election due to lack of power and muscle to penalize defaulters. It had to depend 
on the other institutions such as the General Prosecutor's Office and the Court of 
Publications. Despite the provisions provided in the law, SCEC was unable to take the 
election against violation. Although holding the elections in one day was a difficult task for 
the Ministry of Interior, it assuaged citizens from the month — long election riddle which 
tended to fuel sectarian and factional tension. It was no doubt, the most successful reform. 
The new electoral system agreed upon in the Doha Accord was based on the 1960 electoral 
law which mentioned that the Caza (small administrative district) was the electoral district. 
The new system was better than the old one in terms of representation, but it has some 
short comings, so long as the Lebanese electoral system remained majoritarian — with a 
winner takes all ethic — the implications for the political system as a whole were negative. 
Firstly, it is difficult for independent group to earn seats n Parliament and cracked the power 
of established sectarian parties. Secondly, the majoritarian system strengthened political 
horse — trading. Consequently the 2009 elections encouraged sectarianism and polarization 
and weakened national unity. Lebanese politics was not just sectarian and factional; it was 
much "localized" n the sense that political power was depended an exclusively controlling or 
owning a district. In other words, sectarian leaders, political parties and political families 
considered themselves for entitlement towards district in which they had often historic 
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elientelist networks. Suleiman Frangieh in the.  Zaghorta district, Hezbollah in many South 
352 
Lebanon districts and the Future Movement in Akkar are some prominent case. 
- Election Result — An Analysts 
With announcement of result the election frenzy in Lebanon ended and a new phase 
in Lebanon's volatile history began. The predictions of local and international observers 
about the success of opposition which were based on certain assumptions after Doha 
Accord did prove invalid and were without proper assessment. 
The result of election demonstrated that the March 14 alliance was more stronger 
cohesive and tenacious and that its foundations, at least for the time being, were secured. 
Secondly, the inherent weakness and contradictions of opposition were generally ignored 
while assessing their ability to win a parliamentary majority. Thirdly, the election result 
negated the oft-repeated assumption that Christian note would influence the outcome of 
the election consequences. Indeed the Sunni and Shiite voters had largely decided the result 
and outcome of election in hey districts. Lastly, the general believe that the result of 
election regardless of the outcome would provide a strong platform to the decision makers 
regarding the issues of the national importance, was based on exaggeration and 
overestimated, ignoring the Lebanon's sectarian political system and consensus amongst 
the key sectarian leaders. The reality was that the Doha Accord was discussed in a foreign 
country by Lebanon's sectarian leaders, who allowed interference of regional actors, not by 
the elected representatives in parliament.353  
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- Concluding Notes 
In the 2009 parliamentary elections of Lebanon about 55 % eligible voters cast their 
ballots, while in an up recedented. Although this election was held under the intimidations 
of weapons outside the hands of state authority, result indicates the beginning of 
democracy that remains absent in many other neighboring countries. The election was held 
under a different electoral law than the 2005 elections and the result reaffirmed the victory 
for the majority. The outcome of the result should be taken as a mandate to the Parliament 
and Cabinet and also an opportunity to solidity and implement a governing agenda that will 
lead a truly open and democratic society will be free from violence and foreign interference 
with security and prosperity for all its citizens.
354 
3. Role of Maronite Christians and Lebanese leaders in Lebanon's politics 
3.1 President Rene Mouawad and His Assassination 
The Tripartite Arab committee on Lebanon advised to the National Assembly for 
holding the session in November 1989 and suggested to elect President. The National 
Assembly convened on 5 November 1989 at northern town of Elias Hrawi and elected 
Maronite notable Christian deputy from Zagharte (hometown of Suleiman Franjieh) a 
former Minister of Education and Arts Rene Mouawad as President.355 He was elected 
President in second round of voting and received 52 votes out of the 58 votes cast. His rival 
George Saade and Elias Hrawi withdraw in the second round of voting, (another rescinded 
354 
i~ttp://www.ficus.org/liclib/LICRD/electionsO9/POST7o2OELECr[ON /`20PAPER% 20-%20Political. [30-12-
2012] 
355 
Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (New York: Paicrave 
Macmillan,2003) p.172. 
174 
,aronite Christian deputy.) Deputies of the National Assembly unanimously ratified the Taif 
,greement and re-elected Hussein al-Husseini as President of the National Assembly.
356 
,resident Mouawad on 13 November 1989 invited Dr. Salim al-Hoss to form a government 
~f national reconciliation.357 However, on 22 November 1989, Lebanese independence Day 
'resident Rene Mouawad an his way to a parade was killed by a car bomb in West Beirut. 
-le unfortunately remained as President of Lebanon for less than three weeks. Along with 
him some twenty-three more lives were lost in this and vicious act of determining power. 
Mouawad was not an important and celebrated personality within Lebanon's Christian 
community. He was assassinated simply because he was elected as the first President under 
new constitutional formula in Lebanon. He was moderate and acceptable to Syria and the 
US and also enjoyed popularity both among Christian and along live communities. But he 
was patently not acceptable and familiar General Aoun. Many among radicals considered 
him as "Arabist" and doubted about his credentials. 358 
3.2 President Elias Hrawi and His role 
In the 1972 parliamentary elections Elias Hrawi was elected as a deputy of Zahle. He 
was also the cabinet minister of public works and during the period of 1980 — 82. Hrawi had 
joined the parliamentary bloc, also known as the Independent Maronite Deputies Bloc, 
356 
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which brought him among many president aspirants.359 The 1980s was an era of 
disturbances and violence in Lebanon. After the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, 
the Hrawi was a choice for presidentship who under the constitution had to be a Maronite. 
After taking the charge of office, his main works was, to rebuild the scattered Lebanese 
state and maintain law and order in the state.36o 
A. New President Elias Hrawi 
Immediately after the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, fifty-two deputies 
of the National Assembly elected Elias Hrawi as the next President, during meeting called by 
them. President Hrawi was supposed to be in league with Syria despite his close association 
with Maronite leaders for many years. He belonged to Maronite Christian community and 
was son of a Maronite notable formally. Meanwhile, deputies decided extend the term of 
office of the National Assembly until the end of 1994 and in the same session noted in 
favour of this decision. Undoubtedly, as a matter of sect Lebanon' government institutions - 
the presidency, the government and the parliament —was accomplished and acquired or got 
unanimous vote of confidence from the National Assembly.361  The newly formed 
government took an important decision on 28 November 1989 Cabinet in a meeting 
dismissed General Michel Aoun from post Commander -- in — Chief of the Lebanese army 
and in his place General Emile Lahoud was appointed as Commander— in -- Chief.362  
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B. Michel Aoun's Opposition 
An attack was launched to General Aoun's headquarters by the loyal troops of Hrawi 
and General Aoun was forced to stop his opposition.
363  Syrian forces with the supports of 
Lebanese militia members attached Beirut, killed hundreds of unarmed soldiers and civilians 
on 13th October. As a consequence General Aoun escaped to the French Embassy and later 
on, was permitted to travel to France. After the eleven days from the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops, General Aoun returned to Lebanon on May 7, 2005. General Aoun as a head of the 
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), signed a memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah in 
2006. Free Patriotic Movement which has 27 representative and is the second biggest bloc 
in the Parliament, General Aoun is the leader of the Movement and also a Member of 
Parliament presently.3M  
C. Weakness of President Elias Hrawi and Continuing His role 
The President Hrawi and his predecessors were elected in accord once with the Taif 
Accord on 22 October 1989, with a view to draw reforms on which 62 Lebanese 
Parliamentarians were agreed. 
Hrawi was elected under troubled circumstances. This obviously made him weaker 
President than any of his previous leaders since the impendence of Lebanon in 1943. Hrawi 
was a successor of an assassinated president and had to face the opposition from interim 
Prime Minister, General Michel Aoum, who was not willing to accept the Taif Accord. 
President Hrawi started to operate from the presidential residence in Ba'abda. The Taif 
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Accord had replaced the Lebanese political system from a quasi — presidential system to a 
cabinet parliamentary system, which has its affect on the presidential powers. This was 
done on the expense of presidential powers. Hrawi become President at a time when 
Lebanese politics was dominated by Syria under Hafiz Assad. When Hezbollah freed Terry 
Anderson, all American hostages were released on 4 December 1991, during Hrawi's 
presidency. But certainly it did not end the ban of U.S citizens in Lebanon because Hezbollah 
remained armed and operated freely in Lebanon. This lower scale conflict in Southern 
Lebanon was kept alive because it has to sever the Syrian and Iranian national interest and 
at the sometime the Lebanese president was prevented to use the Lebanese Army to disarm 
Hezbollah and bring an end to the conflict. Another effect to the implementation of the Taif 
Accord was Syria's rejection to deploy its troops to the eastern parts of Lebanon, two years 
after the passage of the reforms by the Chamber of Deputies.365  
According to Lebanese Constitution, each president had a term of six- years and re-
election was prohibited. Due to this the term of the Hrawi had to the end in November 
1995, but in October 1995 the Lebanese government, with the support of Syria, amended 
the constitution so that Hrawi could continue for another three years. This move obviously 
brought stability in the Lebanon and Hrawi was successful in bringing peace in Lebanon and 
this became possible because he had good relations with Syria.366 
3.3 A former president of Lebanon Emile Lahoud 
Emile Lahoud was a former President of Lebanon during 1998 -2007 and is also a 
Lebanese Maronite Christian politician. In 1989, will the support of Syrian president Hafez 
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Assad, Lahoud was appointed as Commander of the Lebanese army and was also elected as 
President in October 1998. However, within months of his election, the Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri resigned and eventually replaced by Salim al-Noss. Lahoud term was extended an 
additional three years by Lebanese Parliament from 2004 to 2007.367 
A. The Extension of Lahoud Term 
The on-going political and economic struggle in Lebanon took a critical turn since Taif 
Accord on 3 d` September 2004. The Syrian resolution to extend the term of President Emile 
Lahoud contravention to constitutional provisions and the way Syrian security agents and 
their Lebanese allies dealt the issue with the heavily-handed methods and used force for an 
amendment through Parliament flashed the crisis. The government was in great trouble 
rather under direct threat as 29 MP's belonging to different seats including Sunni Mosbah 
Ahdab, Druze Akram Shehayeb and Maronite Nassib Lahoud chose to Vote against the 
constitutional amendment. 368 
Although the Syrians and Lahoud conclusively prevailed in the Parliament, they, 
however, defeated at the UN Security Council. In the Security Council, Resolution 1559 was 
passed on 2'~d September, 2004, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon to facilitate the process of selection of the leaders by the Lebanese without foreign 
influence. Syrian protested against this Resolution on the ground that it was an interference 
in the internal affairs of the member state and would set a dangerous precedent. The 
French Ambassador, Jean — Marc de la Sabliere, however, rejected the Syrian's plea and 
opposed that non-action by the UN would permit or allow Syrian "interference in the 
367 
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-nal affairs of another state". The French stand was paramount at the moment because 
as to introduce un — symbolic coordination with the US over a West Asian issue. John 
anforth US ambassador to UN categorically mentioned that continue military presence of 
Syria in Lebanon was improper and more significantly that "it would be very wrong of Syrian 
to continue to interfere in the presidential electoral process in Lebanon. 
This U.S.-French concurrence against Syrian not only fostered prospects for major 
changes in West Asia in the Lebanese context, as well in terms of a broader regional peace. 
It was seen as significant move to isolate Syrian, marginalize Iran and its influence in 
Lebanon and extricate Israeli — Palestinian negotiations from the wider Arab seen and 
redeem democracy in Lebanon. 
Decision of Syria to extend the term of Lahoud and proceeded with the formation of 
a united Lebanese opposition that included prominent Sunni, Christian and Druze leaders. 
Two reasons often considered for this opposition. First, it comprised a broad coalition of 
Lebanon's seats, which formerly had been a red line in the Syrian government's approach to 
Lebanese political affairs. Secondly, this front was not related with exiled General Michel 
Aoun, who from the very beginning turned down the down the Syrian-influenced 
arrangement known as the Taif Accord. The leaders of new united opposition in 2004, 
namely Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and other, 
had once supported the Syrians dominant role in Lebanon during the occupation of the 
southern part of the country in the 1990 by the Israeli forces.369  
369 
lahoud's backing came from the major Shiite parties, Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. The 
opposition was not a cohesive group, but ail to a greater or lesser degree believed that Syria's role in Lebanon 
had created an authoritarian regime based on military rule - Lahoud was Lebanon's former Army Commander-
in-Chief- backed by a security apparatus that restricted freedoms and, significantly for minorities such as the 
Druze, threatened the pluralism of Lebanese society. In this tense starrd-off, the role of then Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri, the most influential Sunni leader sine Taif, became the key not only to understanding 
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The political crisis of Lebanon was in fact revolved around the long-standing 
economic polarization. During Lahoud period national debt of Lebanon touched $ 34 billion, 
or 185 percent of GDP. The political crisis that erupted in Lebanon in 2004 had undisputedly 
been linked with debt crisis. According to opposition leaders, the debts was the result of 
mismanagement, corruption and intentionally pass aging of French to benefits groups and 
individuals loyal to Syria, as well as directly to Syria itself. Opponents, in view of the 
economic crisis, strongly pleaded that in extension of Lahoud term beyond 2004 would 
prolong this situation. Even Syria's loyal Maronite ally in Lebanon Minister Suleiman 
Franjieh, termed the Lahoud era as "the worst in post — independence Lebanon".370  
3.4 The Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the Rebuilding of Lebanon 
During 1975 —1990 the fifteen years of civil war were the periods of severe setback 
of Lebanese economy. The major loss was witnessed in industrial and commercial sectors. 
Several industries were destroyed and communication facilities were also damaged badly. 
Water supplies, roads, and electric generation and distribution were maintained at best, but 
a clear decline was noticed in compassion to the best of the region. With the end of civil war 
it was not difficult only to maintain and improve the basic infrastructure but also due to the 
several Israeli air raids in the decade had a deep impact in the electric facility in particular.371  
The rebuilding of Lebanese economy was an important factor in the election of 1992, 
in which Rafiq Hariri was elected as prime minister. Hariri a successful Lebanese, 
what went wrong in Lebanon, but also came to provide a preview of the direction in which events were 
heading, 
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businessman had fortune to be amassed from Saudi Arabia. Hariri would bring prosperity in 
Lebanon as expected by many international and Lebanese observers through applying his 
business skills. He would bring international investments in Lebanon and this will lead in the 
restoration of Lebanon previous glory 3n 
A. Saudi-Syrian Roles during Harm's Premiership 
The Saudi government decision to guarantee loan to Lebanon in support of Hariri in 
2000, relaxed the concerns of both bankers and investors. Saudi citizens also personally 
showed great enthuses to invest in Lebanon. But an impression was given that Saudi's 
investment would last as long as Hariri would remain in power. This gave an impression that 
Saudi Arabia and Syria were competing powers in Lebanon, Hariri representing the Saudis 
and Lahoud for Syria, acting as an agent for US is the West Asia. Some critics advocate that 
Hariri's political goals and Syrians role in Lebanon are not different from each other and 
both were at Lebanon's expense.373  
The fact is that the relation between Syria and Saudi Arabia are not good. Saudi 
Arabia considered Syrian controlled pro-Iranian Hezbollah as a means of minimizing 
Tehran's regional influence. Syria enjoyed support of Arab masses because of its 
uncompromising attitude towards Israel and US interests and this kept Saudi Arabia to avoid 
direct conflict with Syria. The Saudis acted as are safety net for Lebanese government and 
also bearded the expenses of Syrian forces partially during 1990s. This can be realized from 
372 
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the fact that at Paris Conference lithe Saudis gave $700 million aid package to the Lebanese 
government.374 
But the Saudi support for Lebanon was termed as a dual-policy. Critics advocate that 
Saudi Arabia money justified the Syrian presence in Lebanon and limiting its sovereignty. As 
a matter of fact Saudi money helped greatly to Lebanese economic and political reforms 
which was urgently needed by Lebanese society because it going to lead a worsening 
political and situations.375 
B. The Hariri Assassination and the UN Resolutions 
The Hariri- Syrian struggle, which remained in back doors till 2004, took memento 
international arena after February 2005, Although pro-Syrian politicians in Lebanon has the 
view, that Marwan Hamadeh, Rafiq Hariri, and Ghassan Salarneh wire behind UN resolution 
1559, passed in September 2, 2004.376 Resolution 1559 was actually about the "withdrawal 
of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon" (referred mainly to Syria) and was concerned 
about "the continued presence of armed militia in Lebanon" (referred to Hezbollah).377 
Among the three names of Resolution two were about assassination targets while the third 
the Paris for safety reasons. In a Bomb explosion in Central Beirut, Rafiq Hariri the former 
374 
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Prime Minister was assassinated on 14 February 2005. In this powerful blast sever 
bodyguards of Hariri were killed and some 135 people were injured.378 The United Nations 
Security Council passed a resolution 1595 to establish investigating committee to investigate 
the Hariri's assassination. UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen and German prosecutor had to led 
this investigating committee.379 They submitted their report in October 2005, the reports 
were against the Syria, either in Hariri assassination or for limiting Lebanon sovereignty and 
continuing to smuggle illegal weapons to some of its ties particularly Palestinian groups.38o 
The Michel report highlighted number evidence about the tense relations between 
Syria and Hariri. The report also provided evidence of major campaign of defaming Hariri's 
name by involving allegedly the former Prime Minister with corruption. The report also 
highlighted that it could not deny of possibilities of assassination of Hariri due to a passed 
threat to their financial enters rather than politically motivated (because his endeavor to 
privatize Lebanon economy and making favorable to the Western interests).381  
As a result to this UN report, Resolution 1636 was passed unanimously on 31 
October 2005, seeking genuine Syria cooperation towards investigation, failing which lead 
to the use of force.382  The irreconcilable conflict in the end of 2004 between Syria and Hariri, 
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brought minimizing Syrian interest Lebanon and threatening Syrian regime itself by the fall 
of 2005.383 
C. Lebanon since the Hariri Assassination 
The unexpected events to which began to took place in Lebanon with the Hariri 
assassination on 14 February 2005, together with the mass demonstration in Beirut, 
withdrawal of Syrian army, marking of war's thirtieth anniversary by thousands of Lebanese 
and parliamentary election in which opposition candidates got elected - all these events 
brought a change in the relationship between the state, the political and civil society in 
Lebanon. The mass demonstration in Beirut against the Hariri's murders, which reached at 
its apex when around one million people gathered, there on 14 March, 2005, were 
unexpected show of force by Lebanon civil society. By hosting Lebanon national symbols, 
these people were posing a direct challenge to, the state's political leadership and to the 
political society.3 
The unusual developments in Lebanon since February 2005 also marked the deep 
divisions in its society manifested the widening gap between "March 14 Forces" (Saad Hariri 
Future Movement, Jumblat's PSP, the Qornet Shahwan Gathering and smaller groups such 
as Tripoli Bloc, the Democratic Renewal Movement, and the Democratic left Movement 
(DLM), on the one hand and the March 8 Forces (Amal, Hezbollah, Aoun's FPM, and the pro-
Syrian Bath party and Syrian Nationalist party), on the other hand 385 These two groups were 
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also divided on religious grounds, with most Sunnis and Druze supported the government, 
while most Shiite supporting he opposition group. The Christian Community split between 
two groups. One group with Michel Aoun, the Free Patriotic Movement leader, claiming 70 
present supports among Christians and this was according to the parliamentary election 
results of 2005.
386  
However, in May 2005, Hezbollah and Amal Joined the new government formed by 
Fouad Siniora but the radical Shiite movement joined for the first times since its 
establishment -- both movement sought to acquire veto power within the Cabinet in order 
to check each other undesired decisions. One of the major problem join compromise 
between two rival groups was that some groups in order to achieve their goals adopted 
violence as a mean with the help of forcing countries. Thus, through this acts under mining 
Lebanon's formal and informal conflict regulation mechanism. 
But, violence was not only within the Lebanon's territory. Hezbollah leaders 
proclaimed that it is a 'resistance' and they are legitimate military wing, not militia. Despite 
of domestic and foreign presumes, they continued to, advocate their legitimacy, while other 
Lebanese militia were banned in 1991. As a result the "National Dialogue" were launched by 
Lebanon's political leaders and Hezbollah to solve the differences in March 2006. But the 
Hezbollah right to keep its weapons were resolved on 12 July. Hezbollah fighters attached 
an Israeli patrolling team across the "Blue line" and abducted two Israeli soldier. As a 
consequence, Israel began to attack Hezbollah and tried to destroy its military capabilities. 
They also pressurized Lebanon to ban Hezbollah and deploy the Lebanese army along the 
386 
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"Blue Line" with or without the deployment of an international force in Southern Lebanon. 
However, it resulted in hundreds of causalities, including civilian on both sides.387 
During the confrontation, Hezbollah and Amal resumed their endeavourers to secure 
veto power in the cabinet and demanded the resignation of its Shiite ministers in November 
to limit its representation388. Hezbollah threatened to launch mass demonstration in order 
to compel Siniora's government to resign. About hundreds of thousands Hezbollah 
supporters and its allies (particularly Amal, the FPM, and the SNNP) held a huge sally in 
Beirut and encircled government offices on 1, December 2006.389 
Hassan Nasrallah, the opposition leader in 8 April 2007 stated the situation as 
deadlock, but refused to convert the protest into civil war. He advocates that status quo 
would be maintained till the scheduled elections of 2009. However, another sectarian 
violence erupted in Lebanon during May 2008.390 This conflict ended after on weak in May 
2008. However, the leaders of both majority and opposition succeeded in reaching an 
agreement by the intervention of Qatar. Thus, it is known as Doha Agreement It ended 18 
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months long crisis by electing General Michel Suleiman as the president of the republic and 
forming a national-unity government under the leadership of Fouad Siniora.39x 
Tow years of long street demonstration ended after the Doha Agreement. Presently, 
Saudi Arabia which supported Siniora and Iran which supported opposition reached on a 
power sharing compromise after a long negotiation Siniora with the support of Arab 
countries, US, France, UN and Lebanese parliamentary majority also, opposes to giving the 
opposition a veto —wielding block in the cabinet 392 
3.5 A Short term of Former Prime Minister Omar Karami 
Omar Karami was a Lebanese politician from Tripoli and a former Prime Minister of 
Lebanon. For the first time on 24 h` of December 1990, Omar Karami became a Prime 
Minister just after Salim al-Noss resigned from his post under the pressure of deteriorating 
conditions of Lebanon. Omar Karami remained Prime Minister from 24 December 1990 to 
130' May 1992.393 
When the Lebanese currency collapsed and a massive protest in Lebanon took place 
21 October 2004, Karami sworn again. He resigned from his post among protestors 
following the murder of the previous Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.394  
When the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri took place in 2005, the 
opposition members accused Syria for assassination and demanded withdrawal of Syrian 
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troops and intelligence personnel from Lebanon that was unacceptable to the Karami which 
was pro-Syrian government. Several opposition members even blamed involvement of 
Karami's government itself in the assassination of the Prime Minister Hariri. Karami 
announced under entrance pressure on 28 February 2005 that his government would 
resign, however, it remained temporarily in a caretaker role.
395  
A. Lebanon Prime Minister to resign amid disarray 
In a failed attempt to convince opposition members to join his cabinet Lebanese Pro-
Syrian Prime Minister, Omar Karami told that he wants to step down in the coming days. 
The opposition members impressed their view that government was trying to postpone 
parliamentary election planned for this spring. Karami resigned at end of February only, 
keeping in view to be re-nominated 10 days later, made proclamation after informing 
parliament speaker that he was not in a position to establish unity government he promised 
when he returned to office.396  
3.6 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
Fouad Siniora was a former Prime Minister and Lebanese politician. He remained 
Prime Minister of Lebanon from 19th Jul to 2005 to 25th May 2008 and was also given the 
post again during 25th May 2008 to 9rh November 2009.397  
When Parliamentary elections held in May 2005, anti-Syrian opposition became 
victorious and Fouad Siniora was asked by President Lahoud on 30th June to form a 
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government. At that time he was holding the post of chairmanship of Group Mediterranee 
(a banking group controlled by Hariri family) and he resigned from the post. After a long 
negotiation with the President and different political groups, Siniora formed the 
government on 19 July 2005. It was the first government since the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops from Lebanon and was also the first government to include Hezbollah members (a 
pro-Iranian militant group).398 The Siniora Cabinet on the other hand was also trying 
alongside with 14 March Alliance to disarm Hezbollah military wing peacefully as an internal 
political action. Except the General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, all mainstream 
political factions were represented. Fouad Siniora government came into existence on 19 
July 2005. All the main political factions were represented except the Free Patriotic 
Movement of General Michel Aoun.399  
A. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 
Hezbollah launched a massive cross-border attack on Israel and began the Israel-
Hezbollah war on 12 July 2006. Thus, Siniora in an attempt to end this deadly conflict 
presented a seven-point programme at a conference in Rome in which 15 nations were 
participating. He also convened a meeting of Arab League in Beirut. In an interview with 
television at the conference, he was famously sobbed as he described the suffering of the 
Lebanese people. United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on 12 August. 
Resolution 1701 and it was welcomed by Siniora.400 
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Resolution 1701 of the United Nations Security Council was a proposed plan to bring 
an end to the Israel-Lebanon conflict. The resolution was unanimously passed by United 
Nations Security Council on 11 August 2006. The Lebanese cabinet which also includes two-
members of Hezbollah, passed the resolution unanimously on the very next day. On same 
day, Hassan Nasrallha, Hezbollah leader advocate that his militia would respect the call for 
ceasefire. The ceasefire took place on Monday, 14 August at 8 AM local time, after 
increased attacks by both sides.
401  
The leader of opposition, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on 8 April 2007, announced the 
situation as deadlock but refused to converting the situation into civil war. He declared that 
the status quo would be maintained tell the parliamentary elections 2009. However, a new 
sectarian violence began in Lebanon during the first week of May 2008. Hezbollah militia in 
response to the government's crackdown of his network blocked Beirut airport as well as 
capital main city streets, disturbed the normal life in the capital. A battle started between 
Hezbollah supporters and pro-government loyalists on 8 May 2008. As a result the leaders 
of the organization said that the government's decision as "a declaration of war". The 
leaders of opposition and majority signed the Doha Agreement, ending the 18 months clash. 
The Agreement made the election of General Michel Suleiman as President and created 
national-unity government under Fouad Siniora •402 
B. The Doha Agreement 
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The Doha Agreement was an agreement between rival Lebanese factions which 
came into existence on Wednesday, 21 May 2008. This Agreement brought an 18 months 
long political crisis, Qatar's Emir Sheilkh Hamad bin Khalifa, arranged a meeting of all 
Lebanese political parties to discuss the matter in order to reach on an agreement to end 
the ongoing political crisis which was expected to lead a civil war.
403  
3.7 Michel Suleiman after the Presidency in Lebanon 
The 11th President of Lebanon, Emile Lahoud's term came to an end on November 
23, 2007. During that period, the Lebanese political scenario was divided either in the 
governments loyalists (known as the March 14 camp) or the opposition (known as the 
March 8 camp). The two factions were unable to reach on an agreement to decide who will 
be the Lebanese next President in pursuance to the country's constitution. The powers of 
the Presidency were transferred to the government so that an agreement would be made 
on the matter. 
Several names were proposed as eligible candidates for the Presidency such as, 
Michel Aoun, Nassib Lahoud, and Boutros Harb, among others, in which everyone was 
associated with either March 14 Camp or March 8 camp. However, a matter arose that only 
one candidate would be acceptable to both sides. Michel Suleiman was the only candidate 
which was able to got acceptance from both sides. This dilemma was resolved during the 
negotiations at Doha from May 17 to May 20, 2008. The negotiations which started at Doha 
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was participated by all major Lebanese political parties, and an agreement reach on 
preferring Michel Suleiman as a Presidential candidate in Presidential election.404  
A. The Doha Agreement during of Presidential Vacancy 
From 16 May to 21 May 2008, the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference was held 
at Doha. In this conference, the Lebanese political leaders who were the members of the 
National Dialogue and also showed their commitment t save Lebanon and to bring an end to 
the current political crisis which dangerous for peaceful co-existence of rival political 
factions and Lebanese civilians. Their great commitment to the principles of Lebanese 
constitution and Taif Agreement, as a result of Doha conference, as well as, the several talks 
and consultative meetings between the Arab Ministerial Committee and President and also 
the all political parties which participated in the conference. Thus, Doha Agreement was 
signed on May 21, 2008 by the Lebanese Political leaders in the presence of the President 
and Arab Ministerial Committee members.405  
Finally, the voting held in Parliament and Suleiman was elected with a majority of 
118 votes out of 127 on 25 May, 2008 406  The day was Sunday when Lebanese parliament 
elected Chief Michel Suleiman as the New President of Lebanon. Army Commander General 
Michel Suleiman fills the Presidential post which was vacant about six months after a 
consensus made on him by rival Lebanese Political factions. The opposition leader and 
speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri stated at parliamentary headquarters that "Michel 
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Suleiman got 118 votes and I declare him as the President of Lebanon". The result came 
after the Western-backed ruling coalition and Hezbollah led opposition came to an 
agreement in Doha to end the 18 months long political crisis.
407  
B. President Michel Suleiman calls for unity 
Michel Suleiman requested to his countrymen to set aside their differences and 
bring a new era in the history of Lebanon which has been plagued by 15 months long 
political crisis. Suleiman said, "A new period should be opened in favour of Lebanon," in 
order to preserve national agreement and to protect armed forces. "We protect the country 
by culture of dialogue and not by making it a conflict zone," Suleiman said. He asserted that 
weapons will only be rained against enemy and not on any other direction. He referred it to 
the clashed between pro-government forces and the opposition earlier. He also stated for 
mutual and balanced relation with Syria based on mutual suspect and diplomatic relations. 
He asserted "We should benefit from our experience for the benefit of the two countries". 
Lebanese Parliament accepted Michel Suleiman as new President of Lebanon.408  
The newly elected President Michel Suleiman appointed Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora to lead a government of national unity. Suleiman called Fouad Siniora to form a new 
government. The President Michel Suleiman said that Siniora will began consultation on 
Thursday with the various parliamentary blocs to form a 30 member cabinet in which the 
Hezbollah led opposition will have the veto power over government important decisions. He 
advocate that he will try his best to bridge the gap between all rival parties and seeks to 
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form a government of national unity. "I extend my hand for cooperation and solidarity so 
that our country can achieve the breakthroughs it desires," Siniora said. He advocates that I 
hoped that all parties will learn from their past events and it must not be repeated. He told, 
"I call on all of you to heal the wounds and to overcome the division we have experienced 
and not to resort to violence to solve our problems.409  
3.8 A Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri and His Role 
Saad Hariri was a former Prime Minister of Lebanon from 2009 to till 2011. He is the 
second son of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was assassinated in 
2005.410 After the assassination of his father, he forwarded the Future Movement, a Sunni 
Movement that was created and led by his father, Rafiq Hariri.411 
 
A. The Future Movement 
MP Saad Hariri start the Lebanese political movement that is called the Future 
Movement (Tayyar al Mustaqbal).This movement won majority of seats in 2009 
parliamentary election and have huge number of member in March 14 Alliance. 
The party was officially established in August 2007. But declaration of the party was 
alleged in 5 April 2009 in a convention held it at BIEL convention center in Beirut.412 In 
2009, March 14, Saad Hariri was the foremost leader and his party won 72 National 
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410 http://en.wikiped1a.org/wiki/Saad__Harlri[23-02-2012] 
411 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saad_Hariri#Political_career[24-02-2012] 
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Assembly Seat. Later an in 9th  November 2009 the President of the party Michel Suleiman 
assign Saad Hariri as a new Prime Minister and he succeeds Fouad Siniora 413 
B. March 14 Alliance 
14 Alliance come after the date of Cedar Revolution. Cedar Revolution was a 
assassination of political parties and independents in Lebanon that was call for sovereignty 
over all Lebanese territories. This association was called by MP Saad Hariri. Samir Geagea 
president of the Lebanese Forces also take part in this meeting.
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Constituent parties 
Party Arabic name Seats in Demographic base 
Parliament (after 
2009 election) 
Future Movement TayyarAl 26 Officially secular; 
Mustagbal MainlySunni Muslim. 
Independents 13 
Lebanese Forces a!-qutivat a[- 8 Secular;Maronite. 
lubnaniyah 
Lebanese Social al-Kataeb al- 5 Mainly Maronite Christian 
Democratic Party or Lubnaniyya 
Kataeb 
Social Democrat Hizb al-Henchag 2 Secular,Armenian 
Hunchakian Party 
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National Liberal Party Hizb al-Wataniyyin 1 MaroniteChristian 
al-Ahrar 
Democratic Left Harakat Al-Yassar 1 Secular 
ll-Dimograti 
Islamic Group Al-Jamaa Al- 1 Sunni Muslim 
Islam iya 
Armenian Democratic Hizb al-Ramgavar I Secular,Armenian 
Liberal Party - 
Ramgavar 
Independence Harakat Al-Istiklal 0 Officially secular; 
Movement MainlyMaroniteChristian 
Democratic Renewal Harakat al- 0 Secular 
Tajaddod al- 
Dimoqrati 
Lebanese National Hizb al-Kitla al- 0 Officially secular; 
Bloc Wataniya mainlyMaroniteChristian 
Free Lebanese Harakit Al- 0 SecularArmenian 
Armenian Movement Lubnaniyin Al- 
Arman Al-Ahrar 
Free Shiite Movement Tayyar el-Shi'i el- 0 Shiite Muslim 
Horr 
Lebanese Peace Party Hizb as-Salani al- 0 Secular 
Lubnany 
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Muahedeen Group Jamaai AL- 0 Mainly Druze 
Muahedeen 
Syriac Union of Hizb at Ittihad at 0 Syriac Christian 
Lebanon Siryani 
Shuraya Party Hizb A1-Shuraya 0 Assyrian 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_14_Alliance 
The main opponent of Future Movement was March 8 Alliance. Michel Aoun and 
Shiite Hezboilah led the Free Patriotic Movement along with the Amal Movement. There 
was other opponent they are neither with March 14 Alliance not with the March 8 Alliance, 
Such as Hizbul Tahrir, which was demanding the re-establishment of the Islamic 
Caliphate.415  
C. March 8 Alliance 
The union of various political parties of Lebanon form the March 8 Alliance. Since 
January 25, 2011 March 8 alliances come under power when this association managed to 
nominate Najib Mikati as a new prime minister. When the different parties called for a mass 
demonstration in downtown of Beirut in report of Cedar Revolution.4I6  
The current majority holds 68 National Assembly seat set of 128 in the parliament 
after the 2009 election. 
Constituent parties 
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Arabic Name Seats in Parliament Demographic Base Party 
(after 2009 election) 
Free Patriotic at-Tayyar al- 19 Secular, predominantly Christian 
Movement Watani al-Hurt 
Aural Movement Harakat Amal 13 Secular, 
predominantlyShi'a Muslim 
Hezbollah Hizballah 12 Shi'a Muslim 
Progressive Socialist al-Hizb at- 7 Secular, predozninantlyDruze 
Party Taqaddumi al- 
lsbtiraki 
Lebanese Democratic al-Hizb ad- 4 Secular, Druze 
Party Dimugrati al- 
Lubnani 
El Marada Movement Tayyar al-Marada 3 Christian, mainly Maronite 
Glory Movement Harakat Majd 2 Sunni Muslim 
Armenian Tashnag 2 Secular Armenian 
Revolutionary 
Federation 
Syrian Social al-Hizb as-Surf al- 2 Secular with support across all 
Nationalist Party Qawmi al-Ijtima'i communities 
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Hizb a1-Ba'th al- 2 Secular 
Party Arabi al-lshtiraki 
Solidarity Party Hizb at-Tadamoun 1 Maronite Christian 
Skaff Bloc Kutlat Skaff 0 Secular, mainly Greek Catholic 
Popular Nasserite at-Tanzim ash- 0 Secular, mainly SunniMuslim 
Organization Sha'bi al-Nasiri 
Arab Democratic al-Hizb ad- 0 Alawi Muslims 
Party Dimugrati al-Arabi 
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Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_8__Alliance 
D. Saad Hariri after the Collapse of His Government 
The former government of Lebanon collapsed when the Energy Minister a Gebran 
Bassil along with the ten opposition minister resigned. There all ministers were resigned 
after the warning of political party Hezbollah on January 12, 2011. There was a 
condemnation against the group by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the murder of 
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri PM Hariri refuse to call on emergency cabinet session 
over discussion for takeout cooperation with the STL. The March 8 nominated the Najib 
Mikati as a prime minister and also agrees with the norms that the prime minister must be a 
Sunni. The Saad Hariri was remained as a care taker prime minister for another four months 
until the new government was finally formed.417  
3.9 Najib Mikati and Separation terms of Prime Ministership 
Najib Mikati is a Prime Minister of Lebanon succeeded by Saad Hariri on 13 June 
2011. He was a care taker prime minister of the Lebanon from April 2005 to July 2005 
President Emile Lahoud appointed Najib Mikati as a prime minister.418 In April 2005, Najib 
Mikati succeeded the Omar Abdul Hamid Karami. Omar Karami oath twice as a prime 
minister firstly in 24 December 1990 and later an after the death of Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri on 21 October 2004.419  
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Omar Karami resigned after he was unable to form a consensus government. Before 
resigned he had made aggravated effort to seven months establish a government. The 
appointment of Najib Mikati was a result of the collapse of the Saudi-Syrian initiative to 
reach a compromise on the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
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A. Lebanese government under Prime Minister Najib Mikati 
it was taken about five month to form a new government in Lebanon after the fall of 
Saad Hariri government on 13 June •2011 Najib Mikati formed a 30 minister cabinet.
421  
Michel Suleiman the President of Lebanon then ordered Mikati to form a new 
422 government. 
Eleven ministers were selected by Michel Aoun's change and reform block, giving 
him alone veto power along with one merge minister backed by both Aoun's political party 
and Michel Suleiman's presidential power. Currently the Acun's Free Patriotic Movement 
party has 27 representatives and is the second biggest bloc in the parliament. The current 
lineup brings Aoun back to the government leadership for the Zn time since 1990. Six 
ministers are from Najib Mikati's prime ministerial team in which three are independent. In 
the prime ministerial team 5 ministers are Sunni and one is Greek Orthodox. Six ministers 
come from the other parties in the March 8 Alliance which include only two ministers each 
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firm Hezbollah and Amal movement, New the government has 7 Sunni 6 Maronite and 5 
Shiite ministers.423  
Composition 
Portfolio (Ministry) 
Interior and 
Municipalities 
Lebanese government of June 2011 
Minister 	I Political affiliation 	 I Religious Sect 
Presidential Share 313 
Marwan Charbel 	Free Patriotic Movement 	Maronite 
Deputy Prime Minister 	Samir Mou bel Independent Greek Orthodox 
Environment 	 Nazim Khoury Independent Maronite 
Prime Minister Share 6130 
Prime Minister Na'ib Mikati Glory Movement Sunni 
Finance Mohammad 
Safadi 
Independent Sunni 
Minister of State Ahrnad Karami Glory Movement Sunni 
Information Walid Daouk Independent Sunni 
Education Hassan Diab Independent Sunni 
Economy and Trade Nicholas Nahhas Glory Movement Greek Orthodox 
Change and Reform bloc 11130 
Labour CharbeI Nahas Free Patriotic Movement Greek Catholic 
Telecommunications Nicolas Sehnaoui Free Patriotic Movement Greek Catholic 
Culture Gaby Layyoun Free Patriotic Movement Greek Orthodox 
Justice Shakib Qortbawi Free Patriotic Movement Maronite 
Energy and Water Gebran Bassil Free Patriotic Movement Maronite 
Tourism Fadi Abboud Free Patriotic Movement Maronite 
Defense Fayez Ghosn Marada Movement Greek Orthodox 
Minister of State Salim Bey 
Karam 
Marada Movement Maronite 
Industry Vrej Sabounjian Tashnag Armenian 
Orthodox 
Minister of State Panes Manjian Tashnag Armenian 
Orthodox 
Minister of State Marwan 
Kheireddin 
Lebanese Democratic Party Druze 
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Loyay to the Resistance bloc (2130) 
Agriculture 	 Hussein Hajj 	Hezbollah 	 Shiite 
Hassan 
Minister of State 	Mohammad 	Hezbollah 	 Shiite 
Fneish 
Democratic Gathering bloc (3/30) 
The displaced Alaaeddine Terro Progressive Socialist Party Sunni 
Public Works and Ghazi Aridi Progressive Socialist Party Druze 
Transport 
Social Affairs Wael Abou Progressive Socialist Party Druze 
Faour 
Others (5/30)  
Health All Hassan Amal Movement Shiite 
Khalil 
Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour Amal Movement Shiite 
Sports and Youth Faisal Karami Arab Liberation Party Sunni 
Minister of State Nicolas Fattoush Independent Greek Catholic 
Minister of State Ali Qanso Syrian Social Nationalist Party Shiite 
Source: ^ http://www.dailystar.com•lb/2011/Jun-13/Lebanon-appoints-new-governmen.t.ashx#ixzzlPQN]ioW1 
Influenced with the Arab spring hundred of Lebanese marched along the old 
democracy line in the capital Beirut against the country's sectarian political system also a 
peaceful Saida take place in Beirut.424  
Lebanon is governed by a delicate power sharing system which maintain the balance 
between the country many sects. In 27 February about 8,000 people marched from Dora to 
Beirut in the second round of campaign to "topple the sectarian regime". These Lebanese 
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protestor were demanding for secular state. The other protest took place in Baalbek and 
Sidon similar to the 27 February.
425  
March 14 Alliance organized a rally in which several hundreds of thousands 
supporters attended to tribute of the Start Cedar Revolution 6 years earlier. The protestors 
were demanding for reduction of the Hezbollah and to renew support for the ideals of the 
revolution 426 This was the third protest against the sectarian system 427 
- The main cause of civil war and civil strife in Lebanon: 
The government of Lebanon had been ruled by Maronite Christian since the state 
was created. However, the country had a large Muslim population. There were no Muslim 
representatives in the Maronite Christian government. The Muslim started oppose to pro-
western government. Lebanon had a democratic republic parliament within over all 
framework of confessionalism in which the highest offices were proportionately reserved 
for Maronite Christians. The constitution grant right to the people to change the 
government. However, from mid 1970, to 1992 civil war prohibited the exercise of political 
rights. According to the constitution the parliamentary election must be held for every four 
years. The parliament has right to elect a president at every six years to a single term. Which 
the last presidential elections, were held in 2008 and the parliamentary election were held 
in 2009. According to the constitution the president and parliament appoint the prime 
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minister. The Arab League Charged the Syria to separate the enemy and restore calm during 
second Lebanese civil war (1975-2005). Later on the Lebanese revolted against the Syrian 
presence and caused the withdraw of Syrian troops with support of international 
community. In 1978 Israel occupied part of Lebanon and withdrew from all Lebanese 
territories in 2000 except the Shibaa Farms. In 2008 Doha Agreement set a new trend in 
Lebanese party where the opposition was allowed a veto power in the Lebanese council of 
Minister and confirmed religious confessionslism in the distribution of political power.428  
428 
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CHAPTER - V 
CONCLUSION 
The Republic of Lebanon came into existence in 1920. Prior to this Lebanon 
traditionally referred to Mount Lebanon. The geographic boundaries of Mount Lebanon 
included that part of the present Lebanese territory which extends roughly from the 
Lebanon mountain ranges to the sea excluding Beirut and the regions of Tripoli and Sidon. 
Mont Lebanon was in the main the ancestral home of two important religious sects -- the 
Maronites and the Druzes. 
The Maronites trace their origin to an ascetic monk from the Syrian Church who lived 
in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Most of his activities took place northeast of 
Antioch. After his death his disciples moved to what is today known as Qalat al-Mandiq on 
the Orontes. 
The Maronites were originally a Monothelite communion, and it was only in the late 
twelfth century that they became attached to Rome. William of Tyre, the Crusader historian 
who was contemporary to the union, related the event, and later writers on the subject 
referred to him, to the embarrassment of the Maronites. Moreover, there were several anti-
Catholic movements among the Maronites during the three centuries which followed their 
union with Rome in c.1180. 
Maronite sectarians in the seventh century, fleeing Jacobite persecution in North 
Syria, find in North Lebanon a haven of peace. Druze devotees, considered heretic by 
orthodox Moslems, enter it in the eleventh century from the south. More recently 
Armenians and so-called Assyrians, remnants of communities subjected to Ottoman 
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persecution, make their way into it. All are provided therein with an opportunity to live their 
own lives in their own ways. The minority of the plain may thrive in the mountain to become 
a majority, the heterodoxy to orthodoxy. Maronites, Druzes, and Shiites (Matawilah) 
develop into nationalities or quasinationalities and so they remain. 
The Maronite church's traditional organization and its poverty were not conducive to 
making it an independent and powerful social force on the political scene. However, reform 
in the church and the integration of the Maronite areas into the emirate were favorable 
conditions for the growth of its prestige and power. 
In 1516, the Ottomans captured Mount Lebanon and Syria from Mamluks and set 
about reorganizing the administrative structure of the conquered territories. 
The Ottomans dominated this area for the next four centuries. The Ottomans 
continued the Mamluk policy of recognizing a local Lebanese notable to rule a 
semiautonomous state. Two great dynasties reigned in the mountains of Lebanon until 
1843. The Druze house of Ma'an was paramont until 1697, reaching its zenith under Fakhr 
al-Din 11 (1586-1635). His efforts to obtain total independence for Lebanon led ultimately to 
his defeat and execution. Nevertheless, this Druze leader did much for Lebanon by 
reopening the country to the West as it had not been since the crusades. 
The power of the Ma'n reached its zenith under Fakhr al-Din 11, who controlled all of 
Lebanon and parts of northern Palestine and northwestern Syria around the end of the 
sixteenth century. Fakhr al-Din II is famous for his unsuccessful attempt to break away from 
Ottoman rule. He was captured and executed by the Turks in 1635. Because of his deeds he 
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is considered to be the first hero of the modern Lebanese independence movement and is 
usually thought of as the "father of modern Lebanon." 
During Fakhr al-Din's rule the influence of the West in Lebanon expanded 
considerably, particularly throughout the Maronite community. Catholic missionary schools 
were established in Lebanon by France during the period as part of France's now infamous 
"civilizing mission." 
In 1590, they setup an emirate over Mount Lebanon. Mount Lebanon had 
throughout history provided refuge to threatened minorities. Fleeing from conquering 
invaders or religious persecution, minority communities had found relative security in the 
isolated malleys and mountains of Mount Lebanon. At the time of creation of the emirate, 
Mount Lebanon was by and large dominated by two sects — the Maronites Christian, in the 
North and the Druze Muslims in the South. The feudal system which had been introduced by 
the Mamluk continued to develop under Ottoman rule and reached its culmination in the 
creation of the emirate. During the entire period of its existence (1590-1841) the emirate 
was governed by two main dynasties—the Maans (1590-1696) and the Shihabs (1697-1841). 
In the last decade of Shihabi-Emir Bashir's rule began open and direct confrontation 
started between the Maronites and Druze Muslims. This period also witnessed the direct 
intervention of European powers in the political structure and destiny of Lebanon. The 
breakdown of inter-sectarian harmony between the two principal sects — Maronites and 
Druzes — as a result of socio-economic difference that had arisen between them, offered an 
enticing opportunity for the divide-and —rule policy of the Western powers now competing 
to replace the "sick man of Europe" in West Asia. 
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Resentful of Maronite ascendancy and angered by Christian intrusion into the south, 
the Druze revolted in the mixed districts of the mountain in 1841.This led the five major 
European powers (France, England, Austria, Prussia and Russia) to pressurize the Ottoman 
authorities into effecting a major realignment in the system of rule in the mountain. 
The Maronites were remnants of a once flourishing Christian population in the 
eastern Mediterranean area, while the Druze was a heterodox from the dominant political 
and cultural body of Islam. Could these strangers achieve a successful life together on the 
rocky mountains of Lebanon? Traditional Maronite historiography seems to have originated 
as an expression of national pride. As a small and closely-knit community surrounded by 
enemies, the Maronites tended to be deeply interested in their own history, taking pride in 
having retained their identity through many changes of fortune. As a social force we can 
distinguish two main contributions made by the Maronite Church in the social development 
of Mt. Lebanon. The first was of an ideological nature and the second, purely political. The 
ideological question is treated first at some length. 
By 1841, the Maronites were the only political force in Lebanon with foreign 
support; a romanticized ideology, charismatic leadership under the Maronite patriarchs, 
organizational strength and military proficiency capable of challenging the Sublime Porte 
and its Lebanese allies, the Druzes. A significant development gave much political and 
economic power to the clergy in the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
In 1860, following the massacre of thousands of Christians in Mount Lebanon during 
the sanguineous civil war, it was only natural that France would intervene on behalf of its 
longtime and beloved proteges. French travelers to the Levant who visited Mount Lebanon 
have always written in remarkably warm terms about the Maronites. 
When Ottoman sultan Selim-I defeated the Mamluks (rulers of Syria and Egypt) in 
Syria in 1516, Lebanon came under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, which established 
its capital at Istanbul. By this time, Feudalism was firmly established in the Mountain and 
the political policy to the Turks in Lebanon was similar to that of the Maluks in that it gave a 
certain degree of autonomy to the local emirs, or lords i.e. Fakhr al din-I from the Maan 
family. 
The power of the Ma'n reached its zenith under Fakhr al-Din II (ruled 1586-1635) the 
grandson of emir Fakhr al Din-I, who controlled all of Lebanon and parts of northern 
Palestine and northwestern Syria around the end of the sixteenth century. Fakhr al Din-II 
was able to unite the Mountain with the Chouf (south-east of Beirut, comprises a narrow 
coastal strip, the valleys and mountains of the western slopes) into the 'Emirate of Mount 
Lebanon'. The departure of Fakhr al Din-II from Lebanon did not end the Maanid line. The 
emir who followed was Mulhim Maan, a nephew Fakhr al Din-II, gained control of the Chouf 
and, by 1658, had added the districts of Batrun and Safad to his domain. Ahmad Maan, the 
emir Mulhim's son, succeeded his father in 1667. During his last years, Ahmad Maan, the 
emir was virtually a prisoner in his own palace and died in 1697, without leaving a male 
descendant. 
When the Ma'n Family became extinct upon the death of Ahmad Maan in 1697, the 
House of Shihab, under Amir Bashir al-Shihab, was chosen as its successor by a national 
assembly composed of the nobility of Lebanon. In line with their political policies the 
Ottoman authorities had permitted the Lebanese emirs to meet and elect their new leader. 
The house of shihab achieved the apex of its power under Bashir 11 (1788-1840), who was a 
baptized Maronite. 
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Clearly, by 1840, the Maronite establishment was the only major dynamic political 
force in Lebanon. It had energetic leadership, organizational strength and mass support to 
carry out its directives. Furthermore, the Maronites were the best equipped military force in 
Lebanon and had recourse to France in support of their policies. 
As a subsequent development, in the autumn of 1860, an international commission 
met to negotiate an agreement for the political reorganization of Lebanon. The commission 
represented Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and was presided over by Fuad 
Pasha, who represented Ottoman interests. Eight months after its first meeting on 5 
October 1860, on 9 June 1861, the commission reached an agreement, 'the Reglement 
Organique' comprising 17 articles. This accord established the Mutassarrifiyya (the two 
governorates) under an Ottoman ruler and abolished feudalism in the Mountain. The 
appointment of Mutassarrif (governor) was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, subject to the 
approval of the European powers. This council was to be made up of four Maronites, three 
Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Shiite, one Sunni (both Muslim sects) and one Greek 
Catholic. 
The foundations the new Lebanese state were established in 1943 by an unwritten 
agreement between the two most prominent Christian and Muslim leaders, Khouri and 
Sulh. The contents of this agreement, later known as the National Pact or National Covenant 
(al-Mithaq al-Watani), were approved and supported by their follower. Moreover, according 
to this accord the three to government positions should be distributed as follows: the 
President of Republic should be a Maronite; the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the 
Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shiite Muslim; the Deputy Speaker, Greek Orthodox; 
the Defense Minister, Druze; and the Commander of the Military, Maronite Christian. The 
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ratio of deputies was to be six Christians to five Muslims. An analysis of Lebanon under the 
mandate (1920-43) would focus on the very close ties that evolved between the French and 
the Lebanese, primarily the Christians. 
The confessional system is a term used to designate the political system that has 
been in force in Lebanon since 1926. The confessional system outlined in the National Pact 
was a matter of expediency, an interim measure to overcome philosophical divisions 
between Christian and Muslim leaders at independence. 
The National Pact institutionalized a distribution of political power along 
confessional lines, based on each group's proportional size in the census of 1932 which 
found Christians to be a majority and Muslims a minority. Full formal independence for 
Lebanon in 1946 did not mark a new beginning, although it finally removed the French as 
players in its internal affairs. It was the National Pact of three years previously that was a 
more important milestone in the development of modern Lebanon. Yet from 1943 until 
1975, with one hiccup in 1958, the Lebanese political system was seemingly successful in 
providing a basis for considerable political freedom and prosperity. 
After emerging triumphant over the French in 1943, Lebanon set a course of 
economic and foreign relations designed to ensure its stability in the Mediterranean area 
and in the world at large. The national pact, designed to provide adequate representation of 
Lebanon's major religious communities in the political system, and the Lebanese 
constitution were to guarantee that the country's affairs would not fall under the control of 
any one religious group. The Christians were able to outpace Lebanon's other religious 
communities in the race for political and economic strength for a variety of reasons. 
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The system of government bequeathed to the Lebanese by the French "at the time 
Lebanon gained its independence was modeled after that of France but took into account 
the peculiarities of the Lebanese situation. The two principal pillars on which the Lebanese 
governing system is based are the constitution and the informal National Covenant. While 
the constitution generally establishes a three-branch governmental system, Article 95 gives 
it a peculiarly Lebanese flavor by providing that religious communities shall be equitably 
represented in government, employment, and key ruling bodies including the cabinet and 
the Chamber of Deputies. 
Under the administration of President Bishara Khoury the rules of the game of the 
confessional system were applied and developed in the new circumstances of 
independence. The leaders of the various sects were clearly the principal players and 
beneficiaries of the system. Lebanon's first civil war is one of the conflicts which should be 
mentioned here is Muslim disaffection from the regime of Camille Chamoun, President of 
Lebanon between 1952 and 1958. Chamoun was overtly pro-Western in his foreign policy, 
having no sympathy for the Egyptian President's neutralism and friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union. The war of 1958 was due to a number of factors. At one level it was a factional 
conflict in which those za'ims who had been excluded from high political office were seeking 
to limit and ultimately destroy the power of President Chamoun and his supporters. 
Tensions began to ease in the country toward the end of 1958, but the task of 
reasserting Lebanon's external and internal sovereignty which Chehab had assumed still 
seemed overwhelming. Yet, as President from 1958 to 1964, Chehab gave Lebanon its most 
stable period of sovereign rule. On 9 October Chehab held a series of Meetings with 
Gemayel, Karami, Salam, Jumblat and Yafi. Five days later, after Chehab had concluded his 
seventh meeting with Gemayel and after Karami had completed a two-hour meeting with 
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the Kata'eb leader, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a new four-man 
`National Salvation Cabinet' on the basis of a 'Na victor, No vanquished' formula. President 
Shihab's attempts to build a modern state apparatus in Lebanon were certainly limited by 
confessional and clientelist considerations. Chehab's election reflected the need for reforms 
if the confessional system were to function without major dislocation. One of the reforms 
the new regime called for was expenditure on an irrigation and land-reclamation project to 
alleviate some of the consequences of uneven development. 
The rise of the PRM after June 1967 transformed the camps into strongholds of the 
guerrilla organizations, and already by April 1969, clashes began taking place between 
Palestinian demonstrators and the Lebanese security forces. Fath's ideology consisted of 
four basic principles. First, the Palestinians should have an independent political movement 
and take the initiative in their struggle for the liberation of Palestine. This implied that the 
PRM had to safeguard its independence with respect to attempts by some Arab 
governments to control it. Second, the PRM was not to interfere in the internal affairs of any 
Arab country and therefore was not promote or assist movements or parties the avowed 
objectives of which were the overthrow of existing Arab regimes. Third, the struggle against 
Israel was to be first and foremost an armed struggle. Fourth, at this early stage of the 
Palestinian Revolution, "national unity" was to be emphasized; consequently, a social 
ideology that could antagonize certain Palestinian classes and groups from the PRM was 
best avoided. Lebanon's involvement in the Palestine question entered a new phase with 
the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its military arm, the 
Palestine Liberation Army (PEA), by the Arab League in 1964. 
In October 1969, violent clashes between Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese 
army, which was attempting to restrict their activities, threatened Lebanon's fragile political 
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system and brought down the Government. in November, General Bustani, the Lebanese 
army chief, and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, negotiated an agreement in Cairo with 
the help of President Nasser of Egypt. Under the so-called 'Cairo Agreement' Lebanon made 
important concessions to the PLO. In September 1970, the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan 
finally turned against the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) in Jordan and began to 
subdue them -- a process which was to take over twelve months to complete. 
The consideration will be given to the reasons for Lebanon's collapse into Civil War; 
this review some of the flaws in her structure, and some of the pitfalls in the international 
context which, prior to April 1975, seemed perilous. It was perhaps more than symbolic that 
the Civil War in Lebanon had been sparked by the ambushing of a bus in 'Ain al-Rummana, 
on April 13, 1975, by the Phalangists, which resulted in the killing of 26 persons and the 
wounding of 20 more, most of them Palestinian (although some had been Lebanese) who 
had been attending a Palestinian rally and were on their way back to Tal al-Za'tar. According 
to the Palestinians, the attack had not been a surprise. The crisis had been building up from 
the beginning of 1975, when more arms were being brought in for the Phalangists, and 
Sham'un's militias and when demands began to be made by the Phalangists for a plebiscite 
on the armed Palestinian presence and on whether the Cairo Agreement ought to be 
upheld. On 8 May 1976, under Syrian prompting, the Chamber of Deputies elected Elias 
Sarkis to become the next president when Franjieeh's term ran out in September. By this 
stage relations between the LNM and Syria had badly deteriorated. However, in May Syria, 
which had tried unsuccessfullly to mediate in the conflict, sent troops into Lebanon against 
the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, whom it had previously supported. Syria feared 
that if the PLO and LNM were victorious, it would be unable to control them and their 
victory would inevitably provoke an Israeli intervention, with the possibility of a new 
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confrontation between Syria and Israel. Having been rescued by the Syrians, the Christian 
militias began a new offensive against Muslim and Palestinian areas. By the end of 
September, the LNM and PLO had been subdued. In the meantime the Maronite forces took 
advantage of the Syrian action against the LNM and PLO to attack Palestinian and Muslim 
enclaves in east Beirut. In early August, the Shiite Nab'a quarter fell. On 12 August, after a 
three-month siege, the Palestinian Tal al-Za'tar camp fell. More than a thousand of the 
camp's inhabitants were massacred during its evacuation. The Palestinians were forced to 
retreat from Beirut to their bases in the south. It was not until October that a lasting cease-
fire came into effect at a summit meeting of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
The rising strength of the Palestinian guerrillas prompted the Maronite organizations 
to seek to increase their own military power. The Maronite feared that political reforms 
would destroy the existing guarantees of Christian security and they also resented the 
freedom of action enjoyed by the PLO, as the incidents between Palestinian guerrillas and 
Maronite militiamen became more and more frequent around Palestinian refugee camps 
sited in Christian area. The Maronite leaders believed that it was important to reduce the 
Palestinians' power before PLO military might be able to be combined with Muslim 
superiority in numbers to threaten Christian privileges and security. 
In early 1975, tensions started to increase. A prominent Sunni Muslim politician, 
Ma'ruf Sa'd, was assassinated in Sidon as he led a march to protest against a new fishing 
project planned by Camille Chamoun. The killing sparked off a round of fighting between the 
army and local Muslim militias, backed by PLO guerrillas. 
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During 19 months of civil war (April 1975-Nvovember 1976) some 25-40,000 people 
were killed in the various rounds of fighting. The over-whelming majority were non-
combatants. One estimate made by doctors in Beirut suggested that the ratios of militia to 
civilian deaths were 1:4 in the Christian community and 1:9 amongst the Muslims, indicating 
a more indiscriminate policy on the part of the predominantly Maronite militias of the right 
as compared with the Palestinian commandos and their mainly Muslim allies. 
In the summer of 1975, fighting broke out in Lebanon and it went against the 
Maronite Christians and the Phalange. Israel's response was to strengthen its ties with the 
Christian minority. 
Israel had several reasons for supporting the Maronites at the beginning of the 
conflict, the border with Israel had been quiet and Lebanon had been a fairly stable country. 
In addition, the primary obstacle to the achievement of Syrian aims in Lebanon and the 
driving force behind opposition to the PLO was Camille Chamoun. Although Chamoun's 
militia numbered only some 4,000 compared to a Phalange militia of 10,000, Chamoun 
remained the most important Maronite leader and the only Lebanese figure willing to 
mobilize a general rightist resistance to Syria. 
The overriding goal of Israel's new policy was to unify and strengthen the Christian 
troops vis-a-vis the PLO and its allies; however, Israel avoided direct military intervention on 
behalf of its Maronite friends. It hoped that its new alliance with the Maronites would 
further weaken the PLO and present vehement opposition to Syria's designs to establish 
hegemony over Lebanon. Israeli attempts to create local Christian militia in the south were 
further sustained by a decision to keep the Israeli-Lebanese borders open under the "Good 
Fence Policy" in which Lebanese Christians were encouraged to seek job opportunities and 
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medical treatment in northern Israel. With the coming to power of the Likud coalition in 
May 1977, Israeli links with the Maronites were further consolidated. At the same time, 
Syria's relations with The Christian Maronites began to deteriorate whereas relations with 
its former adversaries, the Palestinians and the Lebanese Leftist forces, improved. 
On 8 May 1976, under Syrian prompting, the Chamber of Deputies elected Elias 
Sarkis to become the next president when Franjieh's term ran out in September. By this 
stage relations between the LNM and Syria had badly deteriorated. Syria feared that if the 
PLO and LNM were victorious, it would be unable to control them and their victory would 
inevitably provoke an Israeli intervention, with the possibility of a new confrontation 
between Syria and Israel. By the end of September, the LNM and PLO had been subdued. In 
the meantime the Maronite forces took advantage of the Syrian action against the LNM and 
PLO to attack Palestinian and Muslim enclaves in east Beirut. 
The Palestinians were forced to retreat from Beirut to their bases in the south. It was 
not until October that a lasting cease-fire came into effect at a summit meeting of the 
League of Arab States (Arab League) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In October 1976, while the 
fighting continued the Saudi King Khaied invited five Arab leaders for an emergency 
conference to be held in Riyadh. The six leaders as member of the Arab League met in a 
imited Arab Summit in Riyadh from 16-18 October 1976. The Mini-summit then worked out 
a series of agreement to resolve the Lebanese crisis. In July 1977, the Syrians persuaded the 
Maronites and Palestinians to come to the conference table to sigh the Chtaura Agreement, 
which stipulated that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon would be monitored. Sarkis, in 
order to pacify the Muslims and Druze, also set up a Board of Reconstruction and 
Development in their welfare. 
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The Israeli invasion triggered a flood of refugees away from South Lebanon that 
totaled 285,000, according to the Lebanese government: Three-quarter of them were 
Lebanese, the rest were Palestinian. They settled on the outskirts of Beirut, many of them in 
South Beirut—the Shiite stronghold that, within a few years, would incubate a then-
unknown organization: Hezbollah. Within seven weeks of the attack Israel withdrew from 
two-thirds of the territory it had captured, occupying a strip of territory along the border 
with Lebanon that it euphemistically began to call a "security zone." It would not give up 
that strip until 2000. A United Nations contingent of peacekeepers, the 6,000-strong United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, took up posts in the territory between the Litani River 
and Israel's occupation zone. Israel's aim was to clear South Lebanon of Palestinian guerillas 
in hopes of ending Palestinian attacks on Israel. But the invasion merely moved the Israeli-
Palestinian front 20 miles north—and laid the groundwork for the much bloodier, more 
extensive invasion to come four years later, in June 1982. 
The government of Gemayel, dependent as it would inevitably by on Israel, would 
then sign a formal peace treaty with the latter. This treaty would satisfy two-long standing 
ambitions with regard to Lebanon. First, it would accord Israel full diplomatic recognition 
and second, it would provide effective Israeli control over south Lebanon. 
Israel's Northern Command under Major General Amir Drori committed to battle a 
total of six divisions in addition to two independent task forces below the division level. Of 
the six divisions four were designated for the western and central sectors. The remaining 
two divisions and the two task forces were designated for eastern sector. The objective of 
the two divisions operating in the western sector was the destruction of the PLO and 
establishing links with the Lebanese Forces in East Beirut. The two divisions operating in the 
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central sector were responsible for cutting off the Syrian troops stationed in the Bekaa 
Valley from the PLO and Beirut area. Once this was achieved the Syria troops in the Bekaa 
would be faced with the threat of an encirclement from the west. The two divisions and the 
two task forces earmarked for the eastern sector would then begin their assault on the 
Syrian army from below, i.e. from the south northwards into the Bekaa. 
For analytical purposes and as a way of ordering the rapid succession of events the 
invasion can be divided in four distinct phases each with its own particular emphasis. 
(a). The First Phase: Sweep Across Southern Lebanon 
(b) The Second Phase: War with Syria 
(c) The third Phase: Terror Bombing and Siege of Beirut 
(d) The Fourth Phase: Assassination of Bashir Gemayil and the Massacre at Sabra and Shatila 
With Gemayel elected to the presidency of Lebanon, Israel was well on its way 
towards achieving its ambitious goals in Lebanon. Within a few months Israel had inflicted a 
humiliating defeat on the Syrian army, forces the PLO to withdraw from.Beirut and managed 
to get its foremost ally elected to the highest office in Lebanon. Later developments, 
however, were to prove that the hopes engendered by these early successes were at best 
premature. On September 14, the President-elect Gemayel was assassinated in a 
tremendous explosion in his party's headquarters in East Beirut. His murder came as a major 
shock to the Israelis. A situation of uncertainty was created and Israel's immediate reaction 
was to occupy West Beirut so as to be in a position to control subsequent developments. 
Thus, within hours of Gemayel's death, the IDF moved into West Beirut in contravention of 
the agreement with Habib. 
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The 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon wakened the PLO by denying it a base from 
which to direct its operations. Al-Fatah's relocation to Tunis and the PFLP's move to 
Damascus distanced both organizations from Israel's northern border, although their units 
continued to operate in the country, and Lebanese Shiite groups-which had hitherto been 
hostile to the Palestinians and tolerant of Israel-attacked and shelled northern towns more 
Zealously than the PLO had over done. In September 1982, under US pressure, President 
Amine Gemayel, soon after assuming office agreed to enter into talks with Israel provided 
the US acted as the mediator. This led to an agreed draft of a peace treaty between 
Lebanon and Israel in early May 1983 known as 17th May Agreement of 1983. 
In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, fighting was renewed 
between Christian and Muslim militias along the 'Green Line', which had effectively divided 
east and west Beirut between Christian and Muslim communities since early 1984. 
Subsequently in May 1986, fighting between Palestinian guerrillas and Amal 
militiamen for control of the refugee camps in south Beirut escalated. In June, a cease-fire 
was imposed around the Beirut camps, as part of a Syrian-sponsored peace plan for Muslim 
west Beirut. In October there was further conflict between Amal and Palestinian fighters 
around refugee camps in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut. in May the Lebanese National Assembly 
voted to annul the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which defined and regulated the PLO's activities 
and legitimized its presence in Lebanon. In January 1988, avowedly as a gesture of support 
for the uprising (Intifada) by Palestinians resident in Israeli-occupied territories, which had 
began the previous month, the Amal leader, Nabih Berri, announced an end to the siege of 
the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon. In May 1988, Syrian troops 
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encircled the southern suburbs of Beirut to enforce a Syrian- and Iranian-mediated cease-
fire agreement between Amal and Hezbollah. 
Lebanon today is passing through a transitional stage with the push-and-pull of 
forces affecting its contemporary fate. The first two models for Lebanon that we considered 
— the Islamic and Syrian ones — constitute a massive defeat for both a Christian Lebanon 
and, by consequence, for a secure Israel in the rapidly changing political and geo-strategic 
contours of the Mideast. Certainly the tenacity of the Muslim and Syrian forces contrast 
favorably with the gloom of Christian deterioration and the self-questioning Israeli position 
on Lebanon. 
The latter two models — the Israeli connection and Christian resistance — have 
suffered a blow since September 1982. Nonetheless, Israel demonstrated a determination in 
maintaining the "security zone" and, as summarized, there are signs of Christian revival. The 
possibility of "Lebanonization" in southern Lebanon, by promoting a more autonomous 
native Lebanese political entity and a "Free Lebanese Army", recalls- America's 
"Vietnamization" policy in South Vietnam: that is, to strengthen the local population to 
defend itself, while reducing the military role of the foreign ally. Israeli policy has avoided 
any precipitate withdrawal from Lebanon, specifically southern Lebanon, and this has 
served to protect the Christian population in the south. But no Israeli government adopted 
as a complementary policy the cultivation of "Lebanonization" or promoted a Lebanese 
liberation struggle. American support for the Contras and Afghani wars of liberation in the 
1980s, or for the Iraqi anti-Saddam Hussein opposition in the 1990s, is examples of policies 
that Israel might consider in evaluating the viability of supporting a Lebanese liberation 
struggle. Israel may be supporting, as reported in July 1998, an anti-Syrian underground 
Christian network in Lebanon. But this is hardly comparable with a bold strategic plan — 
more political than military in design — to promote Christian autonomy and Lebanese 
independence no less in peace and friendship with Jewish Israel. 
Syria's military strategy of domination and penetration, controlling foreign and 
security policy, and acting as "the arbiter of power in Lebanon", has been manifestly 
successful. 
On October 22, 1989, signed The Taif Accord, also known as the carter of National 
Reconciliation, Having an important place in city of Taif in Saudi Arabia in the history of 
modern Lebanon. Before a settlement agreement implemented, it took fifteen years of 
never-ending fighting and destruction of country. It symbolizes the end of the turbulent civil 
war 1975-1989 that turned Lebanon into a daily violent new item. 
This is a number of important principles on which the Lebanese state was built 
contained by the Taif Accord. It again sets forth the basic principles like independence, 
unity, sovereignty, a liberal, and parliamentary democracy. Regarding to institutions, the 
controversial aspect to the accord was the elevation of Deputies' chamber of the President, 
thereby an office, the President, traditionally reserved for a Maronite. The terms of the 
Speaker for a Shiite Muslims which is customarily reserved, as well as the nomination of the 
Prime Minister would be consulted by the Speaker in parliament there are 108 which were 
equally distributed between Christian and Muslims. Thus in parliament a 54-54 seats 
balance between Christian and Muslims was maintained. 
Although the Taif Accord softened the "rules of the games" of the First Republic or 
Lebanon, it did not alter its basic charter. A slight change did occur in proportion of Muslim 
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to Christian legislators and officials which increased to 50-50. It was agreed upon that for 
the foreseeable future President of the Republic would be from Maronite Christian 
community while the Prime Minister would be from the Sunni Muslim community. The 
powers of President have been reduced substantially. And the powers of the Council of 
minister, chaired by Prime Minister, have been increased. The term of the President of the 
Chamber of deputies, would be headed by a Shiite has been increased from one year to 
four. This is atomically remove the old provision and increased the influence of the 
President of the Chamber of deputies. The Taif Accord, at the same time clearly 
recommended for the gradual phasing out of the sectarianism in the political system. 
Lastly, the Accord did explain the Lebanon's relation with Israel and urged used the 
implementation of UN's 425 resolution and also called for the withdrawal of Israeli troop 
from the South Lebanon. It was also provided that, in the mean time, all the necessary steps 
would be initiated to the liberate the Lebanese territory from the Israeli occupation. 
Indeed, General Aoun did opposed Taif Accord and made every efforts to implement 
it, particularly in the territory under his control. It was only at the end of 1990 situation 
became favourable for military move against General Aoun, which Syria seized with 
tactically. Meanwhile, Syria successfully won the support of most of the political and military 
forces in Lebanon for the Taif Accord. Importantly, Hezbullah, Lebanese forces under Samir 
Ja'Ja, and the Maronite religious establishment in Bkerki supported the Taif Accord. 
Syrian forces, accordingly, on 13 October 1990 moved against General Aoun and 
attacked latter's enclave around the Baabda presidential palace in Beirut and after capturing 
it occupied all of East Beirut over. General Aoun took shelter in the French Embassy and 
later went into exile in France. A group of Shiite community named Hezbollah and their 
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Iranian masters particularly too showed their displeasure over the Taif Accord. Their 
concern and resistance regarding Taif Accord was indirectly providing advantage to the 
Maronites and Sunnis and causing damage to their own gains and interests accrued during 
the prolong Civil War. 
They considered the indemnity as scant and were not in accordance with their 
population - which according to them had become largest in the country. In these struggles, 
however, the Shiite community found themselves in capacitate in filling the political offices 
and positions of power assigned to them with educated members of their community. 
Consequently, they were at a disadvantage position in the struggle for a share of the 
national pie. 
The Lebanese - Syrian agreement of 22 May 1991, marked the beginning of new era 
in the history of the countries relationship. It followed the environment mutual distrust and 
discontent between them. Meanwhile, Syria accomplished in implementing its strategic — 
historical goals in Lebanon and also succeeded in securing or commanding the position of 
influence and hitherto full control over Lebanese affairs. An evaluation of Syrian-Lebanese 
relation in historical perspective shows that Syria's conduct or influence in Lebanon had 
been remained different than prevailing view of the pre-agreement period. 
The Accord paved the way for the election of a President and the formation of a new 
government. In mid -- 1992, the government of Lebanon decided to hold the legislative 
elections. The National Assembly on 16 July 1992, through a new electoral law increased the 
number of Assembly seat from 108 to 128, equally shared between Christian and Muslim 
deputies i.e. 68 seats each faction. The result of the election was announcing Hezbollah who 
participated in election for the first time, won the eight seats notably from the Southern 
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constituencies. Nabih Berri, Amal leader, was appointed as speaker of the House or 
Parliament (President of the New National Assembly) in October 1992. Rafiq Hariri, a 
Lebanese 	born Saudi Arabia business executive, was invited by Hrawi to form the 
government after speaker election, as Prime Minister. Prior to the Taif Accord, President 
had enjoyed considerable powers and prerogatives, the Taif Accord, in fact, reduced the 
power of President. Although the term of the President did remain for six years, the 
incumbents were constitutionally not allowed to be succeeded by anyone. Proceeding to 
Taif Accord Presidency was the strongest political position in Lebanon, however, after Taif 
Accord Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and Speaker of Parliament a Shiite Muslim were 
given more powers. President Elias Hrawi, a second rank politician from the town of Zahle in 
the Biqa Valley, was scheduled to replace in the autumn of 1995. He was elected as 
President in 1989 after the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, who was murdered 
17 days after his election. 
Election of National Assembly in Lebanon was held in five rounds during August-
September 1996. Hariri Prime Minister too won the election with large numbers of vote, but 
his supporters were alleged to have been involved in malpractice i.e. vote — baying, in 
Beirut. Nabih Berri was once again re-elected President of the National Assembly by the 
legislatures in October 1996. Hrawi after consultation with Syrian leaders in November 
1996, invited ten legislatures to form a new government and ten allocation of Portfolios in 
the new Cabinet were accomplished on the confessional basis. 
The third election of the National Assembly held in two phases between 27 August 
and 3 September 2000 in Beirut, the Biqa Valley, in Nabatiyeh and Southern part. In this 
election for the first time since 1972, people of former Israel — occupied zone of Southern 
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Lebanon were allowed to East their vote. Numerous instances of electoral malpractice were 
observed by the independent monitors. Hariri, in all, won 97 seats of the 128 seats in the 
Assembly election. Later, President Lahoud formally appointed Rafiq Hariri as Prime 
Minister of Lebanon. An informal agreement was reached between President Lahoud and 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri regarding the power-sharing. 
Omar Karami became a Prime Minister just after Salim al-Hoss resigned from his post 
under the pressure of deteriorating conditions of Lebanon. Karami remained Prime Minister 
from 24 December 1990 to 13th May 1992. When the Lebanese currency collapsed and a 
massive protest in Lebanon took place 21 October 2004, Karami sworn again. He resigned 
from his post among protestors following the murder of the previous Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri. When the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri took place in 2005, the 
opposition members accused Syria for assassination and demanded withdrawal of Syrian 
troops and intelligence personnel from Lebanon that was unacceptable to the Karami which 
was pro-Syrian government. Several opposition members even blamed involvement of 
Karami's government itself in the assassination of the Prime Minister Hariri. Karami 
announced under entrance pressure on 28 February 2005 that his government would 
resign, however, it remained temporarily in a caretaker role. 
On 29 2005 elections for a new National Assembly started in according with the 
existing electoral law introduced in 2000. Christian's leaders did oppose the election a 
ground that it would favour the Syrian's allies. They started demanding for a new electoral 
law dividing the country into smaller constituencies. However their demand was overlooked 
or rejected by the Government. The result of election affirmed that Hariri's Future 
Movement had secured a clear majority in the New Assembly with 72 seats; Amal and 
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Hezbollah attained 35 seats and General Aoun and his allies secured 21 seats. Elections, 
barring few minor incidents held peacefully and in a calm atmosphere and voters were free 
from any pressure or interference. The new Assembly, at the end of June 2005, re-elected 
Nabih Berri, a loyal ally of Syria as Speaker by a thumping votes or majority. President 
Lahoud, after two days, appointed Fouad Siniora, a member of Saad Hariri, Future 
Movement, as Prime Minister and invited him to form the new government. Siniora's 
government the support of 126 of the 128 members of the National Assembly. The National 
Assembly election of 2005 was, in fact, first election in thirty years took place without a 
Syrian military or intelligence presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese elected 128 members of 
Parliament (MPs) in 2005 election with equal representation for Christians and Muslims. 
Many Lebanese considered this election as the end of Cedar Revolution which was won by 
an anti-Syrian coalition led by Saad Hariri. 
On June 7, 2009, elections for new National Assemble were took place in Lebanon. 
The result of the election showed that Saad Hariri, who led March 14 coalition, won or 
secured 71 seats of the total 128 seats. Hezbollah — alliance, another group, could be able to 
capture only 57 seats in the National Assembly. Amal Party chief and Parliament Speaker 
Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah, said he "fully accepted" the result. Hezbollah's Christian 
ally the Free Patriotic Movement too confessed the defeat. 
This election was considered crucial as it witnessed an alliance led by Hezbollah and 
Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and they enjoyed an edge over the country's 
ruling pro-Western combination. The main contestants of this election were the opposition 
March 8 forces and the March 14 coalition led by Saad Hariri, the son of late Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri who was assassinated. In the 2009 parliamentary elections of Lebanon about 55 
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eligible voters cast their ballots, while in an up recedented. Although this election was 
held under the intimidations of weapons outside the hands of state authority, result 
indicates the beginning of democracy that remains absent in many other neighboring 
countries. The election was held under a different electoral law than the 2005 elections and 
the result reaffirmed the victory for the majority. The outcome of the result should be taken 
as a mandate to the Parliament and Cabinet and also an opportunity to solidity and 
implement a governing agenda that will lead a truly open and democratic society will be 
free from violence and foreign interference with security and prosperity for all its citizens. 
immediately after the assassination of President Rene Mouawad, fifty-two deputies 
of the National Assembly elected Elias Hrawi as the next President, during meeting called by 
them. Meanwhile, deputies decided extend the term of office of the National Assembly until 
the end of 1994 and in the same session noted in favour of this decision. The newly formed 
government took an important decision on 28 November 1989 Cabinet in a meeting 
dismissed General Michel Aoun from post Commander — in -- Chief of the Lebanese army 
and in his place General Emile Lahoud was appointed as Commander — in — Chief. Hrawi was 
a successor of an assassinated president and had to face the opposition from interim Prime 
Minister, General Michel Aoum, who was not willing to accept the Taif Accord. He becomes 
President at a time when Lebanese politics was dominated by Syria under Hafiz Assad. 
When Hezbollah freed Terry Anderson, all American hostages were released on 4 December 
1991, during Hrawi's presidency. According to Lebanese Constitution, each president had a 
term of six- years and re-election was prohibited. Due to this the term of the Hrawi had to 
the end in November 1995, but in October 1995 the Lebanese government, with the 
support of Syria, amended the constitution so that Hrawi could continue for another three 
years. This move obviously brought stability in the Lebanon and Hrawi was successful in 
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bringing peace in Lebanon and this became possible because he had good relations with 
Syria. 
In 1989, will the support of Syrian president Hafez Assad, Lahoud was appointed as 
Commander of the Lebanese army and was also elected as President in October 1998. The 
on-going political and economic struggle in Lebanon took a critical turn since Taif Accord on 
3rd September 2004. The Syrian resolution to extend the term of President Emile Lahoud 
contravention to constitutional provisions and the way Syrian security agents and their 
Lebanese allies dealt the issue with the heavily-handed methods and used force for an 
amendment through Parliament flashed the crisis. Decision of Syria to extend the term of 
Lahoud and proceeded with the formation of a united Lebanese opposition that included 
prominent Sunni, Christian and Druze leaders. Two reasons often considered for this 
opposition. First, it comprised a broad coalition of Lebanon's seats, which formerly had been 
a red line in the Syrian government's approach to Lebanese political affairs. Secondly, this 
front was not related with exiled General Michel Aoun, who from the very beginning turned 
down the down the Syrian-influenced arrangement known as the Taif Accord. 
The rebuilding of Lebanese economy was an important factor in the election of 1992, 
in which Rafiq Hariri was elected as prime minister. Hariri a successful Lebanese, 
businessman had fortune to be amassed from Saudi Arabia. Hariri would bring prosperity in 
Lebanon as expected by many international and Lebanese observers through applying his 
business skills. He would bring international investments in Lebanon and this will lead in the 
restoration of Lebanon previous glory. The Saudi government decision to guarantee loan to 
Lebanon in support of Hariri in 2000, relaxed the concerns of both bankers and investors. 
This gave an impression that Saudi Arabia and Syria were competing powers in Lebanon, 
Harm representing the Saudis and Lahoud for Syria, acting as an agent for US is the West 
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Asia. The fact is that the relation between Syria and Saudi Arabia are not good. Saudi Arabia 
considered Syrian controlled pro-Iranian Hezbollah as a means of minimizing Tehran's 
regional influence. 
In a Bomb explosion in Central Beirut, Raflq Hariri the former Prime Minister was 
assassinated on 14 February 2005. In this powerful blast sever bodyguards of Hariri were 
killed and some 135 people were injured. The United Nations Security Council passed a 
resolution 1595 to establish investigating committee to investigate the Hariri's 
assassination. The unexpected events to which began to took place in Lebanon with the 
Harm assassination on 14 February 2005, together with the mass demonstration in Beirut, 
withdrawal of Syrian army, marking of war's thirtieth anniversary by thousands of Lebanese 
and parliamentary election in which opposition candidates got elected - all these events 
brought a change in the relationship between the state, the political and civil society in 
Lebanon. The mass demonstration in Beirut against the Hariri's murders, which reached at 
its apex when around one million people gathered, there on 14 March, 2005, was 
unexpected show of force by Lebanon civil society. 
The unusual developments in Lebanon since February 2005 also marked the deep 
divisions in its society manifested the widening gap between "March 14 Forces" (Saad Hariri 
Future Movement, Jumblat's PSP, the Qornet Shahwan Gathering and smaller groups such 
as Tripoli Bloc, the Democratic Renewal Movement, and the Democratic left Movement 
(DLM), on the one hand and the March 8 Forces (Amal, Hezbollah, Aoun's FPM, and the pro-
Syrian Bath party and Syrian Nationalist party), on the other hand. These two groups were 
also divided on religious grounds, with most Sunnis and Druze supported the government, 
while most Shiite supporting he opposition group. The Christian Community split between 
two groups. One group with Michel Aoun, the Free Patriotic Movement leader, claiming 70 
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present supports among Christians and this was according to the parliamentary election 
results of 2005. However, in May 2005, Hezbollah and Amal Joined the new government 
formed by Fouad Siniora but the radical Shiite movement joined for the first times since its 
establishment — both movement sought to acquire veto power within the Cabinet in order 
to check each other undesired decisions. But, violence was not only within the Lebanon's 
territory. Hezbollah leaders proclaimed that it is a `resistance' and they are legitimate 
military wing, not militia. As a result the "National Dialogue" were launched by Lebanon's 
political leaders and Hezbollah to solve the differences in March 2006. However, another 
sectarian violence erupted in Lebanon during May 2008. This conflict ended after on weak in 
May 2008. However, the leaders of both majority and opposition succeeded in reaching an 
agreement by the intervention of Qatar. Thus, it is known as Doha Agreement It ended 18 
months long crisis by electing General Michel Suleiman as the president of the republic and 
forming a national-unity government under the leadership of Fouad Siniora. 
Fouad Siniora was a former Prime Minister and Lebanese politician. He remained 
Prime Minister of Lebanon from 19th Jul to 2005 to 25th May 2008 and was also given the 
post again during 25th May 2008 to 9 h` November 2009. When Parliamentary elections held 
in May 2005, anti-Syrian opposition became victorious and Fouad Siniora was asked by 
President Lahoud on 30th June to form a government. After a long negotiation with the 
President and different political groups, Siniora formed the government on 19 July 2005. It 
was the first government since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and was also 
the first government to include Hezbollah members (a pro-Iranian militant group). 
Hezbollah launched a massive cross-border attack on Israel and began the Israel-Hezbollah 
war on 12 July 2006. Thus, Siniora in an attempt to end this deadly conflict presented a 
seven-point programme at a conference in Rome in which 15 nations were participating. 
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Resolution 1701 of the United Nations Security Council was a proposed plan to bring an end 
to the Israel-Lebanon conflict. The resolution was unanimously passed by United Nations 
Security Council on 11 August 2006. However, a new sectarian violence began in Lebanon 
during the first week of May 2008. Hezbollah militia in response to the government's 
crackdown of his network blocked Beirut airport as well as capital main city streets, 
disturbed the normal life in the capital. A battle started between Hezbollah supporters and 
pro-government loyalists on 8 May 2008. The leaders of opposition and majority signed the 
Doha Agreement, ending the 18 months clash. The Agreement made the election of General 
Michel Suleiman as President and created national-unity government under Fouad Siniora. 
The Doha Agreement was an agreement between rival Lebanese factions which came into 
existence on Wednesday, 21 May 2008. Thus, Doha Agreement was signed on May 21, 2008 
by the Lebanese Political leaders in the presence of the President and Arab Ministerial 
Committee members. Finally, the voting held in Parliament and Suleiman was elected with a 
majority of 118 votes out of 127 on 25 May, 2008. The opposition leader and speaker of 
parliament, Nabih Berri stated at parliamentary headquarters that "Michel Suleiman got 118 
votes and I declare him as the President of Lebanon". The result came after the Western-
backed ruling coalition and Hezbollah led opposition came to an agreement in Doha to end 
the 18 months long political crisis. 
The newly elected President Michel Suleiman appointed Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora to lead a government of national unity. Suleiman called Fouad Siniora to form a new 
government. The President Michel Suleiman said that Siniora will began consultation on 
Thursday with the various parliamentary blocs to form a 30 member cabinet in which the 
Hezbollah led opposition will have the veto power over government important decisions. He 
advocate that he will try his best to bridge the gap between all rival parties and seeks to 
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form a government of national unity. "I extend my hand for cooperation and solidarity so 
that our country can achieve the breakthroughs it desires," Siniora said. He advocates that I 
hoped that all parties will learn from their past events and it must not be repeated. He told, 
"I call on all of you to heal the wounds and to overcome the division we have experienced 
and not to resort to violence to solve our problems. 
Saad Hariri was a former Prime Minister of Lebanon from 2009 to till 2011. He is the 
second son of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was assassinated in 
2005. After the assassination of his father, he forwarded the Future Movement, a Sunni 
Movement that was created and led by his father, Rafiq - Hariri. In 2009, March 14, Saad 
Hariri was the foremost leader and his party won 72 National Assembly Seat. Later an, in 9th 
November 2009 the President of the party Michel Suleiman assign Saad Hariri as a new 
Prime Minister and he succeeds Fouad Siniora. 
The main opponent of Future Movement was March 8 Alliance. Michel Aoun and 
Shiite Hezbollah led the Free Patriotic Movement along with the Amal Movement. There 
was other opponent they are neither with March 14 Alliance not with the March 8 Alliance, 
Such as Hizbul Tahrir, which was demanding the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. 
The former government of Lebanon collapsed when the Energy Minister a Gebran 
Bassil along with the ten opposition minister resigned. There all ministers were resigned 
after the warning of political party Hezbollah on January 12, 2011. There was a 
condemnation against the group by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the murder of 
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri PM Hariri refuse to call on emergency cabinet session 
over discussion for takeout cooperation with the STL. The Saad Hariri was remained as a 
care taker prime minister for another four months until the new government was finally 
formed. 
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Najib Mikati is a Prime Minister of Lebanon succeeded by Saad Hariri on 13 June 
2011. He was a care taker prime minister of the Lebanon from April 2005 to July 2005 
President Emile Lahoud appointed Najib Mikati as a prime minister. It was taken about five 
month to form a new government in Lebanon after the fall of Saad Hariri government on 13 
June 2011 Najib Mikati formed a 30 minister cabinet. Michel Suleiman the President of 
Lebanon then ordered Mikati to form a new government. 
Lebanon is governed by a delicate power sharing system which maintain the balance 
between the country many sects. In 27 February about 8,000 people marched from Dora to 
Beirut in the second round of campaign to "topple the sectarian regime". These Lebanese , 
protestor were demanding for secular state. The other protest took place in Baalbek and 
Sidon similar to the 27 February. 
The main cause of civil war and civil strife in Lebanon is the government of Lebanon had 
been ruled by Maronite Christian since the state was created. However, the country had a large 
Muslim population. There were no Muslim representatives in the Maronite Christian government. 
The Muslim started oppose to pro-western government. Lebanon had a democratic republic 
parliament within over all framework of confessionalism in which the highest offices were 
proportionately reserved for Maronite Christians. The constitution grant right to the people to 
change the government. However, from mid 1970, to 1992 civil war prohibited the exercise of 
political rights. According to the constitution the parliamentary election must be held for every four 
years. The parliament has right to elect a president at every six years to a single term. Which the last 
presidential elections, were held in 2008 and the parliamentary election were held in 2009. 
According to the constitution the president and parliament appoint the prime minister. The Arab 
League Charged the Syria to separate the enemy and restore calm during second Lebanese civil war 
1975-2005. Later on the Lebanese revolted against the Syrian presence and caused the withdraw of 
Syrian troops with support of international community. In 1978 Israel occupied part of Lebanon and 
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withdrew from all Lebanese territories in 2000 except the Shibaa Farms, In 2008 Doha Agreement 
set a new trend in Lebanese party where the opposition was allowed a veto power in the Lebanese 
council of Minister and confirmed religious confessionslism in the distribution of political power. 
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Map —1 
An estimate of the area distribution of Lebanon's main religious 
groups 
Map-2 
Lebanon Regions 
237 
Map-3 
Map of Lebanon by Religious sect 
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Map-4 
Major Religions in Lebanon by sect (2010) 
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map -5 
The Emirate A.D.: 1516 1842 
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Map-6 
The Qaimaghmate Regime A.D. 1842-58 
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Map -7 
The Mutassarriiiyya ADD. 18.60-1915 
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Map-8 
French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon 
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Map-9 
French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon 
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Map -10 
The Greater Lebanon 
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Mount Lebanon - 
® Major Cities 
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Map -- 11 
Communal Lebanon during Mandate 1920 
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Map-12 
Contemporary DLh1bu6on of Lebanon's Main Religious 
Groups, 1932 (Census) and 1985 
Distribution of Lebanon's Main Religious Groups 
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Map --13 
Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon 
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Map-14 
Lebanon's War (1975-1978) 
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Map-15 
Lebanon's War (19784990) 
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Map —16 
West Beirut and East Beirut 
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Map-17 
The United Nations Interimm Force in Lebanon (UN IL) and 
the Lebanese Buffer Zone 
The Lebanese buffer zone 
The United Nations Interim Force ire Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created in 
1978 and continues to monitor violence in the area. Under the now 
cease-#ire resolution, Lebanese government troops and additional UN 
force; will move in as lsr li troops withdraw 
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Map —18 
Israe 's Invasion.- Rantes, June 1982 
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Map —19 
Israel Withdraws to the AwaIa9 3 September 1983 
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JORDAN 
Between September 1982 and June 1983, 
sixty Israeli soldiers were imprisoned 
for ref using to do reserve duty in Lebanon 
o  
3 3eptembcr1983 Israeli lorces withdraw behind 
Awali rive 
6 December 1963 'PLO claim responsibility for six 
killed in a Jerusalem bus (all 
six were civiiizns. two of them 
children) 
10 February 1984 A PLO unit fires Katyusha rocker 
shells in the region of Kiryal 
Shmona. from just behind Israel' 
northern border 
Map-20 
Sabra and'Shatita Refugee CaQip Areas 
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Sabra and Shatila,16 —17 September 1982 
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Map - 22 
Administrative Divisions Lebanon has five Governorates 
(Singular Muhafazat) 
Administrative Divisions 
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e Governorate capital 
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Map-23 
UNRWA Palestinian Refugee Camps, November 1993 
Offdal UNRWA Palestinian ReTugi Camps, November 1993 
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Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon -1999 
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Map-25 
Israel-Lebanon Crisis 2006 
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Israeli Assault on Lebanon, July 12-27, 2006 
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APPENDIX —1 
LEBANON - CONSTITUTION 
(Adopted on: 23 May 1926} 
{ICL Document Status: 21 Sep 1990} 
(Editor's Note: 
The ICL edition is based on the raw text of an annotated translation by Paul E. Salem 
for the Lebanese Center of Political Studies (cf. The Beirut Review No. 1/1991) 
consolidating all changes up to and including the Amendments of 21 Aug 1990 
(signed into force 21 Sep 1990). That text is itself based on 'The Lebanese 
Constitution: A Reference Edition in English Translation' by the Department of 
Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut 
(1960), and also seems to draw on the 1973 translation by Gabriel M. Bustros for the 
Bureau of Lebanese and Arab Documentation in London. We have added minor 
corrections, changed the British-style 'shall' predominance to more definite wording, 
worked in the ICL formatting, and included article headings and paragraph 
numbers. ICL keys are yet to be done. ) 
Preamble 
a. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country. It is a final homeland for all its 
citizens. It is unified in its territory, people, and institutions within the boundaries defined 
in this constitution and recognized internationally. 
b. Lebanon is Arab in its identity and in its association. It is a founding and active member of• 
the League of Arab States and abides by its pacts and covenants. Lebanon is also a founding 
and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles 
in all fields and areas without exception. 
c. Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, 
especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of 
rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination. 
d. The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise these powers 
through the constitutional institutions. 
e. The political system is established on the principle of separation, balance, and 
cooperation amongst the various branches of Government. 
f. The economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right to private 
property. 
g. The even development among regions on the educational, social, and economic levels 
shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the system. 
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h. The abolition of political confessionalism is a basic national goal and shall be achieved 
according to a gradual plan. 
i. Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese has the right to live in any part 
of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. There is nosegregation of the 
people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, partition, or 
colonization. 
j. There is no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of 
communal coexistence'.This Constitutional Law shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
[Part] A. Fundamental Provisions 
[Chapter] 1. On the State and its Territories 
Article 1 [Territory] 
Lebanon is an independent, indivisible, and sovereign state. Its frontiers are those which 
now bound it: 
On the North: From the mouth of al-Kabir River, along a line following the course of this 
river to its point of junction with Khalid Valley opposite al-Qamar Bridge. 
On the East: The summit line separating the Khalid Valley and al-Asi River (Orontes) and 
passing by the villages of Mu'aysarah, Harbanah, Hayt, Ibish, Faysan to the height of the two 
villages of Brina and Matraba. This line follows the northern boundary of the Ba'albak 
District at the northeastern and south eastern directions, thence the eastern boundaries of 
the districts of Ba'albak, Biqa', Hasbayya, and Rashayya. 
On the South: The present southern boundaries of the districts of Sur (Tyre) and Marji'yun. 
On the West: The Mediterranean. 
Article 2 [Territorial Integrity] 
No part of the Lebanese territory may be alienated or ceded. 
Article 3 [Administrative Areas] 
The boundaries of the administrative areas may not be modified except by law. 
Article 4 [Republic, Capital] 
Greater Lebanon is a Republic the capital of which is Beirut. 
Article 5 [Flag] 
The Lebanese flag is composed of three horizontal stripes, a white stripe between two red 
ones. The width of the white stripe is equal to that of both red stripes. In the center of and 
occupying one third of the white stripe is a green Cedar tree with its top touching the upper 
red stripe and its base touching the lower red stripe. 
[Chapter] II. The Rights and Duties of the Citizen 
Article 6 [Nationality] 
Lebanese nationality and the manner in which it is acquired, retained, and lost is to be 
determined in accordance with the law. 
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Article 7 [Equality] 
All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and 
equally are bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction. 
Article 8 [Personal Liberty, nulls poena sine lege] 
Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one may be arrested, imprisoned,. 
or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law. No offense may be 
established or penalty imposed except by law. 
Article 9 [Conscience, Belief] 
There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state inrendering homage to the Most 
High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free 
exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees 
that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect 
they belong, is respected. 
Article 10 [Education, Confessional Schools] 
Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not 
interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds. There shall be no violation of the 
right of eligious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general 
rules issued by the state regulating public instruction. 
Article 11 [Official National Language] 
Arabic is the official national language. A law determines the cases in which the French 
language maybe used. 
Article 12 [Public Office] 
Every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, no preference being made except on the 
basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established by law. A special 
statute guarantees the rights of state officials in the departments to which they belong. 
Article 13 [Expression, Press, Assembly, Association] 
The freedom to express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the 
freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits 
established by law. 
Article 14 [Home] 
The citizen's place of residence is inviolable. No one may enter it except in the 
circumstances and manners prescribed by law. 
Article 15 [Property] 
Rights of ownership are protected by law. No one's property may be expropriated except 
for reasons of public utility in cases established by law and after fair compensation has been 
paid beforehand. 
[Part] B. Powers 
[Chapter] I. General Provisions 
Article 16 [Legislative Power, One Chamber] 
Legislative power is vested in a single body, the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 17 [Executive Power, Council of Ministers] 
Executive power is entrusted to the Council of Ministers to be exercised it in accordance 
with the conditions laid down in this constitution. 
Article 18 [Bills] 
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The Parliament and the Council of Ministers have the right to propose laws. No law shall be 
promulgated until it has been adopted by the Chamber. 
Article 19 [Constitutional Council] 
A Constitutional Council is established to supervise the constitutionality of laws and to 
arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. The President, 
the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, along with anyten Members of 
Parliament, have the right to consult this Council on matters that relate to the 
constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities have the 
right to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal status, the freedom of belief 
and religious practice, and the freedom of religious education. The rules governing the 
organization, operation, composition, and modes of appeal of the Council are decided by a 
special law. 
Article 20 [Judicial Power] 
Judicial power is to be exercised by the tribunals of various levels and jurisdictions. It 
functions within the limits of an order established by the law and offering the necessary 
guarantees to judges and litigants. The limits and conditions for the protection of the judges 
are determined by law. The judges are independent in the exercise of their duties. The 
decisions and judgments of all courts are rendered and executed in the name of the 
Lebanese People. 
Article 21 [Electoral Rights] 
Every Lebanese citizen who has completed his twenty-first year is an elector provided he 
fulfills the conditions laid down in the electoral law. 
[Chapter] H. The Legislative Power 
Article 22 [Senate] 
With the election of the first Parliament on a national, non-confessional basis, a Senate is 
established in which all the religious communities are represented. Its authority is limited 
to major national issues. 
Article 23 [Eligibility to the Senate] 
{abolished 1927} 
Article 24 [Electoral Laws] 
(1) The Chamber of Deputies is composed of elected members; their number and the 
method of their election is determined by the electoral laws in effect. Until such time as the 
Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-confessional basis, the distribution of seats is 
according to the following principles: 
a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. 
b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious 
community. 
c. Proportional representation among geographic regions. 
(2) Exceptionally, and for one time only, the seats that are currently vacant, as well as the 
new seats that have been established by law, are to be filled by appointment, all at once, 
and by a majority of two thirds of the Government of National Unity. This is to establish 
equality between Christians and Muslims as stipulated in the Document of National Accord 
[The Taif Agreement]. The electoral laws will specify the details regarding the 
implementation of this clause. 
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Article 25 [Dissolution] 
Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, the Decision of dissolution must provide for 
the holding of new elections in accordance with Article 24 and within a period not exceeding 
three months. 
Article 26 [Location of Government and Parliament] 
The Government and the Chamber of Deputies shall be located in Beirut. 
Article 27 [Representation] 
A member of the Chamber represents the whole nation. Norestriction or stipulation maybe 
imposed upon his mandate by his electors. 
Article 28 [No Incompatibility] 
A Deputy may also occupy a ministerial position. Ministers, all or in part, may be selected 
from among the members of the Chamber or from persons outside the Chamber. 
Article 29 [Incompatibility by Law] 
Cases in which persons are disqualified from becoming Deputies are determined by law. 
Article 30 [Validating Elections] 
The Deputies alone have competence to judge the validity of their mandate. No Deputy's 
mandate may be invalidated except by a majority of two thirds of the votes of the entire 
membership. This clause is automatically cancelled as soon as the Constitutional Council is 
established and as soon as the laws relating to it are implemented. 
Article 31 [illegal Sessions] 
Meetings of the Chamber outside those set for legal sessions are unlawful and ipso 
facto null and void. 
Article 32 [Ordinary Sessions] 
The Chamber meets each year in two ordinary sessions. The first session opens on the first 
Tuesday following 15 March and continues until the end of May. The second session begins 
on the first Tuesday following 15 Oct; its meetings is reserved for the discussion of and 
voting on the budget before any other work. This session lasts until the end of the year. 
Article 33 [Extraordinary Sessions] 
The ordinary sessions begin and end automatically on the dates fixed in Article 32. The 
President of the Republic in consultation with the Prime Minister may summon the 
Chamber to extraordinary sessions by a Decree specifying the dates of the opening and 
closing of the extraordinary sessions as well as the agenda. The President of the Republic is 
required to convoke the Chamber if an absolute majority of the total membership so 
requests. 
Article 34 [Quorum] 
The Chamber is not validly constituted unless the majority of the total membership is 
present. Decisions are to be taken by a majority vote. Should the votes be equal, the 
question under consideration is deemed rejected. 
Article 35 [Publicity] 
The meetings of the Chamber are public. However, at the request of the Government or of 
five Deputies, the Chamber may sit in secret sessions. It may then decide whether to 
resume the discussion of the same question in public. 
Article 36 [Voting Process] 
Votes are to be cast verbally or by the members standing, except for elections when the 
ballot is secret. With respect to laws in general and on questions of confidence, the vote is 
always taken by roll call and the responses are made in an audible voice. 
Article 37 [Vote of No-Confidence] 
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Every Deputy has the absolute right to raise the question of no-confidence in the 
government during ordinary or extraordinary sessions. Discussion of and voting on such a 
proposal may not take place until at least five days aftersubmission to the secretariat of the 
Chamber and its communication to the ministers concerned. 
Article 38 [Reintroduction of Bills] 
No Bill that has been rejected by the Chamber may be re-introduced during the same 
session. 
Article 39 [Indemnity] 
No member of the Chamber may be prosecuted because of ideas and opinions expressed 
during the period of his mandate. 
Article 40 [Immunity] 
No member of the Chamber may, during the sessions, be prosecuted or arrested for a 
criminal offense without the permission of the Chamber, except when he is caught in the 
act. 
Article 41 [Re-election] 
Should a seat in the Chamber become vacant, the election of a successor begins within two 
months. The mandate of the new member does not exceed that of the old member whose 
place he is taking; however, should the seat in the Chamber become vacant during the last 
six months of its mandate, no successor may be elected. 
Article 42 [General Elections] 
General elections for the renewal of the Chamber shall take place within a sixty day period 
preceeding the expiration of its mandate. 
Article 43 IRules of Procedure] 
The Chamber draws up its own internal rules and procedures. 
Article 44 [First Session] 
(1) Each time a new Chamber is elected, the Chamber meets under the presidency of the 
oldest member and the secretariat or the two youngest. It will then elect separately, by a 
secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the votes cast, the President and the Vice 
President of the Chamber to hold office for the length or the Chamber's term. At the third 
ballot, a relative majority is sufficient. Should the votes be equal, the oldest candidate is 
considered elected. 
(2) Every time a new Chamber or Deputies is elected, as well as in the October session or 
each year, the Chamber elects two Secretaries by secret ballot according to the majority 
stipulated in the first part or this article. 
(3) The Chamber may, once only, two years after the election or its President and his 
Deputy, and in the first session it holds, withdraw its confidence from the President of the 
Chamber or his Deputy by a Decision of two thirds of the Chamber, based on a petition 
signed by at least ten Deputies. The Chamber, at such point, must hold an immediate 
session to fill the vacant post. 
Article 45 [Presence] 
Members of the Chamber may only vote when they are present at the meeting. Voting by 
proxy shall not be permitted. 
Article 46 (Parliamentary Order] 
The Chamber has the exclusive right to maintain order in its meetings through its President. 
Article 47 [Petitions] 
Petitions to the Chamber may not be presented except in writing. They may not be 
presented verbally or at the bar of the Chamber. 
Article 48 [Remuneration] 
The remuneration of members of the Chamber is determined by law. 
[Chapter] lll. The Executive Power 
[Section] 1. The President of the Republic 
Article 49 [Presidential Powers] 
(1) The President of the Republic is the bead of the state and the symbol of the nation's 
unity. He shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial 
integrity. The President shall preside over the Supreme Defense Council and be the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which fall under the authority of the Council of 
Ministers. 
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a twothirds 
majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be 
sufficient. The President's term is for six years. He may not be re-elected until six years after 
the expiration of his last mandate. No one may be elected to the Presidency of the Republic 
unless he fulfills the conditions of eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies. 
(3) It is also not possible to elect judges, Grade One civil servants, or their equivalents in all 
public institutions to the Presidency during their term or office or within two years following 
the date of their resignation or their leaving office for whatever reason. 
Article 50 [Oath] 
Upon assuming office, the President of the Republic shall take an oath of fidelity before the 
Parliament to the Lebanese Nation and the constitution in the following terms: 
"I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Lebanese Nation 
and to maintain the independence of Lebanon and its territorial integrity." 
Article 51 [Promulgation of Laws] 
The President of the Republic promulgates the laws after they have been approved by the 
Chamber in accordance with the time limits specified by the constitution. He asks for the 
publication or these laws, and he may not modify these laws or exempt anyone from 
complying with their provisions. 
Article 52 [Negotiation of International Treaties] 
The President of the Republic negotiates international treaties in coordination with the 
Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after agreement of the 
Council of Ministers. They are to be made known to the Chamber whenever the national 
interest and security of the state permit. However, treaties involving the finances of the 
state, commercial treaties, and in general treaties that cannot be renounced every year are 
not considered ratified until they have been approved by the Chamber. 
Article 53 [List of Additional Presidential Powers) 
1. The President presides over the Council of Ministers when he wishes without 
participating in voting. 
2. The President designates the Prime Minister in consultation with the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies based on parliamentary consultations which are binding and the 
content of which the President formally discloses to the Prime Minister. 
3. The President alone issues the Decree which designates the Prime Minister. 
4. He issues, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the decree appointing the Cabinet and 
the decrees accepting the resignationof Ministers. 
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5. He issues, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the Cabinet or 
considering it resigned. 
6. He forwards to the Chamber of Deputies Bills that are delivered to him by the Council of 
Ministers. 
7. He accredits ambassadors and accept the credentials of ambassadors. 
8. He presides over official functions and grants official decorations by Decree. 
9. He grants particular pardons by Decree, but a general amnesty cannot be granted except 
by a law. 
10. He addresses, when necessary, letters to the Chamber of Deputies. 
11. He may introduce, from outside the agenda, any urgent matter to the council of 
Ministers. 
12. He may, in agreement with the Prime Minister, call the Council of Ministers to an 
extraordinary session, whenever he deems this necessary. 
Article 54 [Countersignature] 
The decisions of the President must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister or Ministers concerned except the Decree designating a new Prime Minister and 
the Decree accepting the resignation of the Cabinet or considering it resigned. Decrees 
issuing laws must be countersigned by the Prime Minister. 
Article 55 [Dissolution of Parliament by Decree] 
(1) The President of the Republic may, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in 
Articles 65 and 77 of this constitution, ask the Council of Ministers to dissolve the Chamber 
of Deputies before the expiration of its mandate. If the Council, based on this request, 
decides to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, the President issues the Decree dissolving it, 
and in this case, the electoral bodies meets as provided for in Article 25, and the new 
Chamber is to be called to convene within fifteen days after the proclamation of the 
election. 
(2) The administrative staff of the Chamber of Deputies continues to function until the 
election or a new Chamber. 
(3) If elections are not held within the time limit specified in Article 25 of the constitution, 
the Decree dissolving the Chamber is considered null and void, and the Chamber of 
Deputies continues to exercise its powers according to the stipulations of the constitution. 
Article 56 [Promulgation Time Limits] 
(1) The President of the Republic promulgates the laws which have been adopted within one 
month of their transmission to the Government. He must promulgate laws that were 
declared urgent by a special Decision of the Chamber within five days. 
(2) The President issues decrees and requests their promulgation; he has the right to ask the 
Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber has taken within fifteen days 
of the decision's transmission to the Presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on the 
Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree being issued or returned, the 
Decision or Decree is considered legally operative and must be promulgated. 
Article 57 [Presidential Veto] 
The President of the Republic, after consultation with the Council of Ministers, has the right 
to request the reconsideration of a law once during the period prescribed for its 
promulgation. This request may not be refused. When the President exercises this right, he 
is not required to promulgatethis law until it has been reconsidered and approved by an 
absolute majority of all the members legally composing the Chamber. If the time limits pass 
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without the law being issued or returned, the law is considered legally operative and must 
be promulgated. 
Article 58 [Urgent Bills] 
Every Bill the Council of Ministers deems urgent and in which this urgency is indicated in the 
decree of transmission to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued by the President within 
forty days following its communication to the Chamber, after including it on the agenda of a 
general meeting, reading it aloud before the Chamber, and after the expiration of the time 
limit without the Chamber acting on it. 
Article 59 [Adjourning the Chamber] 
The President of the Republic may adjourn the Chamber for a period not exceeding one 
month, but he may not do so twice during the same session. 
Article 60 [Responsibility] 
(1) While performing his functions, the President of the Republic may not be held 
responsible except when he violates the constitution or in the case of high treason. 
(2) However, his responsibility in respect of ordinary crimes is subject to the ordinary 
laws. For such crimes, as well as for violation of the constitution and for high treason, he 
may not be impeached except by a majority of two thirds of the total membership of the 
Chamber of Deputies. He is to be tried by the Supreme Council provided for in 
Article 80. The functions of Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Council are performed by a 
judge appointed by the Supreme Council in plenary session. 
Article 61 [Suspension after impeachement] 
Should the President of the Republic be impeached, he is suspended from his functions. The 
presidency remains vacant until the Supreme Council has settled the matter. 
Article 62 [Vacancy] 
Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council of Ministers 
exercises the powers of the President by delegation. 
Article 63 [Remuneration] 
The remuneration of the President of the Republic is determined by a law. It may not be 
increased or reduced during his term of office. 
[Section] 2. The Prime Minister 
Article 64 [Responsibility and Powers] 
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and its representative. He speaks in its name 
and is responsible for executing the general policy that is set by the Council of Ministers. He 
exercises the following powers: 
1. He heads the Council of Ministers and is ex officio Deputy Head of the Supreme Defense 
Council. 
2. He conducts the parliamentary consultations involved in forming a Cabinet. He signs, 
with the President, the Decree forming the Cabinet. The Cabinet must present its general 
statement or policy to the Chamber and gain its confidence within thirty days of the date of 
issuance of the Decree in which the Cabinet was formed. The Cabinet does not exercise its 
powers before it gains the Chamber's confidence nor after it has resigned or is considered 
resigned, except in the narrow senseof managing affairs. 
3. He presents the Government's general policy statements before the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
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4. He signs, along with the President, all decrees, except the Decree which designates him 
the head of the Government, and the Decree accepting the Cabinet's resignation or 
considering it resigned. 
5. He signs the Decree calling for an extraordinary parliamentary session, decrees issuing 
laws, and requests for reviewing laws. 
6. He calls the Council of Ministers into session and sets its agenda, and he informs the 
President and the Ministers beforehand of the subjects included on the agenda and of the 
urgent subjects that will be discussed. 
7. He supervises the activities of the public administrations and institutions, coordinates 
among the Ministers and provides general guidance to ensure the proper progress of affairs. 
8. He holds working meetings with the competent authorities in the Government in the 
presence of the concerned Minister. 
[Section] 3. The Council of Ministers 
Article 65 [Powers] 
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers. It is the authority to which the 
armed forces are subject. Among the powers that it exercises are the following: 
1. It sets the general policy of the Government in all fields, prepares Bills and organizational 
Decrees and makes the decisions necessary for implementing them. 
2. It watches over the execution of laws and regulations and supervises the activities of all 
the Government's branches including the civil, military, and security administrations and 
institutions without exception. 
3. It appoints Government employees and dismisses them and accepts their resignations 
according to the law. 
4. It dissolves the Chamber of Deputies upon the request of the President of the Republic if 
the Chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails to meet during one of its regular 
periods and fails to meet throughout two successive extraordinary periods, each longer than 
one month, or if the Chamber returns an annual budget plan with the aim or paralyzing the 
Government. This right cannot be exercised a second time if it is for the same reasons 
which led to the dissolution of the Chamber the first time. 
5. The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it, and the President 
chairs its meetings when he attends. The legal quorum for a Council meeting is a majority of 
two thirds of its members. It makes its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it 
makes its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues 
require the approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree 
forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following: 
The amendment of the constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and its 
termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, 
the annual government budget, comprehensive and longterm development projects, the 
appointment of Grade One government employees and their equivalents, the review of the 
administrative map, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral laws, nationality 
laws, personal status laws, and the dismissal of Ministers. 
Article 66 [Ministries, Responsibility] 
Only Lebanese who satisfy the conditions for deputization may assume ministerial 
posts. The Ministers administer theGovernment's services and assume the responsibility of 
applying the laws and regulations, each one according to the affairs of his administration 
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and what is specific to them. Ministers are collectively responsible before the Chamber for 
the general policy of the Government and individually responsible for their personal actions. 
Article 67 [Ministers in Parliament] 
Ministers may attend the Chamber if they so desire, and they have the right to be heard 
whenever they request to speak. They may be assisted by whomever they select from 
among the officials of their Departments. 
Article 68 [Vote of No-Confidence] 
When the Chamber, in accordance with Article 37, passes a vote of noconfidence in a 
Minister, that Minister is required to resign. 
Article 69 [Government Resignation] 
(1) The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances: 
a. if the Prime Minister resigns; 
b. if it loses more than a third of the members specified in the Decree forming it; 
c. if the Prime Minister dies; 
d. at the beginning of the term of the President of the Republic; 
e. at the beginning of the term of the Chamber of Deputies; 
f. when it loses the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies based on the Chamber's 
initiative or based on the Council's initiative to gain the Chamber's confidence. 
(2) Ministers are to be dismissed by a Decree signed by the President and the Prime Minister 
in accordance with Article 65 of the constitution. 
(3) When the Council resigns or is considered resigned, the Chamber of Deputies is 
automatically considered in extraordinary session until a new Council has been formed and 
has gained the Chamber's confidence. 
Article 70 [Impeachment] 
t1) The Chamber of Deputies has the right to impeach the Prime Minister and Ministers for 
high treason or for serious neglect of their duties. The Decision to impeach may not be 
taken except by a majority of two thirds of the total membership of the Chamber. 
(2) A special law is to be issued to determine the conditions of the civil responsibility of the 
Prime Minister and individual Ministers. 
Article 71 [judicial Impeachment Proceedings] 
The impeached Prime Minister or Minister are tried by the Supreme Council. 
Article 72 [Consequences of Impeachment] 
A Prime Minister or Minister leaves office as soon as the Decision of impeachment 
concerning him is issued. If he resigns, his resignation does not prevent judicial proceedings 
from being instituted or continued against him. 
[Part] C. Procedural Provisions 
[Chapter] I, Election of the President of the Republic 
Article 73 [Election of the President] 
One month at least and two months at most before the expiration of the term of office of 
the President of the Republic, the Chamber is summoned by its President to elect the 
newPresident of the Republic. However, should it not be summoned for this purpose, the 
Chamber meets of its own accord on the tenth day preceding the expiration of the 
President's term of office. 
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Article 74 [Vacancy of Presidency] 
Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of the President or 
for any other cause, the Chamber meets immediately and by virtue of the law to elect a 
successor. If the Chamber happens to be dissolved at the time the vacancy occurs, the 
electoral bodies are convened without delay and, as soon as the elections have taken place, 
the Chamber meets by virtue of the law. 
Article 75 
The Chamber meeting to elect the President of the Republic is considered an electoral body 
and not a legislative assembly. It must proceed immediately, without discussion or any 
other act, to elect the Head of the State. 
[Chapter] ll. Amending the Constitution 
Article 76 [Proposal] 
The constitution may be revised upon the proposal of the President of the Republic. In such 
a case the Government submits a draft law to the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 77 [Request] 
The constitution may also be revised upon the request of the Chamber of Deputies. in this 
case the following procedures are to be observed: 
During an ordinary session and at the request of at least ten of its members, the Chamber of 
Deputies may recommend, by a majority of two thirds of the total members lawfully 
composing the Chamber, the revision of the constitution. 
However, the articles and the questions referred to in the recommendation must be clearly 
defined and specified. The President of the Chamber then transmits the recommendation 
to the Government requesting it to prepare a draft law relating thereto. If the Government 
approves the recommendation of the Chamber by a majority of two thirds, it must prepare 
the draft amendment and submit it to the Chamber within four months; it it does not agree, 
it shall return the Decision to the Chamber for reconsideration. If the Chamber insists upon 
the necessity of the amendment by a majority of three fourths of the total members 
lawfully composing the Chamber, the President of the Republic has then either to accede to 
the Chamber's recommendation or to ask the Council of Ministers to dissolve the Chamber 
and to hold new elections within three months. If the new Chamber insists on the necessity 
of amending the constitution, the Government must yield and submit the draft amendment 
within four months. 
Article 78 [Priority] 
When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to the Chamber, it 
must confine itself to its discussion before any other work until a final vote is taken. It may 
discuss and vote only on articles and questions clearly enumerated and defined in the draft 
submitted to it. 
Article 79 [Majority, Promulgation] 
(1) When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to the Chamber, 
it cannot discuss it or vote upon it except when a majority of two thirds of the members 
lawfully composing the Chamber are present. Voting is by the same majority. 
(2) The President of the Republic is required to promulgate the law of the constitutional 
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amendment under the same conditions and in the same form as ordinary laws. He has the 
right, within the period established for the promulgation, to ask the Chamber to reconsider 
the draft, after consultation with the council of Ministers, in which case the vote is by a 
majority of two thirds. 
[Part] D. Miscellaneous Provisions 
[Chapter] 1. The Supreme Council 
Article 80 [Function, Composition, Organizational Law] 
The Supreme Council, whose function is to try Presidents and Ministers, consists of seven 
deputies elected by the Chamber of Deputies and of eight of the highest Lebanese judges, 
according to their rank in the judicial hierarchy, or, in case of equal ranks, in the order of 
seniority. They meet under the presidency of the judge of the highest rank. The Decisions 
of condemnation by the Supreme Council is rendered by a majority of ten votes. A special 
law is to be issued to determine the procedure to be followed by this Council. 
[Chapter] II. Finances 
Article 81 [integral Tax Law] 
No public taxes may be imposed and no new taxes established or collected in the Lebanese 
Republic except by a comprehensive law which applies to the entire Lebanese territory 
without exception. 
Article 82 [Rule of Law] 
No tax may be modified or abolished except by virtue of law. 
Article 83 (Yearly Budget] 
Each year at the beginning of the October session, the Government has to submit to the 
Chamber of Deputies the general budget estimates of state expenditures and revenues for 
the following year. The budget is voted upon article by article. 
Article 84 [Budget Discussion] 
During the discussion of the budget and draft laws involving the opening of supplementary 
or extraordinary credits, the Chamber may not increase the credits proposed in the budget 
or in the draft laws mentioned above either by way of amendment Or by means of a 
proposal. The Chamber may, however, adopt, by way of proposal, laws involving further 
expenditures after the close of this discussion. 
Article 85 [Extraordinary Credit] 
No extraordinary credit may be opened except by a special law. Nevertheless, should 
unforseen circumstances render urgent expenditures necessary, the President of the 
Republic may issue a Decree, based on a Decision of the Council or Ministers, to open 
extraordinary or supplementary credits or transfer appropriations in the budget as long as 
these credits do not exceed a maximum limit specified in the budget law. These measures 
are to be submitted to the Chamber for approval at the first ensuing session. 
Article 86 [Provisional Budget] 
If the Chamber of Deputies has not given a final decision on the budget estimates before the 
expiration of the session devoted to the examination of the budget, the President of the 
Republic, in coordination with the Prime Minister, immediately convenes the Chamber for 
an extraordinary session which lasts until the end of January in order to continue the 
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discussion of the budget; if,at the end of this extraordinary session, the budget estimates 
have not been finally settled, the Council of Ministers may take a decision on the basis of 
which a decree is issued by the President giving effect to the above estimates in the form in 
which they were submitted to the Chamber. However, the Council of Ministers may not 
exercise this right unless the budget estimates were submitted to the Chamber at least 
fifteen days before the commencement of its session. Nevertheless, during the said 
extraordinary session, taxes, charges, duties, imposts, and other kinds of revenues continue 
to be collected as before. The budget of the previous year is adopted as a basis. To this 
must be added the permanent credits which have been dropped, and the Government fixes 
the expenditures for the month of January on the basis of the 'provisional twelfth.' 
Article 87 [Final Financial Accounts, Auditing Bureau] 
The final financial accounts of the administration for each year must be submitted to the 
Chamber for approval before the promulgation of the budget of the year following. A 
special law is to be issued for the setting up of an Auditing Bureau. 
Article 88 [Public Loan] 
No public loan or undertaking involving an expenditure from the treasury funds may be 
contracted except by virtue of a law. 
Article 89 [Contracts, Concessions, Resources, Monpolies] 
No contract or concession for the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, or a 
public utility service, or a monopoly may be granted except by virtue of a law and for a 
limited period. 
[Part] E. Provisions Relating to the Mandatory Power and the Leage of Nations 
Article 90 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943) 
Article 91 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
Article 92 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
Article 93 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 94 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
[Part] F. On the Abolition of Political Confessionallsm 
Article 95 [National Committee] 
(1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims 
and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political 
confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee is to be formed, 
headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social 
figures. 
(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition 
of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers, and 
supervise the execution of the transitional plan. 
(3) During the transitional phase: 
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a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the 
formation of the Cabinet. 
b. The principle of confessional representation in public servicejobs, in the judiciary, in the 
military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies are to be cancelled in 
accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the 
principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents 
are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and 
Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying 
the principles of expertise and competence. 
[Part) G. Provisions Relating to the Election and Functions of the Senate 
Article 96 f...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 97 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 98 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 99 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947) 
Article 100 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
[Part] H. Additional Provisions 
Article 101 (Greater Lebanon, The Lebanese Republic) 
Beginning 1 Sep 1929, the state of 'Greater Lebanon' is to be known as 'The Lebanese 
Republic' without any other change or modification. 
Article 102 [Abrogation of Old Laws] 
All legislative provisions contrary to the present constitution are abrogated. 
Source: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/Ie00000_.html 
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APPENDIX— 2 
THE TA'IF ACCORD 
This accord, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in 
September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989. 
First, General Principles and Reforms: 
I. General Principles 
A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its 
citizens. 
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the 
Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member 
of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member 
of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all 
areas and spheres, without exception. 
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties,. 
especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights 
and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference. 
D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their 
sovereignty through the constitutional institutions. 
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private 
ownership. 
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's 
unity and of the system's-stability. 
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, 
and social reform. 
H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to 
live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may 
not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no 
fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]. 
I. No authority violating the common co-existance charter shall be legitimate 
li. Political Reforms 
A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which 
exercises full control over government policy and activities. 
1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the 
chamber's term. 
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the 
chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy 
speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition 
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submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber 
shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post. 
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is 
included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the 
grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill 
with the approval of the cabinet. 
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate. 
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of secterian restriction, 
the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases: 
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims. 
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect. 
c. Proportionately between the districts. 
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, 
shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the 
basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the 
proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency 
basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be 
formed. 
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not secterian, 
basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. 
The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues. 
B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of 
the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving 
Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of 
the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to 
the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers: 
1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting. 
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council. 
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the 
cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of depostion 
of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the 
adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning 
the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published. 
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the 
constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of 
Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination 
of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance 
with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned 
before the -end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be 
published. 
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies. 
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6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies 
speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which 
the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on. 
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently. 
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet. 
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and 
decrees relieving them from their duties. 
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state 
medals by decree. 
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing 
of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. 
The cabinet shall familiariaze the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the 
country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties 
involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties 
which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber 
of Deputies' approval. 
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies. 
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to 
hold special sessions by decree. 
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent 
issue beyond the agenda. 
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session 
whenever he deems it necessary. 
16. Grant special pardon by decree. 
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates 
the constitution or commits high treason. 
C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and 
speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the 
cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers: 
1. Head the cabinet. 
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the 
president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the 
Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The 
cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its 
resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of 
disposing of affairs. 
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies. 
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees 
accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired. 
OR 
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and 
requesting the reexamination of laws. 
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the 
republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues 
to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes. 
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, coordinate 
between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress 
of work. 
S. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the 
minister concerned. 
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman. 
D. Cabinet: 
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet. 
The following are among the powers exercised by it: 
1-Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, 
and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation. 
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the 
activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, 
and security departments and institutions. 
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces. 
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance 
with the law. 
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president 
of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special 
session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice 
consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the 
purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the 
same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance. 
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The 
cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a 
cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions 
by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a 
majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 
2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state 
of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international 
agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term 
development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, 
reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, 
the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of 
cabinet ministers. 
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E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the 
government's general policiy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister 
shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of 
Deputies withraws its confidence from him individually. 
F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers: 
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases: 
a. If its chairman resigns. 
b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree 
forming it. 
c. If its chairman dies. 
d. At the beginning of a president's term. 
e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term. 
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an 
initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence. 
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and 
the prime minister, with cabinet approval. 
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, 
by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is 
formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow. 
G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political secterianism is a fundamental 
national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a 
phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies electedon the basis of equal sharing by Christians 
and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a 
national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in 
addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, 
and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of 
abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and 
to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim 
period: 
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization 
in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in 
the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, 
excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by 
Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect. 
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card. 
III. Other Reforms 
A. Administrative Decentralism: 
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central 
authority. 
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2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded 
and all state administartions shall be represented in the administrative provinces at 
the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their 
needs locally. 
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes 
national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistance and unity 
of the soil, people, and institutions. 
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the 
smaller administrative units [ district and smaller units ] through the election of a 
council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation. 
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the 
provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the 
municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with 
the necessary financial resources. 
B. Courts: 
[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to 
insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one 
hand, and the givens of common coexistance and the basic rights of the Lebanese as 
stipulated in the constitution on the other hand: 
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to 
try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before 
this council shall be promulgated. 
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe 
the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from 
presidential and parliamentary elections. 
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in 
matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the 
constitutionality of the laws: 
a. The president of the republic. 
b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker. 
C. The prime minister. 
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies. 
[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the 
Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to: 
1. Personal status affairs. 
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites. 
3. Freedom of religious education. 
[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council 
shall be elected by the judiciary body. 
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D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a 
new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common 
coexistance between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political 
representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after 
reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and 
the institutions. 
E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council shall be 
created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the 
state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals. 
F. Education: 
1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary 
stage at least. 
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws 
and regulations. 
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and 
textbooks shall be strengthened. 
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, 
and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and 
reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed 
and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges. 
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens 
national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks 
on the subjects of history and national education. 
G. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law 
and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and 
the objective of ending the state of war. 
Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories: 
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state 
founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a 
detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon 
over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the 
plan shall be as follows: 
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' 
weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning 
with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be 
elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be 
approved constitutionally. 
B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through: 
1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning 
the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the 
governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses. 
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2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure 
of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea. 
C. Strengthening the armed forces: 
1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if 
necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the 
internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own. 
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in 
preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet. 
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be 
able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression. 
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, 
the armed forces shall return to their barracks. 
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives 
exclusively. 
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of 
every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be 
established. Legistlation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction 
shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its 
authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by 
the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, 
the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to 
spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, 
beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the 
republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms 
constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments--the Syrian Government 
and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces 
in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if 
necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. 
An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength 
and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define 
these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The 
Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop 
this agreement. 
Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation: 
Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized 
Lebanese borders requires the following: 
A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling 
for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation. 
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949. 
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli 
occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese 
army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of 
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the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdawl and to provide the 
opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area. 
Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations: 
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. 
Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the 
roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on 
which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be 
embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that 
accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty 
and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of 
security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed 
to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to 
constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, 
Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or 
organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for 
Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not 
permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty. 
Source: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm 
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APPENDIX— 3 
THE CAIRO AGREEMENT 
ON MONDAY, 3 d` November 1969 
The Cairo Agreement (1969) 
On Monday, 3rd November 1969, the Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander 
General Emile al-Bustani, and the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, headed by 
Mr. Yasir `Arafat, chairman of the organization, met in Cairo in the presence of the United 
Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Riyad, and the War Minister, General 
Muhammad Fawzi. 
In consonance with the bonds of brotherhood and common destiny, relations between 
Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution must always be conducted on the bases of 
confidence, frankness, and positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the 
Palestinian revolution and within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty and security, The 
two delegations agreed on the following principles and measures: 
The Palestinian Presence 
It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following bases; 
1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing in 
Lebanon; 
2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to care for the 
interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with the local Lebanese 
authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty; 
3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle [PASC] inside the camps for 
the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure good relations with the 
Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of regulating and determining 
the presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the 
interests of the Palestinian revolution; 
4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the Palestinian 
revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of the 
sovereignty and security of Lebanon. 
Commando Activity 
It was agreed to facilitate commando activity by means of: 
1. Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and 
reconnaissance in the border areas; 
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2. Safeguarding the road to the 'Arqub region; 
3. The Armed Struggle shall undertake to control the conduct of all the members of its 
organizations and [to ensure] their non-interference in Lebanese affairs; 
4. Establishing a joint command control of the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army; 
5. Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides; 
6. Conducting a census of Armed Struggle personnel in Lebanon by their command. 
7. Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese Army headquarters to participate 
in the resolution of all emergency matters; 
8. Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas which will 
be agreed with the Lebanese Army command; 
9. Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle personnel; 
10. Removal of the ilyrun base. 
11. The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and supply 
centers for commando activity; 
12. Releasing detained personnel and confiscated arms; 
13. It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall continue to 
exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all 
circumstances; 
14. The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of 
Lebanon as well as in that of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs; 
15. This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only. 
Head of Lebanese delegation 
Emile Bustani 
Head of Palestinian delegation 
Yasir 'Arafat 
Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 21 May 1987 
1. Abrogation of the law issued by the Chamber of Deputies on 14 June 1983, 
authorizing the Government to ratify the agreement signed by the Government of 
the Lebanese Republic and the Government of the State of Israel on 17 May 1983. 
288 
Z. The agreement signed on 3 November 1969 between the head of the Lebanese 
delegation General Emile Bustani and the Chairman of the PLO and which is known 
as the "Cairo Agreement" is hereby null and void as if it had never existed. Further, 
all annexes and measures related to the Cairo Agreement are hereby null and void as 
if they had never existed. 
3. This law will become effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette. 
Source:http://prrn.mcgili.ca/research/papers/brynen2_09.htm 
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APPENDIX-4 
Lebanon-Syria Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination 
May 20, 1991 
The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic on the basis of the distinguished 
brotherly relations between them which serve their strength from the roots of kinship 
history common affiliation common destiny and joint strategic interests; out of their belief 
that the achievement of the broadest cooperation and coordination between them will 
serve their strategic interests and provide the means for ensuring their development and 
progress and for defending their pan-Arab and national security be a source of prosperity 
and stability enable them to face all regional and international developments and meet the 
aspirations of peoples of the two countries; and in implementation of the Lebanese national 
accord which was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 5 November 1989 have 
agreed on the following: 
Articlel. The two states will work to achieve the highest level of cooperation and 
coordination in all political economic security cultural scientific and other fields in a 
manner that will realize the interests of the two fraternal countries within the framework of 
respect for their individual sovereignty and independence and will enable the two countries 
to use their political economic and security resources to provide prosperity and stability 
ensure their pan-Arab and national security and expand and strengthen their common 
interests as an affirmation of the brotherly relations and guarantee of their common 
destiny. 
Article2. The two states will work to achieve cooperation and coordination in the economic 
agricultural industrial and commercial fields as well as in the fields of transportation 
communications customs the establishment of joint profits and coordination of 
development plans. 
Article3. The connection between the security of the two countries requires that Lebanon 
not become a threat to Syria's security and vice versa under any circumstances. Therefore 
Lebanon will not allow itself to become a transit point or base for any force state or 
organization that seeks to undermine its security or that of Syria. Syria which cherishes 
Lebanon's security independence and unity and the agreement among its people will not 
allow any action that threatens Lebanon's security independence and sovereignty. , 
Article4. After the political reforms are approved in a constitutional manner as stipulated in 
the Lebanese national accord and after the deadlines specified in this accord have expired 
the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will decide on the redeployment of the Syrian forces 
in the al-Biqa' area and the entrance to western al-Biqa' in Dahr as-Baydar up to the 
Haammanah-al-Mudayri-'Any Dara line and if necessary in other points to be specified by a 
joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. The two governments will conclude an agreement 
specifying the size and duration of the Syrian forces' presence in these areas and the 
relationship of these forces with the authorities of the Lebanese state. 
Articles. The two states' Arab and international foreign policy shall be based on the 
following principles: 
290 
1. Lebanon and Syria are Arab states which are committed to the Arab League Charter the 
Arab defense pact and joint economic cooperation and all agreements ratified within the 
framework of the Arab League. They are members of the United Nations and are committed 
to its Charter. They are also members of the Non-aligned Movement. 
2. The two countries share a common destiny and common interests. 
3. Each country supports the other in issues related to its security and national interests in 
accordance of the contents of this treaty. Therefore the governments of the two countries 
shall coordinate their Arab and international policies cooperate to the fullest extent possible 
in Arab and international institutions and organizations and coordinate their stands on 
regional and international issues. 
Article6. The following bodies shall be formed to achieve the goals of this treaty. Other 
bodies can be established by a decision from the Supreme Council. 
1. The Supreme Council: 
A. The supreme council will consist of the presidents of the two contracting countries and a 
number of other members from both countries. 
B. The supreme council will meet at least once a year and more often when necessary at a 
venue to be agreed upon. 
C. The supreme council charts the general policy for coordination and cooperation between 
the two states in the political economic security military and other fields. It also supervises 
the implementation of this policy and adopts the plans and decisions that are made by the 
executive body the foreign affairs committee the economic and social affairs committee 
the defense and security affairs committee or any committee that is established in the 
future provided that the constitutional provisions of the two countries are respected. 
D. The supreme council's decisions are binding and effective within the framework of the 
constitutional laws and rules of the two countries except for those decisions which require 
the approval of the executive or legislative authorities in the two countries under their 
constitutional provisions. 
E. The supreme council defines the subjects on which the committees concerned have the 
right to make decisions. Once they are issued these decisions assume an executive nature 
within the framework of the constitutional laws and rules of the two countries except for 
those decisions which require the approval of the executive or legislative authorities in the 
two countries under their constitutional provisions. 
2. The Executive Body: 
The executive body will consist of the prime ministers of the two countries and a number of 
ministers concerned with the relations between them. This body will assume the following 
tasks: 
A. To follow up on the implementation of the decisions and to submit reports to the 
supreme council on the phases of implementation. 
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B. To coordinate the recommendations and decisions of the specialized committees and to 
submit the proposals to the supreme council. 
C. To hold meetings with the specialized committees whenever the need arises. 
D. The executive body will meet at least once every six months and more often when 
necessary at a venue to be agreed upon. 
3. The Foreign Affairs Committee: 
A. The.foreign affairs committee will consist of the two countries' foreign ministers. 
B. The foreign affairs committee will meet at least once every two months and more often 
when necessary in the two countries' capitals on a rotating basis. 
C. The foreign affairs committee will seek to coordinate the foreign policy of the two 
countries with regard to their relations with all countries. The committee will work to 
coordinate their activities and stands at Arab and international organizations. The relevant 
plans will be drawn up and submitted to the supreme council. 
4. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee: 
A. The economic and social affairs committee will consist of the ministers concerned in the 
two countries in economic and social sectors. 
B. The economic and social affairs committee will meet in the two countries' capitals on a 
rotating basis at least once every two months and more often when necessary. 
C. The economic and social affairs committee will be responsible for working to attain 
economic and social coordination between the two countries and for drawing up the 
recommendations that will lead to such coordination. 
D. The recommendations adopted by the economic and social affairs committee will take 
effect after they have been endorsed by the supreme council in accordance with the 
constitutional provisions of the two countries. 
5. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee: 
A. The defense and security affairs committee will consist of the two countries' ministers of 
defense and interior. 
B. The defense and security affairs committee will be responsible for studying the adequate 
measures needed - to safeguard the two countries' security and for suggesting joint 
measures to confront any aggression or threat endangering their national security or any 
unrest that may disturb their internal security. 
C. All plans recommendations and measures prepared by the defense and security affairs 
committee will be submitted to the supreme council for endorsement after taking into 
consideration the constitutional rules of the two countries. 
6. The General Secretariat: 
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A. A general secretariat will be created to follow up on the implementation of the 
provisions of this treaty. 
B. The general secretariat will be headed by a secretary general who will be appointed by 
the supreme council. 
C. The headquarters specialization basis and budget of the general secretariat will be 
determined by the supreme council. 
Closing Provisions: 
A. Special agreements shall be concluded between the two countries in the fields covered 
by this treaty such as the economic security defense and other fields in accordance with 
the constitutional rules in each of the two countries and shall complement this treaty. 
B. This treaty shall take effect after being ratified by the authorities of the two countries in 
accordance with their constitutional provisions. 
C. Each of the two countries will abrogate any law or regulation which is not in line with this 
treaty. Such abrogation will be done in a way that does not violate any constitutional 
provision in either country. 
Source:http://www.bestin lebanon.com/leba non_info/lebanon_syria_brotherhood_treaty.a 
sp 
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